Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG ENTERPRISES

• Decision Date: 21 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 89963.,89963.
• Citation: 752 N.E.2d 1090,196 Ill.2d 484,256 Ill.Dec. 848
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF BLOOMINGDALE, Appellant, v. CDG ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

752 N.E.2d 1090

196 Ill.2d 484

256 Ill.Dec. 848

The VILLAGE OF BLOOMINGDALE, Appellant, v. CDG ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee.

No. 89963.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 21, 2001.

Richard T. Ryan and Mark F. Smolens, of Ryan, Smolens & Jones, Chicago, for appellant.

Michael J. Morrisroe and Teresa L. Einarson, Bloomingdale, for appellee.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

This case arises from the Village of Bloomingdale's denial of a zoning petition submitted by CDG Enterprises, Inc., and presents two issues for our review. First, whether the Illinois Constitution permits imposition of the common law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception to certain immunities afforded by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Second, whether a claim for quasi-contract is proper under section 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998)) and whether the counterplaintiff alleged sufficient facts for this court to impose a quasicontract remedy. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Illinois Constitution prohibits the insertion of the common law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception into the immunities provided by the Act. In addition, we hold that, though section 2-101(a) of the Act, which preserves municipal liability for contract, does not contemplate the remedy of quasi-contract, the counterplaintiff has failed to sufficiently assert a claim for that remedy. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, the Village of Bloomingdale (Village), sued CDG Enterprises, Inc. (CDG), in the circuit court of Du Page County, for breach of contract alleging that CDG had not paid for services the Village had provided in reviewing its petition for rezoning and site plan approval. CDG, as counterplaintiff, answered and filed two counterclaims, one for tortious interference with business expectancy and another for recovery under a quasi-contract theory. These counterclaims are at issue in this appeal.

In support of both counts, CDG alleged the following facts, which we will take as true for purposes of this appeal on the Village's motion to dismiss. See Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 176 Ill.2d 160, 161, 223 Ill.Dec. 424, 679 N.E.2d 1197 (1997). CDG was the contract purchaser of five parcels of land adjacent to the Village of Bloomingdale. In March 1995, CDG petitioned the Village's planning commission to annex the five parcels into the Village and rezone them so that CDG could build a subdivision. CDG's representatives met with the Village's land planner and other officials, including the Village mayor, who allegedly told CDG that the project would be approved. Between April and October 1995, CDG repeatedly appeared before the Village planning commission for public hearings on its petition.

CDG further stated that, in June or July 1995, the Village allegedly: secretly formed a "task force" in order to pursue the acquisition and development of a golf course, which was adjacent to the five parcels; commissioned Planning Resources, Inc., the Village's consultant in charge of reviewing CDG's petition, to prepare a plan to redesign the golf course so that some of the holes would be on the property CDG intended to acquire; and secretly met with other individuals to create opposition to CDG's plan. In August 1995, the Village planning commission voted down CDG's project, with the chairman allegedly pressuring other members to vote against it. Then, in October 1995, the Village's board of trustees voted down CDG's petition at a public hearing. Soon afterward, the Village publicly revealed that it planned to acquire the golf course, and later did so. In addition, one of the parcels was allegedly bought by individuals "closely aligned with certain of the Village's officials." CDG has not claimed that the Village itself acquired any of the five parcels which CDG had intended to purchase.

CDG further alleged that its petition met all the Village's requirements for rezoning and annexation; that CDG took all the action the Village required; that CDG had spent heavily in reliance on its meetings with the Village; and that, after the Village denied the petition, CDG had to cancel its purchase contracts and forfeit some of what it had paid. CDG's projected gross profits from the project were $4.8 million.

Count I of the counterclaim alleged that the Village deliberately frustrated CDG's business expectancy by secretly working to force CDG out of the planned development. While ostensibly reviewing CDG's petition, the Village allegedly planned all along to develop the adjoining golf course and help cronies of certain Village officials purchase one of the five parcels. Count II alleged that, when CDG filed its rezoning petition and paid the required fee, the Village became obligated through quasicontract to process CDG's petition reasonably and in good faith which it failed to do. CDG never stated what the Village or any of its employees gained by their alleged misconduct. Both counts sought in damages the projected gross profits of $4.8 million.

The Village moved to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)). It asserted sovereign immunity based on various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act (see 745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-104, 2-106, 2-109, 2-201, 2-205 (West 1998)). The trial court dismissed the counterclaims, holding that both were barred by the Village's sovereign immunity under the Act. The Village then voluntarily dismissed its complaint, and CDG appealed.

Before the appellate court, CDG argued that (1) the Tort Immunity Act did not bar its counterclaims because the Act does not immunize governmental actions undertaken for "corrupt or malicious motives"; and (2) the Act did not bar the second count for quasi-contract because section 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998)) specifically preserves municipal liability based on contract.

The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that CDG's tort claim could proceed under the Act. The court rejected the Village's affirmative defenses and held that, the general grants of immunity afforded by the Act are limited by the common law exception for "corrupt or malicious motives." 314 Ill.App.3d 210, 214-15, 247 Ill.Dec. 578, 732 N.E.2d 633. The appellate court also reversed the trial court as to the second count and held that the Village could be held liable in quasicontract to process CDG's petition in good faith and according to its usual procedures, and that that claim fell under section 2-101(a) and was, therefore, not barred by the Act. 314 Ill.App.3d at 215, 247 Ill.Dec. 578, 732 N.E.2d 633.

The Village appealed and we granted review of both issues under Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Since the trial court dismissed CDG's counterclaim under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)), our review is de novo. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill.2d 381, 386, 238 Ill.Dec. 576, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998).

ANALYSIS

I. The Tort Immunity Act

Traditionally, a governmental unit in Illinois was immune from tort liability pursuant to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. In 1959, however, this court abolished the doctrine in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). Then, in response to Molitor, the legislature in 1965 enacted the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Under the Act, Illinois adopted the general principle that local governmental units are liable in tort, but limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based on specific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill.2d 501, 506, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654 (1990). Finally, in 1970, the state adopted a new constitution and with it a new provision regarding sovereign immunity. Article XIII, section 4, of the 1970 Constitution states: "Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 4. Today, therefore, the tort liability of a local public entity or employee is expressly controlled both by the constitutional provision and by legislative prerogative as embodied in the Tort Immunity Act. Burdinie, 139 Ill.2d at 507, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d 654.

The purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998). "By providing immunity, the legislature sought to prevent the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damage claims." Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill.2d 372, 378, 212 Ill.Dec. 542, 657 N.E.2d 887 (1995). The Tort Immunity Act grants only immunities and defenses; it does not create duties. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 1998). "Rather, the Act merely codifies those duties existing at common law, to which the subsequently delineated immunities apply." Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill.2d 378, 386-88, 216 Ill.Dec. 550, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996) (finding that park district owed plaintiff a common law duty of reasonable care); In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill.2d 179, 192, 223 Ill.Dec. 532, 680 N.E.2d 265 (1997) ("governmental units are liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors unless a tort immunity statute imposes conditions upon that liability"); Bubb, 167 Ill.2d at 378,212 Ill.Dec. 542,657 N.E.2d 887; West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill.2d 1, 14, 167 Ill.Dec. 974, 588 N.E.2d 1104 (1992); Vesey v. Chicago Housing Authority, 145 Ill.2d 404, 412,164 Ill.Dec. 622, 583 N.E.2d 538 (1991). The existence of a duty and the existence of an immunity, therefore, are separate issues. Barnett, 171 Ill.2d at 388,216 Ill.Dec. 550,665 N.E.2d 808...