Village of Riverside v. MacLean

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Citation210 Ill. 308,71 N.E. 408
Decision Date23 June 1904

210 Ill. 308
71 N.E. 408

MACLEAN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 23, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Axel Chytraus, Judge.

Bill for an injunction by George A. Maclean and others against the village of Riverside. From a decree granting the injunction, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

[210 Ill. 313]

[71 N.E. 410]

Amos C. Miller and Ralph Crews, for appellant.

Frank F. Reed, for appellees.

[210 Ill. 309]This is a bill filed in the superior court of Cook county on September 24, 1903, by appellees, as complainants, who were owners of certain lots in block 4 of the First Division of Riverside, against the village of Riverside, as defendant, to restrain the latter from opening an alleged highway, intended, as is claimed by appellant, to be a pleasure driveway, but intended, as is claimed by appellees, to be a public road and highway, across a strip of land lying immediately north and west of said block 4, south of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, and east of the Des Plaines river, upon the ground, as is charged by appellees, that the premises in question are a public park and common, and were so dedicated by the Riverside Improvement [210 Ill. 310]Company, and adjudged to be such, and accepted and used as such by the village of Riverside, and relied upon as such by the appellees in the purchoseof

[71 N.E. 409]

their lots in block 4, and so represented upon the recorded maps and plats of the subdivision. The bill charges, in substance, that the opening of the proposed highway or driveway will, under the circumstances, constitute a diversion of the property from the original purpose of which it was dedicated, and a misuse of it to the detriment of the appellees, and against their vested rights and easements. The bill was answered by the appellant, the village of Riverside, denying the material allegations thereof, and to the answer replication was filed.

Upon the hearing of the cause, testimony oral and documentary was introduced; and on June 20, 1903, a final decree was entered, in which the court found that the appellees (complainants below) were the owners in fee of their respective lots as described in the bill, and derived their respective titles thereto by mesne conveyances from the Riverside Improvement Company at the times and in the manner set forth in the bill; that the premises described in the bill as ‘Tract B,’ to wit, the premises bounded by the south line of the right of way of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad on the north, Bloomingbank Road on the east and south, and the river on the west, all in the village of Riverside, were dedicated in 1869 by the said improvement company, the then owner thereof, by common-law dedication, for a public park and common, and have since been and are now public park and common; that the lots of the appellees about on said public park and common; that appellees purchased and acquired their lots after the dedication of said public park and common and in reliance upon the dedication thereof that the village of Riverside was organized in 1875 as a municipal corporation, and then recognized said dedication of said premises known as ‘Tract B’ as public park and common, and [210 Ill. 311]has since treated and cared for the same as public park and common under and in accordance with the said dedication; that said premises have heretofore, at the suit of said defendant, the village of Riverside, been claimed as public park and common, and been adjudged and decreed to be public park and common; that the said premises referred to as ‘Tract D’ in said bill are a part of the premises, described as ‘Tract B,’ and are part and parcel of said public park and common; that complainants below purchased their respective lots for residence purposes prior to August 28, 1900, in full faith that the said tract B and tract D would be forever held sacred to the public uses for which they were dedicated as public park and common-as places of resort for amusement and recreation; that the village of Riverside is estopped to make or assert any use of tract B, or any part thereof, except as public park and common; that the proposed use by said village of that portion of tract B, described in the bill, as a street, or as a public highway, or as an extension of West avenue, or any street or highway in said village, is unlawful, unwarranted, and illegal, and inconsistent with the uses and purposes for which the said tract B was originally dedicated, and is now used and held; that the ordinance passed by said village on August 28, 1900, amending a previous ordinance of the village, approved August 24, 1875, which prohibited riding or driving over or across any public park, road, border, common, or ornamental pleasure ground, by adding thereto the following words, ‘provided that the strip of ground fifty feet in width and included between the east and west lines of West avenue, in the village of Riverside, extended south from the southern terminus of said avenue to Bloomingbank Road, may be used for the passage of pleasure vehicles and pedestrians,’ is null and void and of no effect, and that the proposed enforcement thereof by the village and its officers was illegal and unlawful, and in violation of the duties and obligations, [210 Ill. 312]assumed by said village by the dedication and use of said track B as a public park and common, and in violation of the rights of appellees (complainants below) in said public park and common; that said appellees, and each of them, have an easement in said public park, and the right to have the same devoted perpetually to the uses and purposes for which the same was dedicated, and no other purpose, and that the extension of said proposed street and highway over and upon said public park and common, and the construction of the roadway thereon, and the removal of the trees and shrubbery thereon, as proposed by the said defendant, are without authority of law; that the equities of the case are with the complainants below, and that the material allegations of the bill are true; and that said complainants are entitled to the relief prayed for. And in said decree it was thereupon adjudged and decreed that the defendant below, the village of Riverside, its officers, servants, agents, and employés, should be, and were thereby, perpetually enjoined and restrained, unless thereafter lawfully thereunto authorized, from in any way extending or attempting to extend the said West avenue, or any other street or highway at the location thereof, across, along, upon, or over the said tract B, and from in any way laying out, opening, or extending, constructing, or attempting to lay out, extend, or construct said street, road, or highway upon or across said tract B, and that a writ of injunction issue to that effect, and that complainants below recover costs from the defendant below. To this finding and decree the defendant below excepted, and the present appeal is prosecuted from the decree so rendered.

The following plat is a copy of Exhibit A, attached to the bill, and sufficiently illustrates the location of block 4, with the 21 lots into which the same is subdivided, together with the tract or public park and common across which it is proposed to extend West avenue, as indicated below. The portions which in the original map were colored green are represented by the shaded parts of the map printed herewith:

Image 1 (3.59" X 3.5") Available for Offline Print

The dotted lines show West avenue as proposed to be extended. The shaded portions show park. The black lines show tract D.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

After a careful examination of the record, plats, maps, and evidence, we are of the opinion that the testimony sustains the findings of the court below, and that the decree entered by it is correct.

[210 Ill. 314]About March 1, 1869, the Riverside Improvement Company, incorporated under a special act of the Legislature of Illinois for the purpose of establishing a suburban town, became the owner of the south half of section 25, and the whole of sections 35 and 36, in township 39 north, range 12 east of the third principal meridian, except that part lying south of the Des Plaines river, and also of some parts of sections 1 and 2 in township 38, which lands were included within the outlines of maps and plats hereinafter mentioned, and included said block 4 and said tract B. The lands acquired lay to the east and west of the Des Plaines river, in its north and south course. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad ran east and west, and a little south of west, through the tract, and across the Des Plaines river. Immediately north of the railroad tracks was a tract of land, marked upon the plat, ‘Land not belonging to the company,’ which was not owned by the Riverside Improvement Company, and which at that time was not subdivided. North, however, of this unsubdivided tract, was a tract purchased by the company subject to a mortgage, which was afterwards foreclosed, and all the title of the Riverside Improvement Company was thereby eliminated. The latter tract was platted and subdivided into roadways and parks upon the same plan as the land south of the railroad tracks. The tract here in controversy, and alleged to be a park, or a part of a system of parks, inaugurated by the improvement company, lies south of the railroad tracks, and north and west of block 4, in which the lots of appellees are located. Subsequently the northern part of the unsubdivided tract, lying north of said railroad tracks, was subdivided into lots and blocks and streets, and called ‘Beebe's Central Riverside Addition,’ and the southern part of said tract was subsequently subdivided into lots and blocks, etc., and called ‘Wessencraft's Homestead Addition.’ The street lying north of Wessencraft's Addition, and running east and [210 Ill. 315]west, was designated as ‘Forest Avenue.’ From Forest avenue, West avenue runs...

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63 cases
  • South Park Com'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 8 Febrero 1911
    ...public for recreation and amusement, and it is usually laid out in walks, drives, and recreation grounds. Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N. E. 408,66 L. R. A. 288, 102 Am. St. Rep. 164; Webster's Dict.; 29 Cyc. 1684; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 1066. Whether a pub......
  • Thorndike v. City of Milwaukee
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 24 Mayo 1910
    ...653, 914. That a municipality cannot use for purposes foreign to the dedication lands dedicated for a public park: Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N. E. 408, 66 L. R. A. 288, 102 Am. St. Rep. 164;Sachs v. Trustees of Towanda, 79 Ill. App. 439;Board of Education v. Kansas City, 62 Kan......
  • Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 9
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 5 Diciembre 1932
    ...431, 8 L.Ed. 452; Sheffield & Tuscumbia Street Ry. v. Rand & Moore, 83 Ala. 294, 3 So. 686. See, also, Village of Riverside v. MacLain, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N.E. 408, 66 L.R.A. 288, 102 Am.St.Rep. 164; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361; 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 1102. There right......
  • Friends of N. Spokane Cnty. Parks v. Spokane Cnty., 32056–1–III.
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    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • 21 Octubre 2014
    ...from other jurisdictions have held that a municipality may not use parkland for a public highway. See Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 Ill. 308, 323–24, 71 N.E. 408 (1904) (village's contention that proposed roadway through park would be a “pleasure driveway” was unsupported by evidence......
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