Vill. of LaFayette v. Brown
| Decision Date | 25 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3–13–0445.,3–13–0445. |
| Citation | 27 N.E.3d 687 |
| Parties | The VILLAGE OF LaFAYETTE, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jerod A. BROWN and Dana M. Brown, Defendants–Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Colby G. Hathaway and Justin M. Raver (argued), both of Barash & Everett, LLC, of Kewanee, for appellants.
David L. Cover (argued), of Cover, Evans & Fricke, LLP, of Peoria, for appellee.
¶ 1 In April 2012, the Village of LaFayette (Village) enacted ordinance No. 420, which declared commercial farming within the boundaries of the Village to be a nuisance. LaFayette Ordinance No. 420 (eff. Apr. 2, 2012). Shortly thereafter, the Village brought an action against defendants, Jerod and Dana Brown, seeking conviction for a violation of the ordinance and to enjoin the defendants from further commercial farming on the property.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Stark County, the court found defendants not guilty of violating the ordinance as the Village failed to prove the element of notice. The trial court did, however, issue an injunction prohibiting further commercial farming on the property.
¶ 3 Defendants appeal, arguing that the Farm Nuisance Suit Act (740 ILCS 70/1 (West 2012) ) preempts the Village's ordinance No. 420, that application of the Farm Nuisance Suit Act precludes enforcement of the ordinance against defendants, and that the ordinance is an unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional exercise of the Village's authority.
¶ 4 We reverse.
¶ 6 The Village is a municipal corporation with a population of approximately 230 located in Stark County, Illinois. Defendants purchased the 57–acre farm in question at public auction on June 27, 2011. Six of those acres lie within the Village's boundaries.
¶ 7 Immediately prior to the sale to defendants in 2011, the property was known as LaFayette Home Nursery, Inc., operating commercially as a tree and prairie grass nursery in and around the Village from 1979 until it declared bankruptcy and the bank foreclosed upon it. Within its day-to-day operations, the nursery used pesticides, fertilizers, and heavy equipment. After the nursery's foreclosure and leading up to its sale, some of the owners and employees remained working, with all proceeds going to the bank.
¶ 8 After purchasing the property, defendants removed the trees, leveled off the property, and began preparing the soil for growing corn and soybeans. Prior to purchasing the Stark County property, Jerod Brown farmed commercially for 16 growing seasons. In that time, the Environmental Protection Agency never cited defendants for a violation. No one disputes that defendants operated their farm according to the standard practices of the industry.
¶ 9 On April 2, 2012, approximately nine months after defendants, residents of neighboring Henry County, purchased the property, the Village enacted ordinance No. 420. Ordinance No. 420 expanded ordinance No. 378, which prohibited the keeping of farm animals or livestock within the Village. LaFayette Ordinance No. 378 (eff. Mar. 6, 2000). Ordinance No. 420 expanded the definition of nuisances within the Village to include engaging “in any commercial farming for the production and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural products on any private or public property within the Village of LaFayette.” LaFayette Ordinance No. 420 (eff. Apr. 2, 2012).
¶ 10 On May 22, 2012, during the first growing season since having purchased the property, defendants planted their first corn crop. On June 1, 2012, the Village sent defendants a notice to abate, claiming that defendants were creating a nuisance by being in violation of the newly enacted ordinance.
¶ 11 On June 6, 2012, the Village filed a complaint against defendants, seeking both a penalty for violation of the ordinance and an injunction against continued commercial farming. On March 19, 2013, the parties filed pretrial briefs outlining their positions, and the trial court held a half-day bench trial.
¶ 12 On April 5, 2013, the trial court entered a judgment order acquitting defendants of the alleged ordinance violation based on a lack of notice. However, on April 26, 2013, the court issued an injunction, enjoining defendants from engaging in any commercial farming on their property within the Village. The court specifically found that the protections of the Act did not apply. It noted that “[a]lthough Defendants' property was in continuous use for agricultural commercial purposes, the Village has been a municipal corporation far longer, and has been obligated to serve the public welfare of its residents since its incorporation, which purposes have not changed.”
¶ 13 The trial court denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration. Defendants appeal the injunction. We reverse and vacate the injunction.
¶ 15 On appeal, defendants argue that the application of the Farm Nuisance Suit Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 70/1 (West 2012) ) precludes enforcement of the ordinance against them; that the Act preempts ordinance No. 420. In the alternative, the defendants argue that the ordinance is arbitrary and an unreasonable exercise of the Village's authority and is, therefore, unconstitutional. We need not address the constitutionality of the ordinance as we find that, on the facts of this case, the Act preempts the ordinance.
¶ 16 Ordinance No. 420 regulates nuisances within the Village and, in relevant part, provides as follows:
While the Village clearly has the authority to enact a nuisance ordinance (see 65 ILCS 5/11–60–2 (West 2012) ) (providing that the “corporate authorities of each municipality may define, prevent, and abate nuisances”), the legislature has limited this authority in certain instances. Passed in 1981, the Act states that “[i]t is the declared policy of the state to conserve and protect and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural land for the production of food and other agricultural products.” 740 ILCS 70/1 (West 2012). Thus, the purpose of the Act is “to reduce the loss to the State of its agricultural resources by limiting the circumstances under which farming operations may be deemed to be a nuisance.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 17 Section 2 of the Act defines a farm as:
740 ILCS 70/2 (West 2012).
¶ 18 Finally, and at issue in the case at bar, section 3 of the Act provides:
740 ILCS 70/3 (West 2012).
¶ 19 The Village contends that the trial court properly found that section 3 of the Act was not applicable to defendants, as defendants failed to prove “any changed conditions in the surrounding area.” The mere enactment of an ordinance, the Village argues, does not constitute changed conditions as there was no encroaching residential use of land as contemplated by the statute. We disagree and find the trial court misinterpreted both the Act and the holding of Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel, 2012 IL 113569, 368 Ill.Dec. 50, 983 N.E.2d 463.
¶ 20 In Toftoy, the defendants owned 160 acres of farmland in rural Illinois. Id. ¶ 3. Originally, Clarence Toftoy owned 120 acres of farmland across the road from defendants upon which an over 100–year–old farmhouse sat. Id. While the farmhouse across the road was unoccupied, the defendants began using their property to raise cattle. Id. ¶ 4. Several years later, Clarence tore down the historic farmhouse and transferred ownership of the 1.83 acres upon which it sat to his son and daughter-in-law, plaintiffs Roger and Bobbie Toftoy. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiffs began construction of a new home. Id. Several years after this, plaintiffs filed a nuisance action against the defendants' farm operation, and defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment based upon the Act. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and ordered defendants to take remedial measures to reduce the nuisance caused by the cattle farming operation. Id. ¶ 9. The appellate court affirmed, finding that “ ‘the conditions must alter the character of the surrounding area such that, where the farm was not a nuisance when it began operation, it is transformed into a nuisance by the changed conditions.’ ” Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel, 2011 IL App (2d) 100565, ¶ 36, 356 Ill.Dec. 267, 961 N.E.2d 363 ). Applying that analysis, “the appellate court held that plaintiffs' acquisition and occupation of their land ‘did not alter the character of the area such that the cattle operation, which previously had not been a nuisance, thereby became a nuisance.’ ” Id. (quoting Toftoy v. Rosenwinkel, 2011 IL App (2d) 100565, ¶ 37, 356 Ill.Dec. 267, 961 N.E.2d 363 ).
¶ 21 Our supreme court reversed, finding that “plaintiffs' acquisition of ownership created the legally protected interest in which the plaintiffs are...
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Vill. of Chadwick v. Nelson
...¶¶ 21–22, 368 Ill.Dec. 50, 983 N.E.2d 463. Similarly, in Village of LaFayette v. Brown , 2015 IL App (3d) 130445, ¶¶ 9, 22–23, 389 Ill.Dec. 845, 27 N.E.3d 687, it was held that the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting " ‘any commercial farming’ " in the village constituted a "changed condi......