Village of Maywood v. Houston
| Decision Date | 26 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 34073,34073 |
| Citation | 10 Ill.2d 117,139 N.E.2d 233 |
| Parties | The VILLAGE OF MAYWOOD, Appellant, v. Harlan HOUSTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Louis Ancel, Chicago (Jack M. Siegel, Howard B. Bryand, and Robert E. Grundin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Stephen Jurco, Chicago (Gerald M. Chapman, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
In a justice of the peace court in Cook County, the defendant, Harlan Houston, was found not to have violated an ordinance of the Village of Maywood Regarding the maintenance of trailer camps. The village appealed to the criminal court of Cook County, but on motion of the defendant, its appeal was dismissed. A construction of the Illinois constitution being involved, the appeal comes directly to this court.
The issues raised on the motion to dismiss, and on this appeal, are as follows: (1) Does the village of Maywood have a right to appeal the justice court decision? Incidental to this question is whether the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy properly taken to the criminal court of properly taken to the criminal crout of Cook County?
The ordinance provides as follows: 'It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain or operate any plot of ground as a trailer camp for human habitation within the village.' The penalty prescribed for violation thereof is a fine not to exceed $200. The defendant was charged with violating this ordinance, but was found not guilty by a justice of the peace court jury.
The case raises anew the question of whether a proceeding of this kind is to be considered a civil or a criminal case. The following is a succinct summary of the applicable Illinois cases: 10 I.L.P. Cities, Villages, etc., sec. 1193.
The proceeding is not strictly or exclusively civil or criminal, but resembles both in some respects. For this reason, problems in this area cannot be solved by a mere labeling process, and the decisions of the courts, in Illinois and elsewhere, do not always have apparent logical consistency. Approaches have varied, as have the results; but for the most part, at least in this State, the more common questions have been resolved.
Turning first to the right of a city or village to appeal from an adverse decision, we find such a right has long been recognized. See, e. g., Baldwin v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 418; Knowles v. Village of Wayne City, 31 Ill.App. 471; Town of Greenfield v. Mook, 12 Ill.App. 281. See, City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 Ill.2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504. This comment of the court in the Baldwin case is typical: 'Inasmuch as this is a civil proceeding in form, and only quasi criminal in its character, we are of opinion that the right of appeal is conferred on appellee as well as on appellant.' 68 Ill. 418, 419-420. This rule is followed generally in analogous proceedings to recover a penalty. See People v. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill. 370, 21 N.E. 923; People v. Gartenstein, 248 Ill. 546, 94 N.E. 128; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 27.65.
By thus recognizing a municipality's right to appeal an adverse decision in a case to collect an ordinance violation penalty, the courts have by implication rejected a claim of double jeopardy were the case to be remanded for a new trial.
The Illinois constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides as follows: 'No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.' ( 'Jeopardy, in its constitutional or common-law sense, has a strict application to criminal prosecutions only.' (15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, sec. 360.) As stated in a similar case, 'the charge upon which defendant was arrested was not criminal in character and the proceedings were not criminal in the sense that they were an enforcement of general criminal laws.' People v. Riksen, 284 Mich. 284, 279 N.W. 513, 116 A.L.R. 116.
In permitting an appeal for both sides, the reviewing courts of this State have emphasized the civil aspects of the proceeding, and in...
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People v. Levin
...(see 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 339 (4th ed. 1992)), to which double jeopardy does not attach (see Village of Maywood v. Houston (1957), 10 Ill.2d 117, 120, 139 N.E.2d 233). Thus, the requirement of a mere preponderance quantum of proof effectively defeats any analogy to trial on ......
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City of Chicago v. Prus, 82-1863
...twice in jeopardy for the same offense (Village of Park Forest v. Bragg (1967), 38 Ill.2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill.2d 117, 139 N.E.2d 233). Defendant's further argument, without citation to authority, that plaintiff's request for outright reversal in......
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City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp.
...proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (City of Chicago v. Joyce (1967), 38 Ill.2d 368, 372-73, 232 N.E.2d 289; Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill.2d 117, 119, 139 N.E.2d 233.) In this regard, we have held that, in the absence of clear statutory language expressing an intention that Sta......
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Village of Mundelein v. Minx
...and the long string of cases interpreting Rule 604(a) as applying only to State and not municipal appeals. See Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Ill.2d 117, 139 N.E.2d 233 (1956); Village of Park Forest v. Bragg, 38 Ill.2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868 (1967); Village of Mundelein v. Aaron, 112 Ill.A......