Vill. of Glencoe v. Indus. Comm'n
| Decision Date | 15 December 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 21949.,21949. |
| Citation | 188 N.E. 329,354 Ill. 190 |
| Parties | VILLAGE OF GLENCOE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Superior Court, Cook County; Walter T. Stanton, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Myrtle Hasselberg, claimant, for the death of her husband, opposed by the Village of Glencoe, employer. Award of the Industrial Commission granting compensation, and setting aside the decision of the arbitrator denying compensation, was confirmed by the Superior Court, and employer brings error.
Reversed and remanded with directions.McKenna, Harris & Schneider, of Chicago (George A. Schneider and Abraham W. Brussell, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Maurice G. Shanberg, of Chicago, for defendant in error.
William H. Sexton and Thomas H. Murray, both of Chicago, amicus curiae.
This cause is here on writ of error granted to review the judgment of the superior court of Cook county confirming an award of the Industrial Commission granting compensation to defendant in error, Myrtle Hasselberg, widow of Harry Hasselberg, deceased. Harry Hasselberg was on June 17, 1930, serving as a policeman of plaintiff in error village and was killed while in discharge of his duties. The arbitrator, to whom the application for compensation was referred, found that the deceased and plaintiff in error were not operating under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time of the death of Harry Hasselberg and denied compensation. The ground of this finding was that the deceased was an official of the plaintiff in error village and not an employee, and was not, therefore, within the provisions of the act granting compensation. On review, the Industrial Commission set aside the decision of the arbitrator, found that the deceased and plaintiff in error village were operating under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 48, § 138 et seq.), and entered an award.
The application for certiorari was filed in the superior court of Cook county on December 31, 1931. On Cotober 17, 1932, defendant in error by her counsel moved to quash the writ of certiorari on the ground that the sureties on the bond were not approved by the clerk when the bond was filed, by reason whereof the court did not obtain jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the On October 24, 1932, the village presented a cross-motion seeking an order of the court to be entered nunc pro tunc as of December 31, 1931, directing the clerk to affix his signature as approving the bond on that date. This motion was supported by an affidavit of the deputy clerk stating that he did, in fact, approve the bond but omitted to indorse the clerk's approval thereon. The cross-motion was first denied and later allowed. The court heard the cause on its merits and confirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission without specifically passing on the motion to quash the writ of certiorari, and defendant in error urges here that the court below was without jurisdiction. Thus the first question in the case is presented by defendant in error. Plaintiff in error replies (1) that the village, a municipal corporation, was not required to give bond; (2) the bond was, in fact, approved, as the affidavit offered shows; and (3) that the defendant in error waived the question of jurisdiction by entering her appearance. Concerning the last contention it is sufficient to say that entry of appearance while waiving jurisdiction of the person does not confer jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Eggleston v. Royal Trust Co., 192 Ill. 101, 61 N. E. 423.
First, then, is the question whether the village was required by the Workmen's Compensation Act to give a bond. Plaintiff in error cites the provisions of the Practice Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 110, § 1 et seq.) exempting municipalities from giving bonds on appeal. Paragraph (f) of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 48, § 156(f) provides as follows:
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act are purely statutory. Compensation for injuries received by an employee was unknown at the common law. The jurisdiction conferred on the circuit and superior courts to review findings of the commission by certiorari is special. The writ of certiorari in this class of cases is not to be confused with the common-law writ of certiorari. The powers of the court and the methods of procuring jurisdiction are specifically defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act, and courts can obtain jurisdiction only in the manner provided by that statute. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 62, 127 N. E. 80;Moweaqua Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 403, 153 N. E. 678.
The Practice Act has no application to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act in so far as material to the question here. Municipalities are not expressly exempted from the act, but the direct provisions thereof are, that ‘no such writ of certiorari shall issue unless the one against whom the industrial commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money’ shall file a bond. There is a valid reason why this requirement must be held to apply to municipalities. The finding of the circuit court confirming an award for the payment of money is not a judgment against the employer. The provisions of the act requiring the filing or a bond were intended to prevent the necessity for a judgment and at the same time protect the employee. Nierman v. Industrial Commission, 329 Ill. 623, 161 N. E. 115. This is properly so because awards of compensation usually extend over a period of years. Paragraph (g) of section 19 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, c. 48, § 156(g) provides for a judgment in those cases where no review of the award of the commission is sought and the award is not paid. That section has no relation to cases such as the one before us, where review is sought by certiorari. Since no judgment is entered by the finding of the court confirming an award, it will readily be seen that, if a municipality be not required to give a bond, no method is provided by the act for the recovery of an award against such municipality. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the village was required to give a bond in this case. Nor is this a case where a judgment is entered against the village, as contemplated by the Cities and Villages act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, § 138, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 24, par. 244), exempting villages from giving bond on ‘appeal from the judgment of any court of this State.’
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