Vilar v. Fenton, No. 18537

• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: BROTHERTON
• Citation: 181 W.Va. 299,382 S.E.2d 352
• Parties: Geraldine M. VILAR, Charles G. Curry, and Charles E. Curry v. Margaret M. FENTON, as Executrix of the Purported Will of Wiley V. Curry, and Margaret M. Fenton.
• Decision Date: 05 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 18537

Page 352

382 S.E.2d 352 181 W.Va. 299 Geraldine M. VILAR, Charles G. Curry, and Charles E. Curry
v.
Margaret M. FENTON, as Executrix of the Purported Will of
Wiley V. Curry, and Margaret M. Fenton. No. 18537. Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia. July 5, 1989. Syllabus by the Court

Prior to the entry of the verdict by a jury, a mistrial is procedurally possible; however, declaring a mistrial after the jury verdict is rendered is improper.

Gregory T. Hinton, Fairmont, for Vilar and Curry.

Frank V. Sansalone, Fairmont, for Margaret M. Fenton.

BROTHERTON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a final order, entered September 17, 1987, of the Circuit Court of Marion County. In that order the trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial and recused himself from the case. The appellants argue that the trial judge erred by declaring a mistrial when he disqualified himself from presiding further over the case. We agree; therefore, we reverse.

On June 4, 1980, Wiley Curry executed a will that named Margaret Fenton, the appellee, as his executrix and sole beneficiary. That same day, Mr. Curry executed a written power of attorney to allow the appellee to conduct his affairs. After Mr. Curry's death, the appellants filed this action against Ms. Fenton. The appellants [181 W.Va. 300] alleged that the decedent's will and the power of attorney were invalid. After a two-day trial, a jury found the will invalid.

The appellee filed a motion for a new trial. See W.Va.R.Civ.P. 59. At a hearing on September 17, 1987, counsel for the appellants reported to the court that the appellants were related to a person who had filed an ethics complaint against the trial judge several years earlier. ¹ The trial

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judge sua sponte declared a mistrial, recused himself from the case, and transferred further proceedings to another circuit judge.

Initially, the trial court erred by declaring a mistrial after the jury had rendered a verdict. The traditional distinction between a mistrial and a new trial is set out in 66 C.J.S. New Trial 1(c) (1962):

A mistrial and a new trial are not the same thing in name or effect. There is a marked difference between a court's granting a motion for a new trial and declaring a mistrial; the former contemplates that a case has been tried, a judgment rendered, and on motion therefor said judgment set aside and a new trial granted, while the latter results where, before a trial is completed and judgment rendered, the trial court concludes that there is some error or irregularity that prevents a proper judgment being rendered, in which event a mistrial may be declared. A mistrial is a matter of law, while a new trial results from the exercise of discretion; a mistrial is a nugatory trial, while a new trial recognizes a completed trial which for sufficient reasons has been set aside so that the issues may be tried or litigated de novo. ²

Consequently, it is generally recognized that prior to the entry of the verdict by a jury, a mistrial is procedurally possible; however, declaring a mistrial after the jury verdict is rendered is improper. ³ The Illinois court has aptly summarized this point in Williams v. Deasel, 19 Ill.App.3d 353, 311 N.E.2d 414 at 415 (1974):

A motion for a mistrial is a procedural tool whetted and honed for use during the trial to cut it short for legal reasons which preclude a verdict and entering a judgment that cannot possibly stand. It can therefore be utilized only as a pre-verdict motion and not a post-verdict...