Vigneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7757

• Decision Date: 03 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 7757,7757
• Citation: 118 N.H. 75,382 A.2d 910
• Parties: Maria VIGNEAULT v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY and National Grange Insurance Company.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 910

382 A.2d 910

118 N.H. 75

Maria VIGNEAULT v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY and National Grange Insurance Company.

No. 7757.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Feb. 3, 1978.

Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Kohls, Manchester (James S. Yakovakis, Manchester, orally), for plaintiff.

Brown & Nixon, Manchester (Vincent F. Dooley, Manchester, orally), for The Travelers Insurance Co.

Wiggin & Nourie, Manchester (Gordon A. Rehnborg, Jr., Manchester, orally), for National Grange Insurance Co. DOUGLAS, Justice.

The issue in this uninsured motorist case is whether the language of General Notice G-642 of the Massachusetts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau (issued June 27, 1973) automatically increases the extraterritorial liability coverage of a Massachusetts driver to levels required by the New Hampshire Financial Responsibility Act, RSA ch. 268, as amended, (Supp.1975). We hold that it does not.

The plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident, was injured in New Hampshire when the automobile in which she was riding collided with another driven by Kenneth Larson, a resident of Massachusetts. Defendant National Grange Insurance Company had issued a policy on the car in which plaintiff was riding. The policy contained uninsured motorist protection of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per occurrence, on which National Grange admits liability to the extent that the plaintiff cannot collect her damages from Larson's insurer, Travelers Insurance Company. See American Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 210, 357 A.2d 873 (1976). Larson's policy was issued in Massachusetts. It contained extraterritorial coverage of $5,000/$10,000 and incorporated the language of General Notice G-642:

"If under the provisions of the motor vehicle financial responsibility law or the motor vehicle compulsory insurance law or any similar law of any state or province, a nonresident is required to maintain insurance with respect to the operation or use of a motor vehicle in such state or province and such insurance requirements are greater than the insurance provided by the policy, the limits of the company's liability and the kinds of coverage afforded by the policy shall be as set forth in such law, in lieu of the insurance otherwise provided by the policy, but only to the extent required by such law and only with respect to the operation or use of a motor vehicle in such state or province; provided that the insurance under this provision shall be reduced to the extent that there is other valid and collectible insurance under this or any other motor vehicle insurance policy. In no event shall any person be entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of loss."

According to the agreed statement of facts submitted to the Court (Loughlin, J.), the plaintiff's damages exceed the $5,000 coverage in Larson's policy. The court found that the quoted language did not increase that amount to the $20,000 provided in RSA 268:19 and that National Grange was liable "to a maximum of the limits of the New Hampshire Financial Responsibility Law . . . ." The case has been transferred here. We affirm the judgment on the effect of the Larson policy language, but vacate that part that defines the maximum payment that National Grange must make.

We believe that the court below focused on the correct language in the quoted provision when adjudicating the effect of the General Notice. By its terms the language of the General Notice raises the liability coverage only when a nonresident is required to maintain insurance. Although a nonresident must comply with this State's financial responsibility laws if he wishes to operate a motor vehicle here, RSA 268:14, those laws mandate compulsory insurance only for drivers who have committed specified offenses, RSA 268:3, or who have been involved in an accident, RSA 268:5 I. Prior to the occurrence that generated this litigation, Larson was involved in no accident or breach of law that would have required him to maintain insurance. Such insurance as he now must carry acts prospectively only, RSA 268:20; therefore, the language of the General Notice, on its face, does not raise the policy's liability limits.

Defendant National Grange, the sole proponent of the contrary result before this court, argues that the General Notice is sufficiently ambiguous so that we should interpret the Travelers' policy most favorably to the insured and allow her to recover. Under Massachusetts law, which governs the interpretation of this policy, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Coman, 106 N.H. 364, 365, 212 A.2d 703, 704 (1965); Hinchey v. Surety Company, 99 N.H. 373, 377, 111 A.2d 827, 830 (1955), when "language permits more than one rational interpretation, that most favorable to the insured is to be taken." Palmer v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 304, 306, 225 N.E.2d 331, 333 (1967); accord, Morin v. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., 365 Mass. 379, 390, 311 N.E.2d 914, 920 (1974). Although the language of the General Notice that is incorporated in the policy itself does not admit of more than one rational interpretation, National Grange points to other language contained in the General Notice:

"In the event that evidence of financial responsibility is required because of a motor vehicle accident, the policy shall be construed to have the necessary limits of the state involved and no charge shall be made for any filing required.

In the event that a filing for the future must be made (e. g. driving under the influence), the policy shall be construed as to affording the required limits but a charge shall be made for increasing the limits as has been done in the past."

National Grange argues that the first paragraph increases coverage retroactively whenever a filing of proof of financial responsibility is required following an accident, despite the otherwise unambiguous language of the General Notice. It buttresses that argument by alluding to the distinction made between filing for a past accident and filing for the future because of an illegal action. That distinction is reflected in the New Hampshire statute. Compare RSA 268:5 I with RSA 268:3. The Travelers' policy, however,...