Vill. of Bolingbrook v. Ill.-Am. Water Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 2019
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 3-17-0478
• Citation: 145 N.E.3d 561,438 Ill.Dec. 25,2019 IL App (3d) 170478
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF BOLINGBROOK, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and American Lake Water Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (3d) 170478

145 N.E.3d 561

438 Ill.Dec. 25

The VILLAGE OF BOLINGBROOK, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and American Lake Water Company, an Illinois Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal No. 3-17-0478

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Opinion filed November 13, 2019

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiff, the Village of Bolingbrook (Village), filed a breach of contract claim against the defendants, Illinois-American Water Company and American Lake Water Company. Following an appeal to this court, in which this court held the circuit court of Will County did not have subject-matter jurisdiction and vacated the circuit court's rulings ( Village of Bolingbrook v. Illinois-American Water Co. , 2016 IL App (3d) 150425-U, 2016 IL App 3d 150426, 2016 WL 3127514 ), the plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its claim pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2016) ). The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion. Defendants appeal, arguing the trial court did not have the authority or jurisdiction to enter an order granting the voluntary dismissal.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On November 2, 2010, the Village filed a breach of contract claim against defendants in the circuit court of Will County. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the complaint was insufficient to state a claim and that the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the Village's claim so that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. On April 5, 2011, the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The parties filed motions for summary judgment, with defendants again arguing the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the Village's claim. On January 7, 2015, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village in part, finding defendants were in breach of the parties' water delivery contract from 2004 through 2008. On February 5, 2015, defendants motioned the trial court to reconsider its ruling, again arguing, among other things, that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction and the trial court had no authority to enter the order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Village. On May 7, 2015, the trial court entered a written order indicating that defendant's motion to reconsider was "granted in part and denied in part for the reasons stated in open court on May 7, 2015 (at 10:00) with a written order to follow." The trial court denied the motion to reconsider in regard to its finding of a breach of contract but found that the amount of the Village's damages should be determined by the ICC. On May 19, 2015, the trial court entered a four-page written "ruling on motion to reconsider," indicating its finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether a breach of contract had occurred was to stand but the issue of damages should be presented by the parties to the ICC.

¶ 4 The Village appealed to this court, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that its damages should be adjudicated before the ICC. Defendants also appealed to this court, arguing the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claim because the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the entirety of the claim. Specifically, defendants indicated on the notice of appeal that they were appealing from the order entered on May 19, 2015, and "all prior opinions, orders, and rulings subsumed therein, including those addressing jurisdiction." The defendants also stated in the notice of appeal that they were requesting a reversal, or partial reversal, of the trial court's January 7, February 5, and May 19, 2015, rulings. This court found that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the Village's claim because the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction, held the trial court's rulings were void, vacated the trial court's rulings, and determined that this court was "left without jurisdiction and [could] only dismiss the appeal." Bolingbrook , 2016 IL App (3d) 150425-U, ¶¶ 2, 13, 19-20 This court's order was filed on June 2, 2016, and the mandate was issued on November 8, 2016.

¶ 5 On May 30, 2017, the Village filed its claim against defendants with the ICC. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss that claim, arguing it was time-barred by the statute of limitations.

¶ 6 On June 26, 2017, in the circuit court, the Village filed a "motion to voluntarily dismiss, without prejudice" pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code. In the motion, the Village indicated it was seeking the dismissal without prejudice "so as to proceed with its case before the Illinois Commerce Commission" and agreed to pay defendants' court costs. In response, defendants opposed the Village's motion to voluntarily dismiss, arguing there was no case to dismiss because this court had involuntary dismissed the complaint on appeal and because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. The trial court granted the Village's motion to voluntarily dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-1009 of the Code.

¶ 7 Defendants appealed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal in this case, defendants argue that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the Village's motion for a voluntary dismissal because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Village's claim, (2) the trial court violated this court's mandate where this court held "the trial court d[id] not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's compliant" and determined that the trial court's rulings were void, and (3) the trial court did not have the authority to grant the Village's request for a "voluntary" dismissal of the complaint because this court had already "involuntarily" dismissed the complaint on appeal so that there was no "case" to dismiss.

¶ 10 In response, the Village argues that the trial court was revested with jurisdiction once this court's mandate was issued. The Village contends that even though the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case, the trial court nonetheless had the jurisdiction to grant its motion to voluntarily dismiss the case.

¶ 11 Section 2-1009 of the Code provides:

"(a) The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each such party's attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice, by order filed in the cause.

(b) The court may hear and decide a motion that had been filed prior to a motion filed under subsection (a) of this Section when that prior filed motion, if favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition of the cause." 735 ILCS 5/2-1009(a), (b) (West 2016).

¶ 12 Statutory construction presents a question of law, which we review de novo . Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc. , 212 Ill. 2d 93, 105, 287 Ill.Dec. 583, 816 N.E.2d 345 (2004). In interpreting section 2-1009 of the Code, we note that our supreme court has made clear that a plaintiff's right to dismiss a case without prejudice as of right is subject to two important qualifications: (1) where a defendant has previously filed a motion that could result in final disposition if ruled upon favorably by the court, then the court has the discretion to decide that motion prior to ruling on plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal and (2) where the circumstances are such that a dismissal under section 2-1009 would directly conflict with a supreme court rule, the terms of the rule take precedence. Smith v. Central Illinois Regional Airport , 207 Ill. 2d 578, 583, 280 Ill.Dec. 325, 802 N.E.2d 250 (2003). "Absent such a circumstance, the trial judge generally has no discretion to deny the motion to voluntarily dismiss." In re Nancy A. , 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 551, 279 Ill.Dec. 891, 801 N.E.2d 565 (2003).

¶ 13 In this case, in the previous appeal, this court vacated the trial court's "rulings," holding the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter those rulings and indicating that it was dismissing the appeal.¹ See Bolingbrook , 2016 IL App (3d) 150425-U, ¶¶ 2, 13, 19-20. The Village argues that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 369(b) (eff. July 1, 1982) the trial court was revested with jurisdiction after the mandate had issued because this court had indicated the appeal was dismissed. Rule 369 addresses proceedings after the filing of the mandate in the circuit court, with subsection (a) indicating that the clerk of the circuit "shall file the mandate promptly upon receiving it." Ill. S. Ct. R. 369(a) (eff. July 1, 1982).

Rule 369(b) provides that when the reviewing court dismisses the appeal (or affirms the trial court's judgment) and the mandate is filed in the trial court, "enforcement of the judgment may be had and other proceedings may be conducted as if no appeal had been taken." Ill. S. Ct. R. 369(b) (eff. July 1, 1982). However, in actuality, this court did not "dismiss" the appeal but, rather, addressed the issue of the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction, vacated the trial court's rulings as being void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and determined that the substantive merits of the appeal could not be addressed. See Kyles v. Maryville Academy , 359 Ill. App. 3d 423, 431-32, 295 Ill.Dec. 860, 834 N.E.2d 441 (2005) ("[t]he lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court, in turn, affects our own jurisdiction in that we are then limited to considering only the lack of jurisdiction below, and we may not consider the substantive merit of the circuit court's unauthorized actions"); People v. Flowers , 208 Ill. 2d 291, 307, 280 Ill.Dec. 653, 802 N.E.2d 1174 (2003) (where the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction, the appellate court, in turn, had no authority to consider the merits of the appeal from ...