Vieux v. County of Alameda
| Decision Date | 29 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C-85-3394 WHO.,C-85-3394 WHO. |
| Citation | 695 F. Supp. 1023 |
| Parties | Robert A. VIEUX, Winifred J. Vieux, Donald J. Vieux, Trustee of the Estate of Carl Zwissig, Ralph F. Pombo, Gordon Griffith, Marianne Griffith, Kathleen Brockman, Nancy Burr, Miguel Franco, M.E. Franco, Joseph J. Jess, Connie L. Jess, Paul Marciel, Don Scullion, Trustee of the Greeley Estate, Agnes Martin, Doris E. House, DePaoli Equipment, Inc., a California corporation, Ray A. Petersen, Deborah Petersen, Ferrari Bros., a partnership, Rancho Arroyo de la Alameda, a general partnership, Helen I. Andrade, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, a political subdivision of the State of California, Southern Pacific Transportation Company, a Delaware corporation, Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Robert T. Knox, John George, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Joseph M. Gughemetti, A Professional Corp., San Mateo, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Richard J. Moore, County Counsel, County of Alameda, Oakland, Cal., Lynn H. Pasahow, Rochelle Souza, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, Cal., for County of Alameda, Southern Pacific Transp. Co., Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp., Robert T. Knox and John George.
The major question considered in this action is whether plaintiff landowners become entitled to reversionary land interests in abandoned railroad rights-of-way. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that they do not.
Plaintiffs are twenty-one landowners, or executors or trustees of landowners, challenging the transfer by Southern Pacific Transportation Company ("Southern Pacific") to the County of Alameda (the "County") of certain railroad rights-of-way located in two separate areas known as Niles Canyon Road (9.7 miles long) and the Altamont Pass (11 miles long), both within the County. They represent the overwhelming majority of all owners of land adjoining or underlying the rights-of-way in those two areas.
Defendants include the County, Southern Pacific, Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corporation ("Santa Fe"), and County Supervisors Robert T. Knox and John George ("Supervisors").
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleges violations of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (1981), the Public Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 912 (1986), and the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1962). The complaint seeks damages under the federal Civil Rights Act as well as declaratory relief under all of the aforementioned acts. Moreover, plaintiffs request a writ of mandate pursuant to §§ 1094.5 (1987) and 1085 (1980) of the California Code of Civil Procedure; a declaration of quiet title under the federal Public Lands Act and California law; damages against the Supervisors for waste of, and injury to, taxpayers' assets, property, and funds under § 526a of the California Code of Civil Procedure (1979); declaratory and injunctive relief; and attorneys' fees pursuant to the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981), and § 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure (1980).
Prior to trial, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' § 1985 claim as to all defendants except the County, and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. Before trial, plaintiffs conceded that their claim under the Cable Communications Act of 1934 was no longer applicable.
Therefore, the following claims for relief remained prior to trial: (1) the federal Civil Rights Act; (2) the Public Lands Act; (3) the quiet title action; (4) the taxpayers' suit; and (5) declaratory and injunctive relief.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is the allegation that plaintiffs became entitled to reversionary land interests in the rights-of-way when, on September 13, 1982, the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") approved Southern Pacific's "Notice of Exemption" for a relocation project under which Southern Pacific would abandon its line, and within one year thereafter the rights-of-way were not embraced in a public highway, pursuant to § 912 of the Public Lands Act. 43 U.S.C. § 912.
Defendants argue that, inter alia, no reversionary land interest in favor of plaintiffs ever vested because the ICC's aforementioned approval did not constitute a decree of abandonment of the rights-of-way by a court of competent jurisdiction or by act of Congress, as required under the Public Lands Act. Moreover, defendants contend, even if Congress delegated to the ICC its authority to decree or declare abandonment, the ICC never so decreed or declared as to the rights-of-way in question.
The issues are simple to state but difficult to resolve. The Court considers first the threshold question of whether an abandonment of the Niles Canyon Road and Altamont Pass rights-of-way has actually occurred.
At the outset, the Court notes that while the rights-of-way were embraced in a public highway legally established, there has been no decree or declaration of abandonment by a court of competent jurisdiction or congressional act. Therefore, neither the exception nor the rule set forth in § 912 of the Public Lands Act applies, and plaintiffs are not entitled to any reversionary right, title, interest, or estate in the rights-of-way.
The Court previously ruled that § 912 applies with full force to land grants from Congress to the railroads of the type involved here.
Section 912 provides in pertinent part that:
Whenever public lands of the United States have been or may be granted to any railroad company for use as a right of way for its railroad ... and use and occupancy of said lands for such purposes has ceased or shall hereafter cease, whether by forfeiture or by abandonment by said railroad company declared or decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction or by Act of Congress, then and thereupon all right, title, interest, and estate of the United States in said lands shall, except such part thereof as may be embraced in a public highway legally established within one year after the date of said decree or forfeiture or abandonment be transferred to and vested in whomsoever shall lawfully hold title to the underlying land, or have obtained the interest of the United States' title in such land....
43 U.S.C. § 912.
For plaintiffs to prevail under § 912, the evidence must show that (1) Southern Pacific's use and occupancy of the rights-of-way for railroad purposes has ceased by forfeiture or by abandonment decreed or declared by a court or congressional act, and (2) the rights-of-way have not been embraced in a public highway legally established within one year of the aforementioned decree or declaration of forfeiture or abandonment.
The Court will first address the question of whether the rights-of-way were ever embraced in a public highway legally established.
What constitutes a "highway" for purposes of the federal land grant statutes, i.e., § 912, is a question of state law. See Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir.1974).
Plaintiffs contend that the rights-of-way were not embraced in a public highway legally established because the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), were not satisfied. Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 21000 et seq. (1986). Defendants respond that the rights-of-way were embraced in a public highway legally established under both California common law and statutory law.
California common law provides that where a county has been granted a right-of-way to be used for and devoted to the purposes only of a county road, the act of acceptance of the grant upon the part of the grantee county operates ipso facto to establish the right-of-way as a highway of the county. Watson v. Greely, 69 Cal.App. 643, 649, 232 P. 475 (1924). Moreover, state law holds that the grant and acceptance of the right-of-way constitutes a dedication of the strip to county road purposes. Id. No improvement of rights-of-way by a county is necessary to make them a highway. Venice v. Short Line Beach Land Co., 180 Cal. 447, 181 P. 658 (1919).
Southern Pacific agreed to quitclaim the rights-of-way at issue to the County on April 23, 1985, with the County's agreement that it would place the rights-of-way "into the County's highway system to be used for highway and/or transportation related facilities purposes thereafter." Plaintiffs' Trial Exh. No. 56 and Defendants' Trial Exh. No. B (Southern Pacific/County Agreement) at 1, ¶ 1.
On April 23, 1985, the County "accepted" Southern Pacific's rights-of-way; "declared" the rights-of-way "to be part of the County System of Highways"; and "designated" the Altamont rights-of-way to be "a part of the Altamont Pass Transportation Corridor and/or County Road No. 8110," and the Niles Canyon rights-of-way to be "a part of Niles Canyon Transportation Corridor and/or County Road No. 8111." Defendants' Trial Exh. Nos. H and I, respectively (County Board Resolutions).
Based upon the foregoing evidence, Southern Pacific's grant of its rights-of-way to the County and the County's acceptance of them constituted an ipso facto establishment of a highway under California common law. Watson, supra.
CEQA, on the other hand, requires that an Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") be prepared where the environment may be significantly affected by (1) an "intended" project, California Public Resources Code § 21151, or (2) a "proposed" project, id. at 21100. No EIR is required where it cannot be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that a project may have significant environmental impact. See Perley v. Board of Supervisors of Calaveras County, 137 Cal.App.3d 424, 433 n. 4, 187 Cal.Rptr. 53 (1982).
A Negative Declaration was prepared in connection with the intended acquisition of Southern Pacific's rights-of-way and the incorporation of those rights-of-way into the County's highway system — not in connection with the establishment of a highway as a highway. Plaintiffs' Trial Exh. No. 69; ...
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