Vill. of Morgan Park v. Grhan

• Decision Date: 30 March 1891
• Citation: 136 Ill. 515,26 N.E. 1085
• Parties: VILLAGE OF MORGAN PARK v. GRHAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

136 Ill. 515

26 N.E. 1085

VILLAGE OF MORGAN PARK

v.GRHAN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 30, 1891.

Appeal from appellate court, first district.

G. W. Northrup, Jr., (Consider H. Willett, of counsel,) for appellant.

Albert H. Veeder and Mason B. Loomis, for appellees.

WILKIN, J.

The validity of the ordinance authorizing the laying of said water-pipes, and providing that they should be paid for by special assessment, is not questioned; neither is it denied that, in making proposals for bids on said improvements, the village had a legal right to require a deposit with bids, to be forfeited on the conditions stated in the said published offer and the ordinance referred to therein. Appellees do not controvert the proposition that the offer by the village board, their bid, and the acceptance of such bid, constituted a prima facie valid agreement, by which said sum of $1,100 would be forfeited to the village, on their refusal to enter into a contract in accordance with said bid and said ordinance; but they based their right of recovery upon the single ground that at the time they bid there was no legal assessment existing out of which to pay for said work and material, and that they did not learn that fact until after their bid had been sent in. Mr. Gahan testified at the trial that his attorney advised him to have nothing to do with the assessment, ‘on the ground that it was not according to law,’ and says ‘that was the reason we refused to enter into the contract.’ No attempt was made on their behalf to show that appellees objected to the regularity of any assessment made previous to their bid, or that the village authorities refused to make any and all necessary reassessments, in order to secure them in full payment for all work and material which they might furnish in fulfillment of their bid. There is no pretense that the village authorities were at any time guilty of misconduct, fraud, or concealment in dealing with appellees. In fact, so far as the proof goes, they had as much knowledge of the various steps taken by the village in levying the special assessment before they made their bid as afterwards. All they claim is that they afterwards learned such proceedings were ‘not according to law.’ There is nothing in the proposition published by the village, or in any of its ordinances, indicating that the contract price for the improvement would be paid from funds raised by any particular assessment, nor did appellees attempt to show that they were in any manner whatever led to suppose or understand so. It cannot, therefore, be said that a particular assessment entered into the contract created by said offer, bid, and acceptance. The case, then, viewed in the most favorable light for appellees, resolves itself into the question, did the fact that an assessment made previous to their bid was irregular or void justify them in refusing to carry out their contract with the village? This question waives all consideration of the right of the village to insist that it was the duty of bidders to use diligence to ascertain the validity of such assessment, and therefore it will not be necessary for us to pass upon the various objections urged against the regularity of the proceedings under which the assessment was levied. We entertain no doubt that, under the law, neither the village nor appellees were concluded by that assessment in entering into and carrying out the contract made by the parties as above stated. It will scarcely be contended that if appellees had entered into the contract, and gone on with the improvement,...