Vill. of Fargo v. City of Fargo

• Decision Date: 23 March 1923
• Citation: 192 N.W. 977,49 N.D. 597
• Parties: VILLAGE OF NORTH FARGO et al. v. CITY OF FARGO et al.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

49 N.D. 597

192 N.W. 977

VILLAGE OF NORTH FARGO et al.

v.CITY OF FARGO et al.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

March 23, 1923.

Syllabus by the Court.

Cities and villages in North Dakota are municipal corporations and possess only such powers as are conferred on them by statute. Doubtful claims of power, or doubt or ambiguity in the terms used by the Legislature, are resolved against the corporation.

Statutes must be construed with reference to other statutes concerning the same subject-matter or a part of the same general system of legislation.

In construing statutes, the courts may take judicial notice of the history of the times when they were enacted.

It is presumed that the Legislature, in enacting a statute, did not intend absurd or unjust consequences, or great public inconvenience.

Construing section 3753, C. L. 1913, as amended by chapter 68 of the Session Laws of 1915, with reference to the annexation of territory by cities, it is held, that a city may not annex a portion of the territory within the limits of an incorporated village, although a part of the boundaries of the village border upon and adjoin the boundaries of the city.

A municipal corporation is a creature of the Legislature. Its rights, powers, duties, and territorial extent are fixed by the Legislature and can be abridged, modified, taken away, or altered only in the manner provided by the Legislature.

Appeal from District Court, Cass County; M. J. Englert, Judge.

Action by the Village of North Fargo and others against the City of Fargo and others. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.Barnett & Richardson, of Fargo, for appellants.

W. H. Shure, of Fargo (B. F. Spalding, of Fargo, on the brief), for respondents.

JOHNSON, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Cass county, sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiffs' complaint upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The facts alleged in the complaint, so far as material, are as follows: The city of Fargo is a municipal corporation. The village of North Fargo was organized as a village about 12 years ago, under the general laws of the state governing the incorporation of villages. The south line of the village abuts on the north line of the city of Fargo. Proceedings were initiated by the city of Fargo, under the provisions of chapter 68 of the Session Laws of 1915 and acts amendatory thereof, for the annexation of territory, a portion of which lies within the boundaries of the village of North Fargo. It is further alleged that the village of North Fargo has taken steps to install an individual water and sewer system for its inhabitants and that all of the village has been included and designated as a water and sewer district according to the laws of the state; that subsequent to the initiation of those proceedings, as aforesaid, the defendants initiated proceedings to annex a portion of the territory embraced within the village of North Fargo; that water was furnished the residents of the village by respondents, but that since the trouble over annexation commenced, the respondents have publicly announced that water would no longer be furnished; that there is located in the village of North Fargo an educational institution known as the “Sacred Heart Academy,” affording satisfactory educational advantages to the patrons thereof; that the village has funds on hand with which to construct a building for school purposes; that all of the village of North Fargo is embraced within a single school district; and that the separation therefrom of the territory described in the annexation proceedings instituted by the defendants will materially hinder, obstruct, and impede the school district in providing educational advantages for the inhabitants. It is further alleged that the annexation proceedings against which the injunction is sought, if perfected, will irreparably damage the village in connection with the operation of schools, the levy of taxes in support of municipal and school undertakings, the installation of water and sewage systems and the maintenance thereof, and will hamper the village in the issuing of warrants and bonds for defraying necessary and proper municipal indebtedness. It is also alleged that the annexation, if completed, will interfere with the enforcement of laws within such territory and will cause an unseemly conflict between the village and the city. The complaint concludes with a prayer for an injunction against the defendants perpetually restraining the city of Fargo from procuring or claiming any rights by virtue of such annexation proceedings as are described in the complaint.

No question is raised as to the procedure or details of the attempted annexation. The only question is whether the city of Fargo, a municipal corporation, may, under the statutes of this state, annex a portion of the territory embraced within the corporate limits of the village of North Fargo, also a municipal corporation.

[1] Cities and villages in North Dakota are municipal corporations. State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark, 21 N. D. 517, 131 N. W. 715. Municipal corporations possess only such powers as are conferred on them by statute. Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 227, 46 N. W. 464;Stern v. Fargo, 18 N. D. 289, 122 N. W. 403, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665; Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 33. In the case of Treadway v. Schnauber, supra, the territorial court said:

“A municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and none others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied, or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable; and any fair doubt as to the existence of a power, is resolved, by the courts, against the corporation and the existence of the power.”

In the case of Stern v. Fargo, supra, this court restated the law substantially as laid down in the Treadway Case, supra. In the Stern Case the court says:

“That doubtful claims of power, or doubt or ambiguity in the terms used by the Legislature, are resolved against the corporation.”

There is a dearth of authority on the only question in this case. Appellants cite many cases holding that-

“When there exist two tribunals possessing concurrent and complete jurisdiction of a subject-matter, the jurisdiction becomes exclusive in the one before which proceedings are first instituted, and which thus acquires jurisdiction of the subject.” State ex rel. v. Clark, supra.

This principle manifestly has no application in this case. This is not a contest between two public corporations over the right to appropriate territory outside the limits of both. It is a question of the power of one municipal corporation to detach territory from another municipal corporation and to annex the same.

The decision of the case turns upon the construction of section 1 of chapter 68 of the Session Laws of 1915, which is an amendment to section 3753 of the Compiled Laws of 1913. This section reads as follows:

“Sec. 1. Amendment. That section 3753 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 3753. Any city in this state may so extend its boundaries as to increase the territory within the corporate limits thereof not to exceed one-fourth of its area, by a resolution of the city council passed by two-thirds of the entire members elect, particularly describing the land proposed to be incorporated within the city limits, setting forth the boundaries and describing the land, platted by blocks and lots; provided, that at least two-thirds in area of the territory described in such resolution and proposed to be incorporated within such limits shall have previously been platted into blocks and lots.”

The statute authorizes a city to increase its territory by annexing “land.” It further requires that this “land” must have been previously platted into blocks and lots. This last provision was added at the Session of 1915. It was a part of the statute many years ago. Did the Legislature use the word “land” in this section in the sense of territory already within the limits of an incorporated village divided into lots and blocks and subject to village government? Or, on the other hand, was it the intention of the Legislature that only “land” or territory lying outside of incorporated cities or villages be annexed, provided the same were first platted into lots and blocks?

[2][3][4] It is a settled rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed with reference to other statutes concerning the same subject-matter, or a part of the same general system of legislation (36 Cyc. 1147); with reference to the history of the times when enacted (36 Cyc. 1137); and it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend absurd or unjust consequences, or great public inconvenience (36 Cyc. 1135, 1136; 25 R. C. L. 1017ff).

[5] Section 3753, C. L. 1913 (section 1, c. 68, S. L. 1915), appears as section 1 of article 17 of chapter 73 of the Session Laws of 1887. Again, a similar purpose is expressed in somewhat more elaborate form in section 1, c. 32, of the Session Laws of 1889, limiting, however, the right of annexation to cities of 3,000 population or more. This section appears again as section 185 of chapter 62 of the Session Laws of 1905, and is section 2825 of the Revised Codes of 1905. In the Revised Codes of Dakota 1877, sections 47, 48, 49, and 50, of chapter 24, relating to the incorporation of towns and cities, provide for the extension of the corporate limits of towns. Villages in this state have powers of annexation given in terms substantially as broad as the language of section 3753, supra. See sections 3898-3901, 3968-3973, C. L. 1913.

In the statutes passed by the territorial Legislatures relating to the...