Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation

• Decision Date: 25 January 1960
• Docket Number: Nos. A--39,A--40,s. A--39
• Citation: 157 A.2d 829,31 N.J. 420
• Parties: VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BERGEN COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 420

31 N.J. 420

157 A.2d 829

VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BERGEN COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. A--39, A--40.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 10, 23, 1959.

Decided Jan. 25, 1960.

James A. Mayor, Hackensack, argued the cause for defendants-appellants, Fenner and Hutcheon (Everett I. Smith, Hackensack, attorney. James A. Major, Hackensack, of counsel).

Theodore I. Botter, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued the cause for defendant-appellant, Bergen County Board of Taxation (David D. Furman, Atty. Gen., attorney).

William R. Morrison, Hackensack, argued the cause for plaintiffs-respondents (Morrison, Lloyd & Griggs, Hackensack, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

WEINTRAUB, C.J.

The Village of Ridgefield Park and several of its taxpayers filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against the Bergen County Board of Taxation and the assessors of each of the other municipalities in Bergen County, seeking certain relief with respect to the assessment of real and personal property. Some of the assessors moved for judgment on the pleadings, and so also did the county board. Their motions were denied. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal from the interlocutory orders, and prior to hearing thereon were certified the matter on motion.

Plaintiffs allege that in the Village of Ridgefield Park all real and personal properties were assessed at true value for the year 1959, but the county board and the defendant assessors have 'wilfully, deliberately and intentionally failed, neglected and refused to perform their duties and obligations' to achieve the same treatment of property in the remaining municipalities of the county. This allegation must of course be accepted as true on a motion addressed to the face of the pleadings. Plaintiffs seek to compel compliance for the year 1959 and thereafter, and also a restraint against collection from the Village of Ridgefield Park of an amount in excess of what its fair share of the cost of county government would be upon the assessment of all real and personal property at true value.

I.

It is urged that (1) the issuance of a Mandamus would be contrary to the public interest and (2) plaintiffs should be remitted to an administrative remedy.

Both propositions were presented in Switz v. Middletown Township, 23 N.J. 580, 130 A.2d 15 (1957). There is no point in traversing again the ground fully explored in that case. Succinctly, the situation is this: The Constitution of 1947 provides in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 1:

'Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules. All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of value; and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing district.'

The Constitution does not require that all real property taxed locally or for local use shall be assessed at true value. Rather it requires all such real property to be assessed 'according to the same standard of value,' which may be a percentage of true value. But the statute, N.J.S.A. 54:4--1, provides that unless exempted it shall be subject to taxation 'at its true value.' The Constitution does not require that all personal property shall be taxed or that personal property if taxed, shall be assessed at true value. But, again, the statute just cited provides that all taxable tangible personal property shall be assessed 'at its true value.' See also R.S. 54:3--13, N.J.S.A. and N.J.S.A. 54:3--22; N.J.S.A. 54:4--12, 23, 47.

In Switz we discussed the long history of widespread failure to comply with the legislative mandate. We had before us and decided the question whether the court could properly look the other way. We agreed we could not. It is the singular situation of the judiciary that issues before it must be met and decided when presented. In this forum, action is inescapable for a court necessarily acts whether it grants or denies relief. Either course affirmatively disposes of the right asserted.

In Switz a majority of the court concluded the issuance of Mandamus to achieve assessment at true value should there be delayed for a period of two years. The manifold problems directly and tangentially involved were weighed, and because of them the right of the plaintiff to relief was suspended for the stated period to the end that the Legislature would have an adequate opportunity to explore the subject. More than two years have elapsed and we assume the necessary facts are on hand for such action by the Legislature as it may find to be in the public interest. In the circumstances, we may not delay the right of plaintiffs to enforcement of the existing statutory policy and thus leave their interests to miscellaneous policies allegedly pursued locally without constitutional or statutory authorization.

As stated above, defendants urge the administrative remedy is adequate and must be exhausted before recourse is had to the judicial forum. There are two aspects: the administrative remedy available (a) to review or revise assessments of taxable property and (b) to review the apportionment made by the county board of the cost of county government for the year 1959.

With respect to the first, it is sufficient to say that the statutory right to equal treatment cannot effectively be achieved by an appeal to supervisory statutory agencies or by a multitude of petitions to raise the properties of others to full true value. This view was expressed by the Appellate Division in Switz upon a full discussion of the subject, 40 N.J.Super. 217, 225, 122 A.2d 649 (1956), and our decision in that case rests upon that premise. Hence plaintiffs, upon establishing the allegations of their complaint, would be entitled to a judgment directing the several assessors to proceed expeditiously to assess all taxable property in accordance with the statute, that is to say, at true value as the assessor in good faith finds it to be. If it should appear that plaintiff municipality has thus sought in good faith to assess real and personal property at full true value but has failed in some remediable particular to achieve its aim, it may be required to remedy the shortcoming as a condition for relief, contemporaneously with compliance by the defendants with the judgment. The relief ultimately granted cannot, however, relate retroactively to individual assessments as to which the time for appeal by the owners has already expired. They are not parties to this proceeding. Moreover, retroactive reassessments of all property would entail disorder hurtful to the public interest. That relief accordingly should relate to such future assessment date as the trial court shall find to be feasible and fair in the light of the facts. At the argument before us, it was suggested that failure to assess at full true value was admitted in answers to interrogatories. They are not in the record before us. If at any stage of the proceedings it should be conceded that a party has so failed, the court in its discretion may make an Interim order directing any necessary revaluation process to begin, since the resulting data will ultimately be needed to achieve compliance with the statute.

Defendants correctly challenge plaintiffs' attempt to attack directly in these proceedings the equalization table (R.S. 54:3--17 to 19, N.J.S.A.), the apportionment valuation (N.J.S.A. 54:4--49), and the table of aggregates (N.J.S.A. 54:4--52) made and prepared by the county board for the purpose of allocating the cost of county government for the year 1959 and to restrain the collection of taxes for that year. The reason is not the adequacy of an administrative review to reach the basic vice of unequal assessments of the underlying individual properties. An administrative review of the county board's work is no more adequate to that end than are the other administrative procedures to which we referred above in reaching the conclusion that a Mandamus may issue without prior recourse to them. Rather the compelling reason is that government must function and to that end must have funds. It would be quite extraordinary to enjoin in a wholesale fashion the assessment or collection of taxes where the properties are lawfully taxable and the infirmity is claimed to reside in the valuation process. See in general, 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, § 1218, p. 1039. This essential public policy is reflected in N.J.S.A. 54:2--37, which provides that the review of the county equalization table by the Division of Tax Appeals 'shall not suspend the apportionment of moneys or collection of taxes.' The remedy for the alleged inequity cannot be one which will deny the public the vital services it needs. The question of a subsequent credit either under statute or judicial principle is of course another matter.

II.

In Switz plaintiff sought equal treatment of real property within the municipality in which she was a taxpayer. Defendants here urge that the principle of Switz is not applicable to an action by taxpayers of one municipality to compel compliance with the statute in the other municipalities of the county as to either real property or personal property.

With respect to real property, defendants contend the equalization of the aggregates thereof insures equality of treatment as among the municipalities of the county. It is true that practical equality (somewhat short of the ideal; see City of Passaic v. Passaic County...