Village of Candor v. United States

• Decision Date: 21 May 1957
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 6505.
• Citation: 151 F. Supp. 889
• Parties: VILLAGE OF CANDOR, Ward & Van Scoy, Inc., Candor Cooperative G.L.F. Service, Inc., Philip M. King, President of Candor Business Bureau, Arthur Hollenbeck and Gerald Hollenbeck, copartners, doing business under the firm name and style of Arthur Hollenbeck & Son, and Town of Candor, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America and The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, Defendants, and INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervening Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

151 F. Supp. 889

VILLAGE OF CANDOR, Ward & Van Scoy, Inc., Candor Cooperative G.L.F. Service, Inc., Philip M. King, President of Candor Business Bureau, Arthur Hollenbeck and Gerald Hollenbeck, copartners, doing business under the firm name and style of Arthur Hollenbeck & Son, and Town of Candor, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America and The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, Defendants, and INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervening Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 6505.

United States District Court N. D. New York.

May 21, 1957.

Harrison, Coughlin, Dermody & Ingalls, George Coughlin and Bertram W. Eisenberg, Binghamton, N. Y., for plaintiffs.

Victor R. Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore F. Bowes, U. S. Atty., Syracuse, N. Y., Charles R. Esherick, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant United States.

Mackenzie, Smith, Lewis, Michell & Hughes, Syracuse, N. Y., by Raymond Hackbarth, Syracuse, and Richard Costello, New York City, for defendant Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.

Robert W. Ginnane, Gen. Counsel, B. Franklin Taylor, Jr., Washington, D. C., for intervening defendant Interstate Commerce Commission.

Before CLARK, Circuit Judge, and BRENNAN and FOLEY, District Judges.

BRENNAN, District Judge.

This action is brought to enjoin, set aside and annul certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission which in effect authorize the abandonment by defendant, Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, of its branch line running from the Village of Owego, New York, to the City of Ithaca, New York. Jurisdiction is based upon the appropriate provisions of the statutes 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(20) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1336, 1398, 2321 and 2325.

Application, seeking a certificate authorizing the abandonment of the branch, was filed in November 1955. Public hearings were thereafter held on March 29 and 30, 1956. Exceptions thereto were later filed. The Commission thereafter filed its report and an order, dated October 25, 1956, was entered permitting the abandonment of the branch. Petitions for reconsideration and for a further hearing to consider alleged new evidence were thereafter made and denied by orders of January 28, 1957 and March 5, 1957. March 15, 1957 was fixed as the effective date of the certificate permitting such abandonment. This action was started about March 12, 1957. A temporary restraining order was issued. A three-judge statutory court was convened. By agreement, the consideration of the application for a temporary and final injunction came on to be heard before said court on April 23, 1967. The record made before the Interstate Commerce Commission is before the court. Additional affidavits were offered by plaintiffs in lieu of oral evidence.

The essential facts, as disclosed, may be briefly stated. There has been in existence since 1833 a railroad line extending a distance of 34.79 miles from the Village of Owego to the City of Ithaca, New York. The line was operated under lease by the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company from 1855 to 1946 when it was acquired by merger. It is generally referred to as the Ithaca Branch, same connecting with the main line of the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad at Owego. The branch follows generally an improved state highway. It has served primarily some five or six villages or hamlets and the area traversed may be generally referred to as farming or residential area. Passenger service has been suspended over the branch since 1942.

It is sufficient to say that the evidence disclosed that the branch as a whole has been a losing proposition from a financial standpoint for at least five years; that a considerable outlay of money is required for maintenance purposes to restore and to maintain the branch in a safe operating condition. Operations at the present time are restricted as to speed and the type of equipment which may be used on and over the branch.

There is actually no dispute or objection to the abandonment of that part of the branch extending from the Village of Candor to the City of Ithaca and no serious objection was made thereto. Objections were filed to the abandonment of the whole branch by Arthur Hollenbeck & Son, Ward & Van Scoy, Inc. and Candor Cooperative G.L.F. Service Inc. of Candor, New York, all of whom are engaged in the manufacturing and sale of feed and the furnishing of farm equipment supplies at Candor and Catatonk, New York. They raise no objection however to the abandonment of that segment of the branch between Candor and Ithaca. Their evidence and argument is limited to the contention that the portion of the branch between Owego and Candor — a distance of ten and seventenths miles — should be deleted from the order permitting the abandonment.

The contention is based on argument that the record is insufficient to justify the conclusion that the operation of the railroad over the Owego-Candor segment is detrimental to the public interest; that the Commission erred in denying the opportunity to present additional evidence relating to a proposed tax reduction applicable to that particular segment and that the Commission had no jurisdiction since the Owego-Candor segment was a spur and not a line of the railroad or portion thereof. In substance, the petitioners contend that the Owego-Candor segment should be considered separate and distinct from the branch as a whole and that evidence should be received and findings made applying particularly thereto.

The contention that the Commission lacked jurisdiction is rejected. No argument is made that the proceeding, as instituted, is without the provisions of the statute, but it is argued that by the hypothetical separation of the Owego-Candor segment from the Ithaca branch, such segment is transformed into an industrial spur, and the Commission thereby has lost jurisdiction. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(22).

The railroad from Owego to Ithaca permission to abandon, which is sought, is without doubt a branch line (49 U.S. C.A. § 1(18). While the word "spur", as used in the statute is not defined therein, its characteristics are discussed at some length in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Reading Co., D.C., 132 F.Supp. 616, affirmed, 3 Cir., 226 F.2d 958. Such characteristics are not found here. Compare Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 6 Cir., 233 F.2d 168 and Public Service Commission v. U. S., D.C., 56 F.Supp. 351. The case of United States v. State of Idaho, 298 U.S. 105, 56 S.Ct. 690, 80 L.Ed. 1070, relied upon by the plaintiffs, is plainly distinguishable.

Objection is made that the Village and Town of Candor and the Candor Better Business Bureau are improper parties plaintiff. Their interest as such parties is not convincing but since they could well be heard as intervenors (28 U.S. C.A. § 2323) and do not appear by separate attorneys, a determination of their status is unimportant to this decision.

An approach to the problem involved here is made with a knowledge of the limited function and power of this Court. The citation of a single authority is sufficient. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, at pages 535-536, 66 S.Ct. 687, at pages 697-698, 90 L.Ed. 821.

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