Villani v. Seibert, 66 MAP 2016
| Decision Date | 26 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 66 MAP 2016,66 MAP 2016 |
| Parties | Jean Louise VILLANI, Individually and in her Capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Guerino Villani, Deceased v. John SEIBERT, Jr. and Mary Seibert Frederick John Seibert, Jr. and Mary Seibert v. Jean Louise Villani and Thomas D. Schneider, Esquire Appeal of: Frederick John Seibert, Jr. and Mary Seibert |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Jeffrey B. Albert, Esq., for Nicholas O. Brown, Amicus Curiae.
Anthony Salvatore Cottone, Esq., Burns White, LLC, for The Professional Liability Defense Federation, Amicus Curiae.
H. Robert Fiebach, Esq., Cozen O'Connor, for Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Amicus Curiae.
Bruce Richard Beemer, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., for Attorney General's Office, Participants.
Peter Michael Newman, Esq., Mark William Tanner, Esq., Feldman Shepherd Wohlgelemter Tanner Weinstock & Dodig LLP, for Mary Seibert and Frederic John Seibert, Jr., Appellants.
Guy Anthony Donatelli, Esq., Lamb McErlane, PC, for Jean Louise Villiani, Appellee.
Paul Christopher Troy, Esq., Kane, Pugh, Knoell, Troy & Kramer, L.L.P., for Thomas D. Schneider, Appellee.
OPINION
In this interlocutory direct appeal by permission, we consider whether a legislative enactment recognizing a cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceedings infringes upon this Court's constitutionally prescribed power to regulate the practice of law, insofar as such wrongful-use actions may be advanced against attorneys.
The underlying litigation arose out of a land-ownership dispute between Jean Louse Villani, who was a co-plaintiff with her late husband until his death, and defendants John Seibert, Jr. and his mother, Mary Seibert ("Appellants"). Appellants prevailed in both an initial quiet title action and ensuing ejectment proceedings. During the course of this dispute, the Villanis were represented by Thomas D. Schneider, Esquire ("Appellee").
Subsequently, Appellants notified Mrs. Villani and Appellee that they intended to pursue a lawsuit for wrongful use of civil proceedings based upon Mrs. Villani's and Appellee's invocation of the judicial process to raise purportedly groundless claims. In November 2012, Mrs. Villani countered by commencing her own action seeking a judicial declaration vindicating her position that she did nothing wrong and bore no liability to Appellants. Appellants proceeded, as they had advised that they would do, to file a complaint naming Ms. Villani and Appellee as defendants. The declaratory judgment complaint having been lodged in Chester County, but the ensuing wrongful-use action being filed in Philadelphia, a decision was made to coordinate the matters in the Chester County court.
Appellee interposed preliminary objections to Appellants' complaint. As is relevant here, he contended that the statutory scheme embodying a cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceedings, commonly referred to as the "Dragonetti Act,"1 is unconstitutional.2 Appellee relied on Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which invests in this Court the power to prescribe general rules "governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts," as well as "admission to the bar and to practice law," while directing that "[a]ll laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions." PA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (c). He also stressed that this Court has characterized its constitutional and inherent powers to supervise the conduct of lawyers as being exclusive. See, e.g. , Pa.R.D.E. 103 ; Commonwealth v. Stern , 549 Pa. 505, 510, 701 A.2d 568, 570 (1997).
Centrally, Appellee portrayed the Dragonetti Act as an unconstitutional incursion by the General Assembly upon the Court's power under Article V, Section 10(c). Given this asserted defect, he claimed that attorneys should be immunized from any liability under these statutory provisions. In support, Appellee referenced a series of cases in which this Court had stricken legislative enactments on the basis that those statutes intruded on the Court's constitutionally prescribed powers. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections in Seibert v. Villani ("Defendant's Memorandum"), No. 2012–09795 (C.P. Chester), at 7–9 ().
Appellee also observed that, in defining the contours of liability for wrongful use of civil proceedings, the Legislature fashioned a "probable cause" standard that permits a lawyer acting in good faith to proceed with litigation, where he or she "reasonably believes that under [the supporting] facts the claim may be valid under the existing or developing law." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8352(1). According to Appellee, however, such prescription clashes with the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by this Court, which authorize attorneys to advance good faith arguments for "extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Pa.R.P.C. § 3.1 (emphasis added). It was his position that the asserted difference "surely represents an intrusion by the legislature into the exclusive power of the judiciary that is prohibited under Article V, Section 10(c)." Defendant's Memorandum at 11.
Furthermore, Appellee took issue with the Dragonetti Act's incorporation of subjective standards. See, e.g. , 42 Pa.C.S. § 8352(3) (). He contrasted such subjectivity with the more objective litmus established under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. Pa.R.P.C. 3.1 . Appellee opined that the statute's focus on subjective motivation "means, as a practical matter, that summary disposition is exceedingly difficult." Defendant's Memorandum at 12. He concluded that, "[o]nce again, the legislature violates Article V, section 10(c) by purporting to regulate attorney conduct through different standards than those selected by the Supreme Court." Id.
In a similar line of argument, Appellee claimed that the Act's prescription for monetary damages should be viewed as a further intrusion into this Court's exclusive province. In this regard, Appellee explained that the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, also promulgated by this Court, establish the procedures for addressing violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, encompassing all stages from the investigation of an allegation of inappropriate conduct to the final disposition of a complaint by this Court, as well as delineating all available forms of discipline. See Pa.R.D.E. 204 –208. Appellee commented that: "Nowhere do the disciplinary rules permit an opposing party to seek monetary damages from an attorney." Defendant's Memorandum at 12. According to Appellee, the only tribunal authorized to address any and all grievances against attorneys is the Disciplinary Board, which functions under the Supreme Court's oversight. See id. (citing Pa.R.D.E. 205 –207 ). "In short," he proclaimed, "the concept of a lawsuit against an attorney for money damages based on his conduct in a civil case is repugnant to Article V, section 10(c)." Defendant's Memorandum at 13; accord id. ().
In response, Appellants defended the Dragonetti Act as substantive remedial legislation designed, for the benefit of victims, to redress wrongs committed by those pursuing frivolous litigation. Appellants explained that it has long been the law of the Commonwealth that a lawyer may be liable for tortious conduct committed in his professional capacity. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Preliminary Objections in Seibert , No. 2012–09795 ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"), at 5 (); accord Dietrich Indus., Inc. v. Abrams , 309 Pa.Super. 202, 208, 455 A.2d 119, 123 (1982) ().3
Appellants further offered that the Dragonetti Act was fashioned after Section 674 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which indicates as follows:
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF TORTS § 674 (1977). Moreover, Appellants alluded to comment d to Section 674, which provides:
If [an] attorney acts without probable cause...
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