Village of Schaumburg v. Franberg

• Decision Date: 31 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-2375,79-2375
• Citation: 424 N.E.2d 1239,54 Ill.Dec. 336,99 Ill.App.3d 1
• Parties: , 54 Ill.Dec. 336 VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold P. FRANBERG and Walter W. Scheble, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1239

424 N.E.2d 1239

99 Ill.App.3d 1, 54 Ill.Dec. 336

VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold P. FRANBERG and Walter W. Scheble, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 79-2375.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

July 31, 1981.

[99 Ill.App.3d 2] [54 Ill.Dec. 337] John F. O'Meara, Arlington Heights, for defendants-appellants.

Allen D. Choka, Jack M. Siegel, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

LORENZ, Justice:

Complaints were filed by plaintiff, the Village of Schaumburg (the Village) Before reaching the issues presented for review, we find it necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties as to the exact stipulation of facts upon which defendants were tried. Defendants maintain that the stipulation included evidence that they picked up the passengers in the Village only after being solicited to do so, and that they returned the passengers to the Village of Mount Prospect, in which they were licensed. The Village argues that the only stipulated evidence was that defendants picked up passengers in the Village without the required license. The transcript of the proceedings reveals the following exchange between defense counsel, the Village prosecutor, and defendant Franberg:

[54 Ill.Dec. 338] against defendants, taxicab drivers for Prospect Cab Company of the Village of Mount Prospect, Illinois, for having "no public passenger business license" in violation of section 30-2 of the Village's ordinance. The stipulated facts at the ensuing bench trial showed that defendants were charged with violating the aforementioned ordinance after a Village police officer observed them on three separate occasions picking up passengers at the Woodfield Shopping Center located in the Village of Schaumburg without the required license. Defendants appeal from the findings of guilt and the imposition of a fine of $25 and $10 court costs because of their failure to have licenses to pick up passengers within the limits of the Village in violation of the ordinance.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, this is a little conclusive. I don't think there is any question about the facts, there is no argument. These are cabs that pick up people on request from United Airlines. They have an arrangement with United Airlines to pick the people up and take them back to the community that the people live in and they are licensed in.

PROSECUTOR: They were hustling people at Woodfield.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes they were, by request.

PROSECUTOR: They have to have a license, that is how the ordinance reads. Do they have a license?

JUDGE: First of all, there is no evidence presented as to the violation in question. There has been a lot about the law.

PROSECUTOR: I think he agreed to the facts, that is why he started.

JUDGE: Is that correct?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think we would Judge. We are saying that I think the police officer marked it inter-urban operation. That is what we are talking about. This is not a case where we are disputing the facts, that I know of anyway.

JUDGE: The only thing I see before me is no public business license.

DEFENDANT FRANBERG: Well, this is what it was. I was on request to pick these people up and the way I understood it was that I don't have to have a Schaumburg license to pick up people who called to take them back. And if I had the business license I would have done it.

JUDGE: Do we have any evidence to present?

PROSECUTOR: The evidence presented is such that the officer, if he were called to testify would testify that they were picking people up within the Village of Schaumburg. He observed them picking up passengers, he verified that they had no business license, the ordinance reads that to pick up people within the Village of Schaumburg they must definitely have a business license.

JUDGE: Do you stipulate to those facts, counsel?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

JUDGE: Then my finding is guilty, $25 and $10 on each count. I think your argument * * *

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I only want to make it clear that the facts on the record show and we are agreeing to JUDGE: Right, but I am just telling you how I am going to find you. I honestly don't believe that these cases pertain to these cases.

[54 Ill.Dec. 339] that they were bringing them back to places when they were licensed and that is all, and that we had no Schaumburg license. Is that agreed to?

OPINION

A stipulation is an agreement between parties or their attorneys with respect to business before the court. (People v. Buford (1974), 19 Ill.App.3d 766, 312 N.E.2d 796.) While a stipulation need not follow any particular form, it must be clear, certain and definite in its material provisions (Scott v. Dreis & Krump Co. (1975), 26 Ill.App.3d 971, 326 N.E.2d 74), and it is essential that it be assented to by parties or those representing them. (See 83 CJS Stipulations, § 3.) In the present case, we find that the only stipulation entered between the parties immediately followed the trial court's inquiry as to whether there was any evidence to present. Defense counsel unequivocally agreed to the prosecutor's statement that defendants were observed picking up passengers within the Village without the proper license. Defense counsel's opening remarks along with defendant Franberg's unsworn comment that he was "on request" to pick up passengers and "take them back" were not part of the stipulation and were never assented to by the prosecutor. Likewise, defense counsel's subsequent attempt to "make it (the stipulation) clear" concerning defendants' actions in merely returning the passengers to Mount Prospect, was not only offered without the prosecutor's concurrence, but occurred subsequent to the trial court's finding of guilty. In sum, defense counsel clearly stipulated to the prosecutor's version of the expected testimony without qualification, and no other stipulations were made. Therefore, that evidence cannot be disputed on appeal. (See People v. Wiggins (1973), 9 Ill.App.3d 1078, 293 N.E.2d 696.) We, therefore, turn our attention to the issues raised for our review.

Defendants initially contend that they were improperly found to have violated section 30-2 of the Village's ordinance since "public passenger vehicle licenses" are required only of persons in the business of operating them, and not of drivers.

Section 30-2 provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any public passenger vehicle or engage in the business of operating public passenger vehicles in the village, including the operation of one or more such vehicles, without obtaining a public passenger vehicle license for each such vehicle operated, as provided in this chapter and otherwise conforming to the requirements of this Code, and applicable provisions of other ordinances of the village. Village of Schaumburg. Code, Ch. 30, § 30-2.

Basically, defendants argue that this section is inapplicable to them as taxicab drivers since the Village code has no provision requiring drivers to obtain individual business licenses. Moreover, they assert, no proof was adduced that defendants owned, controlled or operated the business in which they drove the taxicabs, and they therefore fell outside the section's prohibition of "engag(ing) in the business of operating" the vehicles.

Our determination of the applicability of section 30-2 of the Village ordinance to defendants requires a brief review of some basic rules of construction. As a general rule, courts apply the same rules of construction to municipal ordinances as they do to statutes. (1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 30.06 (4th ed. 1972).) The primary rule in construing statutes and ordinances is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislative body. (Brown v. Illinois Department of Revenue (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 238, 44 Ill.Dec. 516, 411 N.E.2d 882; Pressley v. Chicago (1960), 26 Ill.App.2d 283, 168 N.E.2d 41.) The search for legislative intent must begin with the words of the legislation itself, and when the language is clear, its plain meaning must be given effect. (Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill.2d 317 43 Ill.Dec. 12, 410 N.E.2d 12.) Under section 30-2, it is unlawful for "any person to drive or operate any public passenger vehicle or engage in the business of operating public passenger vehicles in the village * * * without obtaining a public passenger vehicle license" (emphasis ours.) To interpret this language as being inapplicable to drivers of taxicabs would require us to totally ignore the plain and ordinary meaning of the words "drive" and "or." The use of the disjunctive "or" obviously reveals that the ordinance was meant to apply to separate groups of people those who "drive" a cab, or those who "operate one," or those who "engage in the business" of operating such vehicles. Therefore, defendants, as drivers of the vehicles, fall squarely within the ambit of this section. While defendants are correct in noting that there is no provision in the ordinance for drivers to obtain a public passenger vehicle license, this does not render invalid a requirement that they drive licensed vehicles. An ordinance may make driving an unlicensed vehicle alone an offense. (See, e. g., City of Chicago v. Vokes (1963), 28 Ill.2d 475, 193 N.E.2d 40.) Furthermore, we believe that the Village's code, when viewed as a whole, evidences an intent that licensing of vehicles is necessary to ensure that passengers receive safe and adequate service. For instance, the ordinance requires vehicles to be inspected by an approved automotive repair garage (section 30-3) and be kept in clean and sanitary condition (section 30-16) before a license will issue. Given this scheme, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the drivers, who are in actual control and possession of the vehicles and are responsible for their safe operation, are equally subject to the licensing requirements. Under our interpretation, the drivers face penalties for violating section 30-2, and are surely encouraged to...