Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon

• Decision Date: 22 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99136.,99136.
• Citation: 216 Ill.2d 402,837 N.E.2d 29
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, Illinois, an Illinois Municipal Organization, Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF SANGAMON, Illinois, an Illinois Body Corporate and Politic, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

837 N.E.2d 29

216 Ill.2d 402

The VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, Illinois, an Illinois Municipal Organization, Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF SANGAMON, Illinois, an Illinois Body Corporate and Politic, Appellant.

No. 99136.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 22, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John P. Schmidt, State's Attorney, J. William Roberts, D. Bradley Blodgett, Russell L. Reed, Special Assistant State's Attorneys, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, L.L.P., Springfield, for appellant.

John M. Myers, Alex B. Rabin, of Rabin, Myers, Hanken & Durr, P.C., Springfield, for appellee.

Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue is whether the Village of Chatham, Illinois, or the County of Sangamon, Illinois, has zoning and building code jurisdiction over unincorporated lands that are subject to annexation agreements between the property owners and the Village. The circuit court of Sangamon County granted summary judgment in favor of the Village, finding that the Village's ordinances apply. Further, the circuit court rejected the County's claim that the provision of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 2002)) which authorizes application of the Village's ordinances is unconstitutional. A divided appellate court affirmed. 351 Ill.App.3d 889, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216. We granted the County's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Various persons who owned property in unincorporated Sangamon County reached agreements with the Village for the future annexation of their properties. The property owners and associated contractors obtained permits from the Village and began construction upon the properties. On March 8, 2002, the County sent letters to the property owners and the Village regarding the construction, asserting building code jurisdiction over the properties. In letters to the property owners, the County's zoning and building administrator noted that the County had not issued construction permits to the owners and requested that the owners contact the County as soon as possible. In the letter to the Village, the County stated that it had noticed construction taking place in areas "pre-annexed" to the Village, where the property owners had not obtained building permits from the County. The County asked the Village to refer to the County all applications for building permits in unincorporated areas and all questions regarding zoning of unincorporated areas.

In response, the Village filed an action for declaratory judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2002)). The Village sought a determination that the Village, and not the County, has zoning and building code jurisdiction in areas subject to annexation agreements with the Village, and an injunction preventing the County from making demands on contractors and interfering with the Village's annexation agreements. The Village also asked the court to establish an escrow account into which contractors could deposit the County building permit fees, with the proceeds to be paid to the County if the County prevailed or refunded to the contractors if the Village prevailed. Subsequently, the Village and County stipulated that, during the pendency of the lawsuit, owners, contractors, and developers would obtain County building permits and pay appropriate fees as required by County resolutions. The Village would also issue appropriate building permits to the owners, contractors, and developers, but would not charge any additional building permit fees. The funds collected by the County were to be placed in an escrow fund, administered by the county clerk of Sangamon County.¹ Lastly, both the Village and the County had the right to inspect the construction sites.

In its answer to the complaint, the County admitted the existence of a controversy between the Village and the County as to the applicability of section 11-15.1-2.1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 2002)), and demanded strict proof of the annexation agreements between the property owners and the Village. As an affirmative defense, the County claimed that section 11-15.1-2.1 contained an arbitrary classification and violated the special legislation provisions of article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 13). Lastly, the County counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, alleging that it had zoning, building code and Plat Act jurisdiction (765 ILCS 205/1 et seq. (West 2002)) over the unincorporated lands by operation of law. In a subsequent amendment, the County claimed that division 15.1 of the Municipal Code, if interpreted in the fashion advocated by the Village, is an invalid exercise of the police power because the legislation does not bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals and general welfare or convenience. Yet later, the County abandoned the Plat Act portion of its counterclaim.

Both the Village and the County moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, the County submitted a map to the court detailing the properties subject to annexation agreements and the corporate limits of the Village. Susan Poludniak, a staff member of the Springfield-Sangamon County regional county planning commission, caused the map to be prepared, and stated in an affidavit that the map "updates the corporate limits of the Village of Chatham over and above those maps produced by the Village of Chatham, including additional information received about newer annexation agreements." The circuit court granted the Village's motion for summary judgment and denied the County's motion. The court found that division 15.1 of the Municipal Code grants zoning and building code jurisdiction to municipalities over lands subject to annexation agreements. Further, the court upheld section 11-15.1-2.1 and division 15.1 against the County's special legislation challenge. The court found that the County "failed to meet its burden in establishing that the 1993 amendments made by the legislature to Division 15.1 are not rationally related to a legitimate State interest and that they are clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary."

A divided appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Village. The court first determined that section 5-1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1063 (West 2002)), which grants counties building code power over buildings located outside a municipality's corporate limits, and section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (West 2002)), which provides that a municipality shall not exercise zoning power outside its corporate limits if the county has adopted zoning ordinances, are not controlling where the lands at issue are subject to an annexation agreement with the municipality. 351 Ill.App.3d at 893-98, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216. The court reasoned:

"By providing `property that is the subject of an annexation agreement * * * is subject to the ordinances, control and jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that lies within the annexing municipality's corporate limits' * * * (65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1(a) (West -2002)), the legislature manifested its intent to make this general provision controlling in cases where the land is subject to an annexation agreement." 351 Ill.App.3d at 897, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216.

Next, the appellate court rejected the County's special legislation challenge, finding that the County failed to meet its burden of showing that the classification contained in section 11-15.1-2.1 is arbitrary and unreasonable. 351 Ill.App.3d at 901, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216. The court also rejected the County's claim that the legislation is an invalid use of police powers by the legislature. 351 Ill.App.3d at 901-02, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216. Lastly, the court rejected the County's argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact which made entry of summary judgment in favor of the Village inappropriate. The court noted that the County had admitted a dispute with the Village over zoning and building code jurisdiction and provided the circuit court with a map showing the location of some of the disputed lands. 351 Ill.App.3d at 902-03, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216. The court concluded that entry of a judgment declaring that the Village's ordinances applied to the disputed lands was proper and would terminate the controversy between the Village and the County. 351 Ill.App.3d at 903, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216.

Justice Myerscough dissented. Like the majority, she noted the apparent conflict between section 11-15.1-2 of the Municipal Code, section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code and section 5-1063 of the Counties Code. She disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that section 11-15.1-2 prevails over the other statutes. She would apply the principle of in pari materia to reconcile the statutes and would hold that a municipality's zoning power only becomes effective when the property is actually annexed. 351 Ill.App.3d at 904-07, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216.

We granted the County leave to appeal, and allowed the Illinois Municipal League leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Village. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

As noted above, the circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the Village in this action for declaratory judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). In the present case, the correctness of the circuit court's ruling turns on its determination that section 11-15.1-2.1 does not...