Villegas v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2023
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-01628-ADA-SAB
• Parties: JAVIER NAVARRO VILLEGAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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JAVIER NAVARRO VILLEGAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-01628-ADA-SAB

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 28, 2023

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND (ECF No. 16) OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS

I. INTRODUCTION

Javier Navarro Villegas and Luis Navarro Villegas (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant” or “Ford”), pursuant to California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”). Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to remand. (ECF No. 16.) The matter was referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c)(7).

A hearing on the motion was held on April 26, 2023. Having considered the moving, opposition and reply papers, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, the arguments presented at the April 26, 2023 hearing, as well as the Court's file, the Court issues the following findings and recommendations that recommend denying Plaintiffs' motion to remand.

II. BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2021, Plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with Defendant regarding a 2021 Ford F-150 (the “Subject Vehicle”), for a total price of $77,396.44. (Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1-3 at 4.)^[1] Plaintiffs allege defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested during the warranty period, including but not limited to, engine, transmission, and electrical. (Compl ¶¶ 1617.) Plaintiffs allege they delivered the Subject Vehicle to an authorized repair facility but Defendant was unable to conform the Subject Vehicle to the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19.)

Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 14, 2022, in the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno. (ECF No. 1-3 at 2.) Plaintiffs bring causes of action for: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Act, breach of express warranty; and (2) violation of the Song-Beverly Act § 1793.2.^[2] (Compl. ¶¶ 14-39.) On December 21, 2022, Defendant removed this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.)

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for remand. (Pls.' Mot. Remand (“Mot.”), ECF No. 16.) On March 2, 2023, the District Judge referred the matter to the undersigned for the preparation of findings and recommendations and/or other appropriate action. (ECF No. 17.) On the same date, the Court reset the hearing on the motion for remand to be held before the assigned Magistrate Judge, on April 5, 2023. (ECF No. 18.)

Defendant did not file an opposition to the motion by the deadline to do so, and on March 22, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a statement indicating such lack of filed opposition. (ECF No. 20.) On March 24, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to extend, nunc pro tunc, the deadline to file the opposition brief due to a calendaring error. (ECF No. 21.) On March 28, 2023, the Court granted the motion for extension of time, continued the hearing on the motion to remand until April 26, 2023, and extended the deadline for Plaintiff to file a reply brief. (ECF No. 22.)^[3] The Defendant's opposition brief was filed concurrently with the motion for extension of time. (Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Remand (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 21-4 at 2-19.) On April 10, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief. (Pls.' Reply (“Reply”), ECF No. 23.)

On April 26, 2023, the parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on the motion to remand. (ECF No. 24.) Counsel Maite Colon appeared by videoconference for Plaintiffs. Counsel Sarah Lambert appeared by videoconference for Defendant.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a matter to federal court if the district court would have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). A motion to remand is a proper procedure to challenge a removal based on lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Id.

Ultimately, “[t]he removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). Thus, if there is any doubt as to the right of removal, a federal court must reject jurisdiction and remand the case to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs will obtain such damages, penalties and fees at trial thereby exceeding the required $75,000 minimum amount in controversy to establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs do not present any challenge regarding the citizenship of the parties as satisfying the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.

A. Preliminary Issue of Whether the Motion to Remand is Untimely

“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendant argues that because Plaintiffs did not file the motion to remand until after the expiration of the thirty (30) day period, the motion should be denied to the extent it is predicated on procedural defects in the removal process. (Opp'n 9.) Plaintiffs respond that Section 1447(c) provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(c).

To the extent Defendant is only arguing that if Plaintiffs' motion for removal touches upon procedural defects rather than jurisdictional, the raising of procedural defects would be foreclosed as untimely. See Ceja-Corona, 2013 WL 638293, at *4 n.2 (“The Court finds that, pursuant to section 1447(c), were Plaintiff to raise subsequent issues unrelated to diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy in its motion for remand such arguments are waived due to its untimely filed motion to remand.”). However, Defendants did not clearly explain in briefing any alleged procedural defects Plaintiffs' motion may rest on that are separate from the jurisdictional issue, and at the hearing, Defendant conceded the motion to remand is targeted at jurisdictional issues. Accordingly, the Court finds the instant motion to remand is properly presented as to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Ceja-Corona v. CVS Pharmacy, No. 1:12-CV-01703-AWI, 2013 WL 638293, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (“Courts routinely refer to the amount in controversy as the required or statutory ‘jurisdictional amount,' and find it is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived . . . [w]hile Plaintiff has waived any procedural objections to the notice of removal by filing an untimely motion to remand, the text of section 1447(a) specifically excludes a motion to remand based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction from the thirty day window.”) (footnote omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-01703-AWI, 2013 WL 1281581 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013); Mehta-Shreve v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 219CV01086RFBDJA, 2020 WL 1853607, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2020) (“Plaintiff's motion to remand is based on a claim that there is not complete diversity in this case, which is a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction[ ] [accordingly, the motion to remand is timely filed.”). The Court proceeds to the merits of the parties' arguments.

B. Amount in Controversy

The amount in controversy is an “simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant's liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, “[i]n determining the amount in controversy, the Court accepts the allegations contained in the complaint as true and assumes the jury will return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor on every claim.” Henry v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc., 692 Fed.Appx. 806, 807 (9th Cir. 2017).

As inherent in the parties' framing of legal authorities and arguments in briefing, and as the Court's review of the relevant authorities, there is some difference in the way courts have explained and applied the standards pertaining to establishing the amount of controversy.

For example, Defendant cites to Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 69899 (9th Cir. 2007), and both parties cite to Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Guglielmino, the Ninth Circuit was presented with the question of what “is defendant's burden of proof when plaintiffs move to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1447(c) and their statecourt complaint specifies that their damages are less than the jurisdictional requirement?” Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 698-99. The Ninth Circuit explained that caselaw supported the existence of three different burdens of proof which may be placed on a removing defendant.^[4] The first two...