Viles v. Sharp, 15384-1.
Citation | 248 F. Supp. 271 |
Decision Date | 20 May 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 15384-1.,15384-1. |
Parties | William B. VILES, Plaintiff, v. John R. SHARP and Michael F. Brosnahan, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Wurdack & Wurdack, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
Alder & Morrison, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Sharp.
John A. Borron, Jr., of Knipmeyer, McCann & Millett, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Brosnahan.
This case pends on plaintiff's motion to remand and defendant Brosnahan's motion to dismiss or sever the claims. The petition filed in the State court alleged that defendants Sharp and Brosnahan are equally liable to plaintiff for injuries resulting from an accident involving defendant Brosnahan on May 23, 1963, and defendant Sharp on December 14, 1963. Defendant Sharp, a resident of Kansas, removed the case to this Court, alleging the following ground:
Defendant Sharp reiterates his theory that the joinder is "improper" in the suggestions in opposition to plaintiff's motion to remand to the State court.
Section 1441 of Title 28, United States Code, which provides for removal of actions generally, has never been interpreted by the cases to allow removal on the basis of "improper" joinder. It is well accepted that "fraudulent" joinder is a basis for removal, but the distinction between "fraudulent" and "improper" is important. As Judge Murrah has stated:
McLeod v. Cities Service Gas Company, 10 Cir. 1956, 233 F.2d 242.
The removing defendant in this case "frankly admits that the intent of plaintiff is difficult to prove;" indeed, the removing defendant would have us infer that a fraudulent joinder, within the meaning of the removal statute, is to be inferred solely from the fact that it is the removing defendant's view of the Missouri law that "the two separate claims of plaintiff cannot be lodged against two separate defendants, arising out of two separate occurrences, involving separate questions of law and fact, in one suit."
The removing defendant contends that "the intent or purpose for which improper joinder was made is immaterial." Professor Moore makes clear that such a statement is true in a sense quite different from that suggested by the removing defendant. On pages 532-533 of Paragraph 0.1612 of Volume 1A of Moore's Federal Practice, it is stated:
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...having ruled upon such motions, they were properly ruled on by the state court without 'refiling' in the state court. Viles v. Sharp (W.D.Mo.1965), 248 F.Supp. 271. See Ayres v. Wiswall (1884), 112 U.S. 187, 5 S.Ct. 90, 28 L.Ed. 693; Ransom v. Sipple Truck Lines, Inc. (N.D.Iowa 1943), 52 F.......
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...Ins. Co., W.D.Mo.1963, 220 F.Supp. 222; Gustaveson Inc. v. Graybar Electric Co., W.D.Mo.1963, 222 F.Supp. 473; and Viles v. Sharp and Brosnahan, W.D.Mo.1965, 248 F.Supp. 271. The latter case involved a factual situation not dissimilar from that involved in this An application of the rules o......
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Fischer v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
...W.D.Mo.1963, 220 F.Supp. 222; Gustaveson Inc. v. Graybar Electric Co., W.D.Mo.1963, 222 F.Supp. 473; and Viles v. Sharp and Brosnahan, W.D. Mo.1965, No. 15384-1 248 F.Supp. 271, * * * The cases cited merely illustrate the consistent application of the construction placed on § 1441(c) by Fin......
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Drost Equipment, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 85-126-B.
...to not have had a cause of action against a defendant does not in itself demonstrate that he was joined in bad faith. Viles v. Sharp, 248 F.Supp. 271, 272 (W.D.Mo.1965). Similarly, mere improper joinder is not grounds for removal. Id. Defendant Ford Motor Company's conclusory statements in ......