Vidrine v. Ctr. for the Performing Arts at the Woodlands
| Decision Date | 19 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 09-12-00378-CV,09-12-00378-CV |
| Parties | ANDREA L. VIDRINE, Appellant v. THE CENTER FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS AT THE WOODLANDS D/B/A CYNTHIA WOODS MITCHELL PAVILLION AND THE WOODLANDS LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.P., Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Andrea L. Vidrine brought suit against the Center for the Performing Arts at the Woodlands d/b/a Cynthia Woods Mitchell Pavilion ("the Pavilion") and the Woodlands Land Development Company ("Woodlands") after she tripped and fell on stairs after leaving a concert at the Pavilion. Vidrine appeals the trial court'sorder granting summary judgment in favor of the Pavilion and Woodlands. We affirm the orders of the trial court.
Vidrine was injured when she fell down a set of steps along the Woodlands Waterway ("the Waterway") after leaving a concert at the Pavilion. At the time of the injury Vidrine was headed to her car, which was parked in a lot across from the Waterway. Vidrine filed suit against the Pavilion and Woodlands alleging that she was injured as a result of a dangerous condition. Vidrine specifically alleged that the stairs on which the accident occurred were not properly lit. Vidrine alleged that the Pavilion and Woodlands "negligently permitted the stairs to be unlit and/or improperly lit, negligently or willfully allowed such condition . . . and negligently or willfully failed to warn [her] of the condition[.]" Vidrine generally pleaded a cause of action for negligence asserting, among other things, that the Pavilion and Woodlands failed to maintain the stairs in a reasonably safe condition, failed to warn her of the dangerous condition, and failed to provide adequate lighting of the area in question. The Pavilion and Woodlands both filed hybrid motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted in favor of both parties against Vidrine. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the moving party must prove that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion[.]" Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we must (1) place the burden of showing there is no issue of material fact on the movant; (2) take all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true; and (3) indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005); Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49; see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). "A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action is entitled to summary judgment." Little v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a directed verdict granted before trial, to which we apply a legal-sufficiency standard of review. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003). In general, a defendant seeking a no-evidence summary judgment must assert that noevidence exists as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's claims on which the plaintiff would have the burden of proof at trial. Mathis v. RKL Design/Build, 189 S.W.3d 839, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). With the filing of the motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant. See Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must present "more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact." Id. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence allows reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence does "'no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion.'" King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). When, as here, the trial court does not specify the grounds upon which it ruled, the summary judgment may be affirmed on any of the movant's theories that has merit. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996).
Woodlands filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Woodlands presented undisputed evidence that Woodlands Waterway is a linear park on private land, owned by Woodlands, as a private landowner. It alsopresented undisputed evidence that Woodlands Waterway is open to the public and used for a variety of recreational purposes, including: walking, jogging, exercising pets, playing Frisbee, listening to music, enjoying nature, hosting various athletic events, sightseeing, kayaking, and canoeing. As one ground in its traditional motion for summary judgment, Woodlands argued that it could only be held liable to Vidrine for gross negligence. In support of this argument, Woodlands relied on the Recreational Use Statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 75.001-.007 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). (Recreational Use Statute).
"The recreational use statute recognizes that landowners or occupiers, who open their property to the public for recreational purposes, provide a public benefit." Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn, 228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007). To encourage this use, the statute limits the liability of property owners who give permission to the public to enter the premises for recreation. Id.; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 75.002(c); State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). The statute "absolves property owners of liability for injuries to others using the property for recreation so long as the property owner does not engage in grossly negligent conduct or act with malicious intent or in bad faith." City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611, 612 (Tex. 2002). The Statute states in pertinent part:
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 75.002(c).
Woodlands argued that pursuant to the statute, Vidrine had the legal status of a trespasser and could only recover from Woodlands for gross negligence, malice, or bad faith. See id. § 75.002(c)(2). In its no-evidence motion, Woodlands argued that there was no evidence Woodlands owed Vidrine a duty to remedy the condition, no evidence Woodlands committed gross negligence, no evidence that Woodlands willfully or wantonly injured Vidrine, and no evidence that Woodlands acted with malicious intent or bad faith towards Vidrine. In her response, Vidrine argued that the Recreational Use Statute did not apply to exempt Woodlands from liability for general negligence. On appeal, Vidrine argues that the trial court erred in granting Woodlands' motion for summary judgment because she was using the Waterway solely as a method of ingress and egress between the concert at the Pavilion and its parking lot, and not for recreation.
In determining whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, we must first determine whether the Recreational Use Statute applies. If it does, the statute limits Woodlands's liability by raising Vidrine's burden of proof to that of gross negligence, malicious intent, or bad faith. See Flynn, 228 S.W.3d at 659 (citing Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 285-87). The Statute provides a non-exclusive list of activities that are considered "recreation[,]" including: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, cave exploration, water sports, bicycling and mountain biking, disc golf, dog walking, radio control flying, and "any other activity associated with enjoying nature or the outdoors." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 75.001(3). Vidrine argues that her "use of the Waterway was only for ingress and egress between [t]he Pavilion and the parking lot" and "getting to one's car is not 'enjoying nature or the outdoors.'" Woodlands contends that Vidrine was walking along the Waterway, "and walking is a form of recreation."
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that a person's intent upon entering the premises is not controlling. Torres, 89 S.W.3d at 614. "It is what she was doing when she was injured that controls[]" the determination. Id. In support of its assertion that Vidrine was recreating on the premises, Woodlands cites cases inwhich individuals were injured while walking in a park, including City of Austin v. Saverse, No. 03-11-00330-CV, 2011 WL 4507268, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 30, 2011, pet. denied) and Russell v. City of Fort Worth, No. 2-05-191-CV, 2006 WL 1351485, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 18, 2006, pet. denied).1 However in both Saverse and Russell, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they were engaged in recreation on the premises at the time of their injuries. See Russell, 2006 WL 1351485, at *3 n.2 (); Saverse, 2011 WL 4507268, at *1 (...
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