Villafane v. Manson

• Decision Date: 07 July 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-78-117.
• Citation: 504 F. Supp. 78
• Parties: Maximino VILLAFANE v. John MANSON, Commissioner of Correction, State of Connecticut.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

504 F. Supp. 78

Maximino VILLAFANE v. John MANSON, Commissioner of Correction, State of Connecticut.

Civ. No. H-78-117.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 7, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Martha Stone, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, Charles Sturdevant, Gross, Hyde & Williams, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Robert E. Beach, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., Wallingford, Conn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BLUMENFELD, Senior District Judge.

I.

Petitioner was indicted for murder in the first degree on December 6, 1971 by an 18-member grand jury in Fairfield County. He was subsequently tried before a petit jury which returned a verdict of guilty. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus raising various constitutional claims.¹

II.

Petitioner, a Puerto Rican, concentrates his efforts on a challenge to the array from which the indicting grand jury was selected. He claims that he has been denied equal protection of the laws in contravention of the fourteenth amendment by the systematic exclusion of Puerto Ricans from that array. In resolving his claim, it is useful to set forth those facts which are not in dispute.²

First, both parties agree that, at least prior to 1972, grand juries in Fairfield County were selected from the electorate by the County Sheriff. Sheriff John P. Previdi, County Sheriff at the time of petitioner's indictment, maintained a list of 138 persons from which he made his selections. His predecessor had maintained a similar list. These lists were composed largely of the sheriffs' friends and acquaintances and their friends and acquaintances. In essence, both Sheriff Previdi and his predecessor had unfettered discretion in deciding on the membership of each grand jury.

Second, there is no dispute as to Sheriff Previdi's personal contact with Puerto Ricans. As the trial court found, he personally knew no Puerto Ricans whom he could ask to serve on the grand jury. He did not know the extent of the Puerto Rican electorate nor did he make any attempts to ascertain the neighborhoods in which the Puerto Ricans were concentrated. He was also unaware of the demographic shifts in Fairfield County during his tenure as sheriff.

Third, the parties do not dispute that Puerto Ricans constituted a small but identifiable class in the county.³ Census figures identified the Puerto Rican population as 1.8% of the total Fairfield County population, and other figures establish that they constituted, at the relevant time, approximately .93% of the electorate eligible for service on the grand jury.

Fourth, both parties agree as to the accuracy of the numbers and statistics involved in this case. Between 1963 and 1971, 738 grand jurors were chosen from the sheriffs' lists and 41 18-person grand juries were empaneled. Of the 738 grand jurors who were selected during this period only two were Puerto Rican.⁴ Thirty-nine grand juries had no Puerto Ricans, and two had one Puerto Rican juror each.

III.

While petitioner has no constitutional right to a grand jury array which exactly mirrors the ethnic composition of society, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208, 85 S.Ct. 824, 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the fourteenth amendment does protect him from having the members of his ethnic group substantially underrepresented in the grand jury array. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1279, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). As the Supreme Court has indicated in Castaneda v. Partida, supra:

"While the earlier cases involved absolute exclusion of an identifiable group, later cases established the principle that substantial underrepresentation of the group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results from purposeful discrimination."

Id. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 1279. Castaneda then teaches:

"In order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S., 475 at 478-479 74 S.Ct. 667, at 670-671, 98 L.Ed. 866. Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. Id., at 480 74 S.Ct. at 671. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935). This method of proof, sometimes called the `rule of exclusion,' has been held to be available as a method of proving discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S., at 480 74 S.Ct., at 671. Finally, as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., 229 at 241 96 S.Ct., 2040, at 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S., 625 at 630 92 S.Ct., 1221, at 1225, 31 L.Ed.2d 536."

Id. at 494, 97 S.Ct. at 1280 (footnote omitted).

A.

No dispute is raised as to either the first or third criterion announced in Castaneda. As to the first criterion, Puerto Ricans clearly constitute "a recognizable, distinct class" which, as the statistics reveal, has been "singled out for different treatment under the laws, ... as applied." The trial court ruling on petitioner's earlier motion to quash the indictment reached this same conclusion, as did the Connecticut Supreme Court.⁵ As noted above, the State does not take a contrary position.

With respect to the third criterion, it is also well-established that the procedure used to choose the grand jurors was a "procedure ... susceptible of abuse." Fairfield County's procedure afforded its sheriffs even more discretion than did the key-man system in Castaneda, which the Supreme Court considered "highly subjective" and "susceptible of abuse as applied." Id. at 497, 97 S.Ct. at 1281, 1282. Moreover, the Second Circuit has had occasion to warn of the danger implicit in the very selection system here under challenge. It noted:

"Although in this instance there was nothing in the case to show that, in the selection of the grand jury, there was any systematic exclusion of an identifiable group or that the jury list was otherwise not a representative cross-section of the community, the method of selection resting as it does entirely in the hands of one person, the sheriff of the county, leaves much to be desired."

Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1419, 47 L.Ed.2d 354 (1976) (considering a Fairfield County grand jury). Thus, the only dispute in the case centers on the proper application of Castaneda's second criterion.

B.

Under Castaneda, the second of the three criteria involves measuring "the degree of underrepresentation" by "comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time." Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S., at 494, 97 S.Ct., at 1280. In order to make out a prima facie case, petitioner must establish not only that his group was underrepresented, but also that the degree of underrepresentation was substantial. Id. at 493-94, 97 S.Ct., at 1279-1280.

The justification for the "substantial" requirement stems from the need to show intentional conduct. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26, 99 S.Ct. 664, 670 n.26, 58 L.Ed.2d 579. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated that disparate impact alone will not suffice to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment.⁶ Rather, a party claiming that he has been denied equal protection of the laws must establish that there has been an intentional act of discrimination. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979).

"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington Heights, supra, 429 U.S., at 266, 97 S.Ct., at 564. Whether the proof offered is sufficient will necessarily vary on a case-by-case basis. Under some circumstances, statistics alone can establish such a clear pattern of discrimination that they cannot be explained on any legitimate grounds. When this occurs, the statistics may amount to circumstantial evidence sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement. Id. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564.

How clear this pattern must be appears to vary with the nature of the case. In Arlington Heights, the court indicated that a pattern of discrimination must generally be quite "stark" in order to justify a finding of intent. Id. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564. However, as the Court also noted, this requirement is somewhat relaxed in jury selection cases. Id. at 266 n.13, 97 S.Ct. at 564 n.13. In Castaneda, supra, a post-Arlington Heights jury selection case, the Court concluded that a showing of "substantial" underrepresentation coupled with an opportunity to discriminate was sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494-95, 97 S.Ct. at 1280-1281.

Consequently, the only issue in dispute on this second criterion is whether the statistics, as agreed to by both parties, are sufficient to establish that Puerto Ricans were "substantially underrepresented" in the grand jury array. Petitioner insists that they are, while the State...