Village of Kaktovik v. Watt
| Decision Date | 19 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 79-3216,79-3193 and 79-3199,Nos. 81-1752,No.95-590,81-1753 and 81-1774,No. 81-1753,81-1753,81-1774,No. 81-1774,No. 81-1752,s. 81-1752,s. 79-3216,81-1752,95-590 |
| Citation | 689 F.2d 222 |
| Parties | , 223 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,103 VILLAGE OF KAKTOVIK, et al. v. James G. WATT, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, et al., Appellants. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, et al. v. James G. WATT, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, et al., Appellants. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, et al. v. James G. WATT, in his official capacity as Secretary, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al., Appellants, Amoco Production Company, Intervenor-Defendant. . Argued 5 May 1982. Decided 1 Oct. 1982. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action). Kathryn A. Oberly, Sp. Lit. Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants in Bruce J. Terris, with whom James M. Hecker, Nathalie V. Black and Robert S. Blacher, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for North Slope Borough, et al., appellees in Clifton E. Curtis, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Village of Kaktovik, et al., appellees in Patrick A. Parenteau, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Nat. Wildlife Federation, et al., appellees in E. Edward Bruce and Richard A. Meserve, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for amici curiae Atlantic Richfield Co., et al., urging reversal of the attorneys' fees orders in Before ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, and HAROLD H. GREENE, * United States District Judge for the District of Columbia. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY. Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by United States District Judge GREENE. WILKEY, Circuit Judge: This is an action for attorneys' fees and costs brought by plaintiffs/appellees, the Alaskan Village of Kaktovik, the Alaskan governmental entity of North Slope Borough, and the National Wildlife Federation. Plaintiffs challenged the decision of defendant/appellant Secretary of the Interior to conduct the Beaufort Sea Outer Continental Shelf lease sale, alleging that the proposed sale would violate the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 1 the |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil Action Nos. 79-3216, 79-3193 and 79-3199).
Kathryn A. Oberly, Sp. Lit. Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants in Nos. 81-1752, 81-1753 and 81-1774.
Bruce J. Terris, with whom James M. Hecker, Nathalie V. Black and Robert S. Blacher, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for North Slope Borough, et al., appellees in No. 81-1753.
Clifton E. Curtis, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Village of Kaktovik, et al., appellees in No. 81-1752.
Patrick A. Parenteau, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Nat. Wildlife Federation, et al., appellees in No. 81-1774.
E. Edward Bruce and Richard A. Meserve, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for amici curiae Atlantic Richfield Co., et al., urging reversal of the attorneys' fees orders in Nos. 81-1752, 81-1753 and 81-1774.
Before ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, and HAROLD H. GREENE, * United States District Judge for the District of Columbia.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
This is an action for attorneys' fees and costs brought by plaintiffs/appellees, the Alaskan Village of Kaktovik, the Alaskan governmental entity of North Slope Borough, and the National Wildlife Federation. Plaintiffs challenged the decision of defendant/appellant Secretary of the Interior to conduct the Beaufort Sea Outer Continental Shelf lease sale, alleging that the proposed sale would violate the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 1 the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 2 other federal statutes and treaties protecting arctic marine resources, and a special "trust responsibility" to Alaskan Native Americans.
We conclude that plaintiffs/appellees are not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Part I considers the plaintiffs' claim to an award under the OCSLA and ESA. Part II addresses the enforceability of a settlement agreement reached by the plaintiffs with the Department of Justice prior to litigation on the merits of the attorneys' fees issues. Because we find an award inappropriate on either ground, we reverse the decision of the district court awarding plaintiffs in excess of $230,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. 3
Plaintiffs ultimately lost on all issues, 4 but, some may be surprised to find, this need not bar the award of attorneys' fees and costs under the relevant provisions of OCSLA 5 and ESA. 6 However, we think it inappropriate for such an award to be made in today's case.
Our decision today in no way reflects on plaintiffs' counsel, whom the trial judge described as "excellent," 7 and of "ability rarely presented ... (and) the most exacting skill." 8 He concluded that they "could not have served their clients better." 9 We, too, were impressed with the quality of counsel, both on the merits and on the attorneys' fees issue. Nonetheless the statutes, their legislative histories, and the recent case law in this area all lead us to conclude that an award here would be inconsistent with congressional intent. Put in simplest terms, plaintiffs' litigation here was not so "exceptional" 10 and such a "substantial contribution( ) to the statutory goals" 11 of the underlying acts that an award is appropriate.
The Supreme Court, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 12 limited the opportunity to obtain public interest fees in the federal courts to those situations where there is specific statutory authority. Plaintiffs argue that the attorneys' fees provisions in both OCSLA and ESA contain such authority for an award to them here. Both statutes authorize awards "whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 13 The issue, then, is whether an award in this case is "appropriate" within the meaning of the statutes.
Last February this court published a trilogy of decisions involving the interpretation of the word "appropriate" in attorneys' fees statutes like the ones before us today. It is hardly necessary for us to retrace the analysis so painstakingly undertaken in those cases, and we will simply restate the principles we can glean from them. 14 Thus, Sierra Club v. Gorsuch 15 stated that courts are allowed "to award attorneys' fees to parties who have 'substantially contributed' to the goals" of the underlying statute. 16 Whether such a substantial contribution was made is to hinge on the importance, complexity, and novelty of the issues raised, and on the aid rendered in interpreting and implementing the act. 17 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. (EDF) v. EPA 18 quoted approvingly from the remarks made by Senator Tunney during the passage of the attorneys' fees provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act that, while "a successful plaintiff 'should ordinarily recover in (sic) attorneys' fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust,' " awards might also be appropriate "where such award is in the public interest without regard to the outcome of the litigation." 19 Senator Tunney was also quoted to the effect that "appropriate" was "a word which should (be) liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of this act." 20 Finally, in Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 21 we embraced the "valuable guidance ... abundantly afford(ed)" by Sierra Club and EDF, concluding that in determining whether an award is appropriate "the dominant consideration is whether litigation by that party has served the public interest by assisting the interpretation or implementation" 22 of the underlying statute.
Applying these principles to the matter today convinces us that the district judge-who did not have the advantage of the illumination afforded by these cases at the time he made his award-erred in his decision to grant attorneys' fees and costs. No substantial contribution was made to the goals of ESA or, especially, OCSLA. The public interest was not, on balance, appreciably furthered by the claims. The issues raised lacked the required importance, novelty, and complexity, and the suit helped little in the interpretation and implementation of these statutes. The contributions to the statutory goals in the case before us differ from those made in the February trilogy both because the statutory goals here were different and because the contributions were less.
Turning first to the statutory goals involved, we note that the Clean Air Act and Toxic Substances Control Act-the statutes involved in the cases last February-were enacted solely for environmental protection. One of the two acts central to our claim, however,-OCSLA-has as its primary goal expediting the development of our offshore resources, the very end plaintiffs blocked. As a unanimous Supreme Court recently stated:
The "basic purpose" of the 1978 Amendments (to OCSLA) was to "promote the swift, orderly and efficient exploitation of our almost untapped domestic oil and gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf," H.R.Rep.No.95-590, p. 53 (1977), ... and the Amendments were broadly designed to achieve that aim. 23
Litigation and, especially, delay from litigation were to be discouraged-particularly at the pre-development, pre-exploration leasing stage, where the chances of harm to the environment are slim. 24
This is not to say that OCSLA was insensitive to environmental concerns, or that the aims of ESA do not to some degree weigh against the pro-development aims of OCSLA. 25 But the statutory language and history and the Supreme Court's comment do place this case in a statutory context different from those governed by the Clean Air Act or the Toxic Substances Control Act alone. Where the statutes differ, the criteria for a substantial contribution to the statutory goals must differ, too. We must conclude that the contributions made to the underlying purposes of the statutes and to the public interest were less here than in Sierra Club, EDF, and Alabama Power. Indeed, given the specific aims of OCSLA, we cannot say that plaintiffs' action merits an award of attorneys' fees.
The inappropriateness of an award is particularly manifest when we weigh-as we think we must-the costs as well as the benefits to the statutory goals and the public interest which resulted from plaintiffs' litigation. It would of course be unwise for judges to weigh too finely the two. But here we must note that the adverse effects of the lawsuit on the expedited development of the nation's energy resources-an explicit aim of OCSLA-and the public treasury were considerable and the benefits to the public meager.
The Government asserts that the six-month delay caused by plaintiffs' suit cost $30 million-the sum which would have accumulated, at 15% interest, on the $400 million whose use the Government lost for six months. 26 Considering the other "adverse impacts on our national security and our economy," the Government further estimates a cost to the nation of $50-60 million. 27 It was in fact such considerations that prompted us to issue our order-vacating the district court's injunction against the Secretary's acceptance of bids and issuance of leases-without delay, while the opinion on the merits was being written. 28
Turning to the contributions made by the suit, we must conclude again that we have a situation considerably...
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