Vigliotti v. K-mart Corp., K-MART

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: KAHN
• Citation: 680 So.2d 466
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D654, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D957 Rose VIGLIOTTI, Appellant, v.CORPORATION and KM Administrative Service, Appellees.
• Decision Date: 13 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1795,K-MART

Page 466

680 So.2d 466 21 Fla. L. Weekly D654, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D957 Rose VIGLIOTTI, Appellant,
v.
K-MART CORPORATION and KM Administrative Service, Appellees. No. 95-1795. District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District. March 13, 1996.

Page 467

Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for appellant.

Robert L. Teitler of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson, Miami, for appellees.

KAHN, Judge.

In this workers' compensation case, Rose Vigliotti seeks review of an order denying compensability for her injury. Vigliotti worked as a door greeter for the employer, K-mart Corporation. On June 20, 1994, after she clocked out, but before she left the K-mart store, Vigliotti slipped on something on the floor and fell, injuring her left wrist and left hip. At the time of her fall, Vigliotti was walking toward the front of the store on the path designated by the employer for employees to use on their way in and out of the store.

Vigliotti sought payment for medical bills incurred as a result of her accident as well as indemnity benefits. The employer and carrier, KM Administrative Service, controverted the claim, and a hearing took place before the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC). In the order entered April 18, 1995, the JCC construed section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), a new statute defining "arising out of," and denied the claim based on his determination that Vigliotti was not performing work at the time of her accident. Because the JCC misapplied the statute, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides:

"Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation. An accidental injury or death arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death.

Appellees assert that the language of this new statutory definition is clear and the Legislature intended to narrow the scope of compensable injuries by now requiring some significant causal link between an employee's actual work function and the injury, i.e., the "work performed" must be the "major contributing cause" of the injury. Accordingly, appellees maintain that because Vigliotti was not literally performing work at the time of her fall, her injury did not arise out of her employment. The parties recognize, as did the JCC, that this construction would result in claimants, such as Vigliotti, bringing suit in tort against their employers for injuries they have suffered during working hours, while they are on the employers' premises, but when they are not literally performing work. We see nothing, however, in the extensive revisions to the Workers' Compensation Law to indicate the Legislature intended to broaden tort liability of employers in this fashion as a solution to the workers' compensation crisis. See, e.g., § 440.015, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994).

We have considered carefully K-Mart's contention that the phrase "work performed" must be construed to include only actual performance of primary job duties by an employee. As previously noted, this construction would broaden the potential tort liability for every employer in Florida. Moreover, this construction would contravene the legislative intent to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker by an efficient and self-executing system. § 440.015, Fla.Stat. Indeed, K-Mart's construction would lead to expensive and time consuming judicial inquiry in a broad range of cases that are now undoubtedly handled administratively without the intervention of attorneys....