Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County

• Decision Date: 15 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. TCA 89-40247-WCS.,TCA 89-40247-WCS.
• Citation: 796 F. Supp. 1477
• Parties: VILLAS OF LAKE JACKSON, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

796 F. Supp. 1477

VILLAS OF LAKE JACKSON, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. TCA 89-40247-WCS.

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

June 15, 1992.

E.C. Deeno Kitchen, Robert King High, Jr., Ken W. Davis, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs.

John Cooper, Gregory T. Stewart, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS THE FOURTH AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

SHERRILL, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending is Defendants' motion to dismiss the fourth amended and supplemental complaint and memorandum. Docs. 166 and 167. The motion argues that the complaint does not allege a constitutionally protected property interest, the claims are not ripe, the complaint fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted, the individual Defendants have absolute or qualified immunity, Plaintiffs have not been deprived of a protected property interest, and there are insufficient allegations of abuse of power. Plaintiffs have filed a response. Doc. 185. Both parties have filed supplemental authority. Docs. 176 and 190.

Defendants have also moved to strike the demand for injunctive relief as to count I and the demand for monetary relief as to count IV. Doc. 168.

Dismissal of a complaint or a portion thereof pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should not be ordered unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint when ruling upon the motion.

I. The factual allegations of the fourth amended complaint.

The fourth amended and supplemental complaint, doc. 164, alleges that Plaintiff Richard L. Pelham, through the business organizations also named as Plaintiffs, owns a tract of land of approximately 46 acres near Lake Jackson in Leon County, Florida. Plaintiffs seek to construct multi-family dwellings on the land.

It is alleged that in 1972, at the request of Pelham and another person, the county rezoned the property to multi-family residential (RM-3). It is alleged that the county knew at the time of rezoning that Pelham had a contract to purchase the land contingent upon such rezoning, and that he intended to develop all of it. Plaintiffs allege that prior to the rezoning decision, the county considered the issue of the water quality of Lake Jackson.

It is also alleged that since 1972, with the approval of the county, to address the water quality concerns and in further reliance upon the zoning Pelham expended funds to construct facilities for the project as planned. This included a storm water treatment system, a clubhouse, pool, roadways, and a central sewer system, all of which were made large enough to accommodate the full project as planned, not just the 120 initial units. The complaint alleges that over the years the county, through its authorized agents, has acknowledged that Plaintiffs possess "vested" rights under Florida law to complete the entire planned development under the RM-3 zoning, and that under Florida law, Plaintiffs have such vested rights.

It is further alleged that in January 1988, Plaintiffs applied for the permits necessary to construct another phase of the project, and that at that time the zoning permitted such development. The county then enacted a series of emergency ordinances imposing a moratorium upon issuance of permits for structures below the 120 feet elevation in the Lake Jackson basin. Since much of the land was below that level, the permits were not issued.

On August 30, 1988, the county enacted ordinance 88-53, restricting development around Lake Jackson to abate pollution of the lake and other bodies of water. The ordinance was soon replaced on October 21, 1988, with a substantially identical ordinance 88-62. That ordinance now requires that 95% of the property below the 100 foot elevation level be left in an undisturbed state, and that no structures be placed below 96.5 feet of elevation. Since a substantial portion of the project was below the 100 foot elevation, it is alleged that the ordinance effectively has frustrated development of the project as originally conceived by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that the ordinance was enacted with intent forever to halt their project despite their vested rights, and will destroy substantially all economically viable use of the property.

It is alleged that Plaintiffs thereafter applied for permits necessary to complete the remainder of their planned project, but the county has refused or failed to issue the permits due to the ordinance. Plaintiffs allege that the ordinance as applied to the subject real property is arbitrary, capricious, and not reasonably calculated to further the alleged public purpose of preserving the water quality in Lake Jackson, but goes far beyond that purpose. It is alleged that the elevation lines have no reasonable basis in fact, the planned project can be constructed to manage storm water so as to avoid degradation of Lake Jackson, that it will cause no degradation as compared to upland development already permitted, and that alternative uses are permitted under the ordinance which will contribute much more to degradation of the lake.

In the summer of 1989, Plaintiffs allege that they sought to mitigate damages by filing an application for permits to construct a smaller project than originally planned above the 100 foot elevation, but with reservation of rights to complete the full project as planned. The county issued the necessary site plan approval, permits, and building permits. The complaint alleges that the county "purported" to issue the permits as conditioned upon the outcome of rezoning proceedings, and that these rezoning activities had commenced as early as June 20, 1989. Plaintiffs began construction on this smaller project in reliance upon these permits and its prior vested rights.

On October 24, 1989, the county rezoned the property to estate classification, permitting only one single family home per two acre lot, thus abolishing the zoning which had previously permitted multi-family development. The county ordered Plaintiffs to stop all work on the smaller plan for multi-family construction which had commenced. On October 31, 1989, the county revoked all prior permits issued to Plaintiffs.

As a consequence, it is alleged that the county has evidenced an intent to prohibit all further development of the multi-family project as planned by Plaintiffs since 1972.

Count I is a claim for just compensation for a taking of Plaintiff's property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The property alleged to have been taken is the underlying real property and Plaintiffs' "vested rights to complete the Project." As will be discussed ahead, Plaintiffs have identified and alleged both the right to develop the entire project as originally planned and a right to develop the smaller project for which permits were issued in 1989. Ordinance 88-62 and the estate zoning are challenged as invalid as applied to Plaintiffs' real property.

Count II asserts an arbitrary and capricious substantive due process claim arising from the same facts.

Count III asserts a taking without just compensation substantive due process claim arising from the same facts.

Count IV alleges the same facts and further alleges that Defendants "contemporaneously permitted other similarly situated property owners to go forward with development in and around Lake Jackson when plaintiffs were denied such rights." It is claimed that this is a violation of equal protection of the law.

Count V sues the members of the Board of County Commissioners in both individual and official capacities based upon the facts alleged in paragraphs 1 through 23, 26, 28, 31, and 33. Count V does not specifically identify the constitutional wrongs alleged to have been committed by these Defendants.

II. Whether the just compensation claim in count I and the due process takings claim in count III are ripe.

Questions concerning ripeness go to subject matter jurisdiction. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 7 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, whether the claims presented are ripe for review must be resolved before addressing any constitutional questions.

A. A final, definitive decision.

The court may not entertain the just compensation claim in count I until "the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question." Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3119, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). Only then will the factfinder be able to determine the ultimate issue, whether the owner will be "unable to derive economic benefit" from the land. Id. See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986).

The same rule applies to the substantive due process taking claim in count III. The court may not entertain such a claim until the administrative agency has arrived at a definitive decision sufficient for the court to determine the central issue, whether the regulation "goes so far that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 197-200, 105 S.Ct. at 3122-3123; Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d at 1573-1574.

Plaintiffs have identified three property interests which they allege have been taken without just compensation or in violation of substantive due process. Those interests are the underlying real property, an alleged vested property right to develop the project as originally planned, and an alleged vested property right to develop the smaller project as permitted in...