Viles v. City of Waltham

• Decision Date: 05 January 1892
• Citation: 157 Mass. 542,32 N.E. 901
• Parties: VILES v. CITY OF WALTHAM.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

157 Mass. 542

32 N.E. 901

VILES v. CITY OF WALTHAM.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

January 5, 1892

COUNSEL

Elder & Wait, for plaintiff.

C.M Ludden, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON, J.

The question at issue is whether the domicile of the plaintiff was in Waltham on May 1, 1890, and the only exceptions relate to the introduction of evidence bearing on that issue. There was no dispute at the trial that his domicile was in Waltham until April 28, 1890, when he started for Chicago, arriving there the following day. It was also in evidence that he afterwards dwelt in Chicago, and had his principal place of business there. To acquire a domicile there must be a residence in a place, and an intention to make that place one's home. To maintain his suit the plaintiff was required not only to prove that he took up his abode in Chicago, but also that he did it with the intention of giving up his home in Waltham, and acquiring a home in Chicago. The change in his place of abode might be temporary or permanent. It might indicate a change of domicile or not according to the circumstances attending it. Declarations of a person, accompanying a change of his abiding place, have always been held competent to explain the change as a part of the res gestae; but declarations in such cases are often admissible on a broader ground than as a part of the act of removing from one place to another. The intention of the person removing is competent to be proved as an independent fact, and anything which tends to show his intention in making the change may be introduced if it is free from objection in other particulars. The intention may be inferred from acts and conduct, and conduct which tends to show the intention is competent for that purpose. Declarations which indicate the state of mind of the declarant naturally have a legitimate tendency to show intention. Com. v. Trefethen, 156 Mass. ----, 31 N.E. 961. But, on grounds of public policy, declarations in one's own favor by a party to a suit are not ordinarily received in evidence. In the first place, so far as they purport to be a mere narrative of past events they are not primarily an expression of present feeling, but a recital of what has been, which, for its value, depends upon the truthfulness of the speaker. Secondly. Declarations of a purpose or intention, or of a feeling, made after the beginning of a controversy to which they relate, are naturally so affected by interest as to be untrustworthy, and for that reason they should not be received. This rule, however, does not go so far as to exclude expressions of pain, or other indications of one's mental or physical condition that may be treated as symptoms, which often are valuable evidence of a condition of body or mind. Thirdly. The danger that declarations may have been made for a purpose, when they are sought to be introduced as evidence in favor of the person making them, has led to the exclusion of them, even on the issue of what was the intention or state of mind of the declarant, unless they are made under such circumstances as to give them some corroboration. In general, such corroboration is found in the fact that they accompany and explain acts which of themselves would be competent evidence on the issue involved. They are then admissible as a part of the res gestae. When one has changed his place of abode, and the question arises whether he intended to change his domicile,...