Village of Glencoe v. Hurford

• Decision Date: 09 June 1925
• Docket Number: No. 16362.,16362.
• Citation: 317 Ill. 203,148 N.E. 69
• Parties: VILLAGE OF GLENCOE v. HURFORD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

317 Ill. 203

148 N.E. 69

VILLAGE OF GLENCOE

v.HURFORD.

No. 16362.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 24, 1925.

Rehearing Denied with Modification June 9, 1925.

Petition by the Village of Glencoe for widening and altering of street, and for condemnation of property. From a final order and judgment, overruling objections of Samuel R. Hurford, he appeals.

Affirmed.

Thompson, J., Duncan, C. J., and Farmer, J., dissenting.Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; E. M. Moogan, Judge.

Morton T. Culver, of Chicago, for appellant.

George I. Hicks, of Chicago, for appellee.

HEARD, J.

This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the superior court of Cook county under the Local Improvement Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 24, § 698 et seq.), overruling objections of appellant to the entry of such order and judgment after proceedings had, in conformity with the act, upon a petition filed by appellee for the widening and altering of a street in the village of Glencoe called Sheridan Road, and for the condemnation of certain private property to be taken for use as a public street in such widening and alteration. The parties whose property was sought to be taken by the condemnation proceeding have not appealed.

[1] It is contended by appellant that the village of Glencoe had lost its jurisdiction of Sheridan Road and that the Lincoln Park commissioners had succeeded to such jurisdiction. In 1913 the General Assembly passed an act which, among other things, provided that the commissioners of Lincoln Park, of the county of Cook, are authorized to take, regulate, etc., the public street, thoroughfare etc., known as Sheridan Road running through Glencoe, provided the consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the prontage of the lots and lands abutting on Sheridan Road in each municipality or park district, or in that portion of each township not within any city or village, shall first be obtained, and that the consent, expressed by resultion or otherwise, of the authorities of each municipality, park district, and township shall first be obtained. Laws of 1913, § 1, p. 443. Before the Lincoln Park commissioners could acquire any rights in Sheridan Road in the village of Glencoe, it was necessary that both the consent in writing of the owners of a majority of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting thereon and the consent of the authorities of the village of Glencoe should be first obtained. The village of Glencoe on July 7, 1914, passed an ordinance giving consent to the commissioners of Lincoln coln Park to take, regulate, etc., Sheridan Road in Glencoe according to the provisions of the act of 1913, provided the commissioners should accept that same within 60 days. The commissioners accepted in writing the provisions of the ordinance in accordance therewith. The consent in writing of the ownersof a majority of the frontage of the lots and lands abutting on Sheridan Road in the village not having been obtained, in August, 1922, the village board passed an ordinance in which it was recited that the requirements of the act necessary to be fulfilled to make the ordinance giving consent to the Lincoln Park Commissioners effective had not been fulfilled; that the necessary consents and permissions had not been acquired by the commissioners; that the commissioners had never in any manner assumed or exercised any authority, control, or supervision over Sheridan Road; that the village of Glencoe had at all times maintained control and supervision over it, and repealed the ordinance of July 7, 1914. The consent of the property owners abutting on Sheridan Road in the village of Glencoe never having been obtained and the Lincoln Park commissioners never having assumed control and management over the road, the village of Glencoe never lost jurisdiction over the road, and this objection of appellant was properly overruled.

[2] It is contended by appellant that the improvement in question is a general and not a local improvement, and that for this reason the judgment should not have been entered. The petition herein is for the purpose of widening Sheridan Road and taking off sharp angles at certain intersecutions. The evidence in the record shows that while the widening of the street would improve it for general travel, it would be a particular advantage to the immediate locality and increase the value of the property specially assessed. The fact that the improvement will be of advantage to the city does not change its character as a local improvement if primarily it is a material advantage to the adjacent property. Where the improvement enhances the value of adjacent property, as distinguished from benefits diffused by it throughout the municipality, it is a local improvement. City of Springfield v. Consolidated Railway Co., 296 Ill. 17, 129 N. E. 580;Northwestern University v. Village of Wilmette, 230 Ill. 80, 82 N. E. 615. Under the evidence in the present case, the court properly held the improvement to be a local improvement.

[3] It is contended by appellant that the description of parcel 21, said to be described in the petition and ordinance, is so indefinite that it cannot be located. We have carefully examined the abstract in this case and find in neither the abstract of the recommendation of the board of local improvements, the assessment roll, the objections filed, the order overruling the objections, the judgment appealed from, nor the abstract of any of the proceedings set forth in the bill of exceptions, any description of any of the property sought to be taken or any description of parcel 21. The abstract consists of 591 pages, and the record, together with the exhibits, constitutes a volume of over 2,000 pages. While a court of review will sometimes search the record for the purpose of affirming a case, it will not search the record to hunt for error not disclosed by the abstract. The description of parcel 21 as set forth in the petition is such that the property can be located by a competent surveyor.

The first point in appellant's brief is:

‘Subdivider has the right to make reservations and to limit the use of dedicated streets. Village of Bradley v. N. Y. C. Rr.’

We assume that by the reference appellant wishes to call attention to the case having that title reported in 296 Ill. 383, 129 N. E. 744; but our attention is not called in the argument to any facts to which either that case or this point in appellant's brief might have reference.

The village of Glencoe is a municipal corporation in Cook county having a population, according to the last federal census, between 2,500 and 3,500, and is operating under a special charter granted by the General Assembly in 1869. By its charter it was granted the power to lay out, open, alter, widen, extend, establish, vacate, abolish, grade, pave, or otherwise improve and keep in good repair all roads, streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, squares, commons, parks or other public grounds or places in the village and to have exclusive control of the same. It was also given the power to pass all ordinances which the council may deem necessary and proper for the carrying into full effect of the provisions of the charter and for the regulation of the municipal government of the village.

The recommendation of the board of local improvements for this improvement was filed November 13, 1922, the ordinance for the improvement was adopted by the village board of trustees December 13, 1922, and commissioners were appointed, who took their oath May 17, 1923. These proceedings were not commenced under the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act of 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 696), and had no connection therewith. In 1913 the General Assembly passed an act (Laws 1913, p. 520) for the construction of a system of state-aid roads, by which one-half the cost of the construction of the road was to be paid by the county in which it was located and one-half by the state treasurer out of any unexpended balance remaining in the state road and bridge fund. As originally passed, this act contained a provision that no road or part thereof lying within the corporate limits of any city or village within this state shall be improved or opened with state aid. Section 9. It was also provided, by section 32 of the act (which is the section referred to in section 12 of the $60,000,000 Bond Issue Act as section 32 of article 4 of the act of 1913), that whenever any state-aid roads should be constructed or improved, thereafter the cost of maintaining and keeping such roads in proper repair should be paid out of the state road and bridge fund upon the warrant of the Auditor, whenever such payment should be ordered by the state highway commission. It was also provided that no steam or electric railroad company, telephone or telegraph company, or company laying or using pipe lines, should have the right to locate or construct its road or place its poles or wires or lay its pipe lines upon any state-aid road without the consent of the county board of the county wherein it was proposed to place or locate the same. This act also provided for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the name of the Department of Public Works and Buildings or in the name of the county in which the improvement was made. Section 9 of this act, which is section 9 of article 4 of the State Road and Bridge Act, was after its passage amended from time to time, so that at the time of the commencement of these proceedings it contained the following provisions:

‘And, provided, that a road or part thereof lying within the corporate limits of any city or village having a population of twenty thousand (20,000) inhabitants or less, as shown by the last federal census, situate within any county of the third class, may be improved or constructed with state aid to connect or complete, by the most direct route, a state-aid road already improved or constructed or being improved or constructed to the corporate limits of such city or village.

...