Village of Western Springs, Ill., v. Collins

• Decision Date: 24 January 1900
• Docket Number: 638.
• Citation: 98 F. 933
• Parties: VILLAGE OF WESTERN SPRINGS, ILL., v. COLLINS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

98 F. 933

VILLAGE OF WESTERN SPRINGS, ILL., v. COLLINS.

No. 638.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

January 24, 1900

W. P Quinby, for plaintiff in error

Hatch &amp Ritsher and Bennett H. Young, for defendant in error.

Before WOODS and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and BUNN, District Judge.

JENKINS Circuit Judge, after the foregoing statement of the case, .

We take it that the production of the deed upon the prayer of the defendant made the instrument produced a part of the plaintiff's declaration, to the same extent as though it had been set out in haec verba in, and made part of, the declaration. 1 Chit. Pl. 433. It therefore appears on the face of the declaration that the covenant sued on was that of a married woman, which at common law was inoperative because of her inability to contract. Jackson v Vanderheyden, 17 Johns. 167. The statute of the state of Illinois with respect to the rights and liabilities of married women, which governs the case before us, was passed in the year 1874 (2 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 2122, § 6), and is as follows: 'Contracts may be made and liabilities incurred by a wife, and the same enforced against her, to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were unmarried. ' Within the last 50 years many of the states of the Union have enacted laws removing, in large measure the common-law disability of married women, and decisions in the different states upon the various statutes have not been at agreement. It would be unprofitable here to review the various decisions, for the supreme court of the state of Illinois has passed upon this statute, and its decision is controlling. In Snell v. Snell, 123 Ill. 403, 14 N.E. 684, the court held that where a married woman had, for the purpose of releasing her dower, joined with her husband in a deed of certain premises, which were therein wrongly described, a bill in equity would lie, as against her, to reform the deed, although it was conceded that the contract of conveyance was that of the husband, and that such a bill would not lie prior to the statute. The judge delivering the opinion of the court below indulges in strong and general language with respect to the supposed emancipation of married women by the statute quoted, in respect of her right to contract as though she were a feme sole. The actual point decided, however, was as stated. In the case of Stanford v. Kane, 133 Ill. 199, 24 N.E. 414, 8 L.R.A....