Village of Westville v. Loitz Bros. Const. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 4-87-0521,4-87-0521
• Citation: 165 Ill.App.3d 338,519 N.E.2d 37
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 116 Ill.Dec. 447 VILLAGE OF WESTVILLE, Vermilion County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOITZ BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Page 37

519 N.E.2d 37

165 Ill.App.3d 338, 116 Ill.Dec. 447

VILLAGE OF WESTVILLE, Vermilion County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOITZ BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 4-87-0521.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Jan. 21, 1988.

Wendell W. Wright, Wright Law Offices, Danville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard T. West, Follmer & West, Urbana, for defendant-appellee.

Justice SPITZ delivered the opinion of the court:

On June 18, 1986, Loitz Bros. Construction Company, Inc. (Loitz), filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association and served the demand on the village of Westville (Westville). The dispute for which Loitz sought arbitration arose out of a construction contract between O'Neil Brothers Construction Company, Inc. (O'Neil), and Westville for the construction of a sanitary sewer system. Loitz was a subcontractor of O'Neil and was approved by Westville to be a subcontractor. On June 10, 1986, O'Neil assigned its rights to pursue claims under the contract to Loitz and also authorized Loitz to proceed in its name in the pursuit of said claims. The contract between O'Neil and Westville contained a "broad form" of arbitration agreement which provided:

"All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to, the CONTRACT DOCUMENTS or the breach thereof, except for claims which have been waived by the making and acceptance of final payment as provided by Section 20, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. This agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in any court having jurisdiction thereof."

On January 28, 1987, Westville filed a motion for stay of the arbitration proceeding in the circuit court of Vermilion County. On May 6, 1987, O'Neil was added as a party claimant to the arbitration proceeding before the American Arbitration Association. On May 19, 1987, a hearing was conducted to consider the motion for stay of arbitration proceedings. On July 8, 1987, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion for stay of arbitration and directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. It is from this order that Westville appeals.

As both parties agree, upon application to a court to stay arbitration proceedings, the only issue to be considered by the court is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, and this question is to be summarily determined. Lester Witte & Co. v. Lundy (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 1100, 54 Ill.Dec. 489, 425 N.E.2d 1; Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 10, par. 102(a), (b).

Westville's principal contention on appeal is that no valid assignment of a right to arbitrate has occurred in this case. They base this contention upon a "non-assignability" clause in the contract. However, as the court stated in Kennedy v. Deere & Co. (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 781, 785, 96 Ill.Dec. 957, 960, 492 N.E.2d 199, 202:

"Lacking any statutory prohibition, the right to receive moneys due or to become due under an existing contract may be assigned though the contract itself may be unassignable. (DuPont DeBie v. Vredenburgh (4th Cir.1974), 490 F.2d 1057.) Under Federal common law, no less than under the law of this State, an assignee for collection may sue as the real party in interest. Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co. (2nd Cir.1966), 359 F.2d 292, citing Rosenblum v. Dingfelder (2nd Cir.1940), 111 F.2d 406."

Additionally, as the court stated in Saltzberg v. Fishman (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 447, 452, 78 Ill.Dec. 782, 786, 462 N.E.2d 901, 905:

"A chose in action is also personal property and is assignable. (See Browning v. Heritage Insurance Co. (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 943, 947, 338 N.E.2d 912.) A suit to enforce a chose in action may properly be brought in the name of the assignee. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 2-403(a)."

Furthermore, as the court stated in Ozdeger v. Altay (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 629, 632-33, 23 Ill.Dec. 446, 448-49, 384 N.E.2d 82, 84-85, in construing an arbitration agreement similar to the one at issue in the instant case:

"We believe the holding of this court in Roosevelt University v. Mayfair Construction Co. governs the outcome of the present case. The contract there contained an arbitration clause identical to the clause with which we are concerned. This court held that, in comparison to a clause providing for arbitration of disputes 'arising in connection with' a contract, a clause using the language 'arising out of, or relating to' is broader in scope. As in Blades, the contractor claimed damages for owner-caused delays under a contract which contained no express provision relating to this issue. The court, while agreeing with the Blades holding, nevertheless held that the inclusion of this type of arbitration clause in the contract justified submission of the issue to arbitration. Similarly here, by inserting this broad arbitration clause into the contract, it is clear that the parties intended to resolve through arbitration any and all disputes arising out of the subject matter of the contract, that is, the construction of plaintiffs...