Vill. of Vernon Hills v. Heelan

• Citation: 14 N.E.3d 1222
• Decision Date: 23 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2–13–0823.,2–13–0823.
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF VERNON HILLS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant–Appellant and Cross–Appellee, v. William J. HEELAN, Defendant and Counterplaintiff–Appellee and Cross–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

14 N.E.3d 1222

The VILLAGE OF VERNON HILLS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant–Appellant and Cross–Appellee
v.
William J. HEELAN, Defendant and Counterplaintiff–Appellee and Cross–Appellant.

No. 2–13–0823.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

July 23, 2014.

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Keith L. Hunt and Bradley E. Faber, both of Hunt & Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.

Charles W. Smith, of Smith, LaLuzerne & Hartman, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellee.

Brian D. Day and Roger Huebner, both of Illinois Municipal League, of Springfield, amicus curiae.

OPINION

Justice ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The Board of Trustees of the Vernon Hills Police Pension Fund (Board) awarded a line-of-duty disability pension (40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2010) ) to defendant, police officer William J. Heelan. Thereafter, plaintiff, the Village of Vernon Hills (Village), filed a complaint in the trial court seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated under section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2010) ) to pay the

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health insurance premiums for Heelan, his wife, and his two children. Heelan filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Village was obligated under the Act.¹ The Village appeals from the trial court's declaratory judgment in Heelan's favor; Heelan cross-appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion for sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. July 1, 2013). For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In December 2009, while on patrol, Heelan, a 20–year veteran of the Village's police department, was dispatched to a “panic call alarm.” Upon arrival at the scene, Heelan saw an unknown man exiting a building. As he quickly approached the man, Heelan slipped on a patch of ice and fell on his right side at the edge of a curb. Heelan was taken by ambulance to a hospital emergency room, where he was X-rayed, prescribed pain medication, and released. He followed up with various physicians and underwent physical therapy. An MRI showed that Heelan suffered a labral tear in his right hip.

¶ 4 Dr. Jay Levin conducted an independent medical evaluation of Heelan in connection with a claim Heelan filed under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2010)). Dr. Levin opined that the December 2009 incident had aggravated Heelan's preexisting right hip osteoarthritis. According to Heelan, prior to the incident, he had not experienced any pain or problems from arthritis.

¶ 5 During the year following the incident, the Village paid Heelan his full salary pursuant to the Public Employee Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2010) ). Heelan underwent a right hip replacement in April 2010. After this surgery, Heelan returned to work on light duty for about two months. His right hip replacement exacerbated his left hip osteoarthritis, and Heelan underwent a left hip replacement in September 2010. He did not return to work after this second surgery. Heelan and the Village subsequently settled Heelan's workers' compensation claim in a lump-sum agreement.

¶ 6 In December 2010, Heelan filed an application for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 3–114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2010) ). The Board conducted a hearing on June 28, 2011. Pursuant to section 3–115 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3–115 (West 2010) ), the Board admitted into evidence the reports of three physicians selected by the Board—Dr. Joseph Meis, Dr. Thomas Gleason, and Dr. Joshua Jacobs. Drs. Meis and Jacobs each certified that Heelan was “disabled to a point that he [was] not able to perform his duties as a police officer.” Dr. Meis identified Heelan's hip replacements as the conditions that disabled him, while Dr. Jacobs identified Heelan's right and left hip osteoarthritis as the disabling conditions. Dr. Jacobs further certified that it was “medically possible” that Heelan's disability resulted from an act of duty or the cumulative effects of acts of duty, specifically identifying the December 2009 incident as the cause of Heelan's disability. Dr. Gleason, on the other hand, opined in his report that Heelan was not disabled to a point of being unable to perform his police duties, “unless police procedure to incarcerate arrested persons as required exceeds the medium level as defined by the [Illinois] Department of Labor Guidelines.” Dr. Gleason certified that, if Heelan were disabled,

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it was medically possible that his disability resulted from an act of duty or the cumulative effects of acts of duty.

¶ 7 The Board also heard telephone testimony from Dr. Gleason. Dr. Gleason testified that he would not recommend that Heelan engage a 200–pound person resisting arrest or run after a fleeing suspect. Dr. Gleason agreed on cross-examination that, if the service requirements of the Village police department exceeded the medium level of the Department of Labor guidelines, Heelan was disabled. After considering the evidence, the Board determined that Heelan qualified for a line-of-duty disability pension and it adopted its written findings and decision on August 24, 2011.

¶ 8 On September 22, 2011, the Village filed its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Heelan was not eligible for health insurance benefits under the Act. In its complaint, the Village alleged that Heelan had not suffered a catastrophic injury, as required by section 10(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2010)), and that Heelan's injury had not resulted from his response to what he reasonably believed to be an emergency, as required under section 10(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2010)). The Village acknowledged Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill.2d 392, 273 Ill.Dec. 779, 789 N.E.2d 1211 (2003), in which the court held that a catastrophic injury is synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension, but the Village asserted that Krohe was factually distinguishable and did not address the issues raised in the Village's complaint. Heelan answered the complaint and filed his counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Village was obligated to provide the insurance benefits.

¶ 9 On June 4, 2012, the Village filed notices of deposition of Drs. Levin, Meis, Jacobs, and Gleason. Heelan moved to strike the depositions, arguing that the testimony would not be relevant to the proceedings or, alternatively, that the Village was collaterally estopped from contesting Heelan's injury. On August 24, 2012, the trial court granted Heelan's motion to strike, relying on Krohe and its progeny. The court noted that in Krohe the supreme court held the term “catastrophic injury” in section 10(a) of the Act is a term of art meaning an injury resulting in the award of a line-of-duty disability pension (see Krohe, 204 Ill.2d at 400, 273 Ill.Dec. 779, 789 N.E.2d 1211 ). The court elaborated, “I know that because not only does Krohe say it, but the Nowak case [ (Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838, 354 Ill.Dec. 825, 958 N.E.2d 1021 ) ] says it. Also, it's an Illinois Supreme Court case. And the Second District in the Richter case [ (Richter v. Village of Oak Brook, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, 354 Ill.Dec. 768, 958 N.E.2d 700 ) ] says Krohe says it. So if I needed any reassurance, I certainly have it in those cases that construe Krohe. ” The Village subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling, which the court denied.

¶ 10 On February 26, 2013, Heelan filed a motion in limine to bar any testimony on the issue of whether he had suffered a catastrophic injury under section 10(a) of the Act. Heelan argued that the Village was collaterally estopped from asserting that he did not suffer a catastrophic injury. Relying on the trial court's August 24, 2012, order granting his motion to strike the depositions, Heelan further contended that, under Krohe, the Village was prohibited from denying that he suffered a catastrophic injury. The court granted the motion in limine.

¶ 11 On March 18, 2013, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The Village conceded that section 10(b) of the Act was

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satisfied, indicating that it was not contesting that, during the December 2009 incident, Heelan was responding to what he reasonably believed to be an emergency. In light of the court's prohibition of testimony regarding whether Heelan suffered a catastrophic injury under section 10(a), the Village made an offer of proof as to that issue. The Village rested its case, and Heelan moved for a directed finding, which the court granted.

¶ 12 Heelan then presented evidence to support his counterclaim. When Heelan began testifying about his belief as to the emergency nature of the December 2009 incident, the Village objected on relevance grounds in light of its concession regarding section 10(b) of the Act. The court sustained the objection and allowed Heelan to make an offer of proof. Heelan then testified about his application for, and the Board's award of, a line-of-duty disability pension. The Board's written decision also was admitted into evidence. Heelan testified that, following the award of...