de Villiers v. Utah County

• Decision Date: 05 October 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 920765-CA and 930274-CA,s. 920765-CA and 930274-CA
• Citation: 882 P.2d 1161
• Parties: Margot DE VILLIERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH COUNTY, Highland City, and John Does 1-3, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 1161

882 P.2d 1161

Margot DE VILLIERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH COUNTY, Highland City, and John Does 1-3, Defendants and Appellees.

Nos. 920765-CA and 930274-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Oct. 5, 1994.

Darwin C. Hansen, Stephen G. Morgan, and Joseph E. Minnock, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for appellee Highland City.

Lee C. Henning and David C. Richards, Salt Lake City, for appellee Utah County.

Before BENCH, DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ.

OPINION

DAVIS, Judge:

Plaintiff Margot de Villiers appeals from summary judgments entered separately in favor of defendants Highland City and Utah County, claiming that the trial court erred in ruling that Highland City was immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), ¹ and that Utah County had no duty to erect a warning sign on 6000 West. We affirm.

FACTS

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). The facts below are stated accordingly.

Plaintiff was severely injured in an automobile accident on January 18, 1990. The accident occurred at the intersection of 11500 North (Oakview Drive) and 6000 West (the intersection) in Highland City, Utah. Oakview Drive is a privately owned road maintained by the Oakview planned unit development subdivision (Oakview PUD). Utah County owns and maintains 6000 West. Oakview Drive provides access to 6000 West for the Oakview PUD residents.

Before construction can commence on a planned unit development within the city limits of Highland City, a developer must submit a proposed plat to the Highland City Planning Commission (Commission) for approval. The original Oakview PUD plat submitted to the Commission provided that Oakview Drive would run along the northern boundary of the subdivision property line until it intersected with 6000 West. The Commission rejected this initial proposal and required certain modifications before the plat would be approved. Paul Frampton, the Oakview PUD developer, testified that the Commission wanted a common area that would create a park-like entrance and that would be separated from the residential lots by Oakview Drive. Richard Clayton, who was hired by Frampton to help procure approval of the Oakview PUD plat, first testified that the Commission itself designated the Oakview PUD common area. ² However Clayton then testified that he did not recall whether the Commission was concerned about either the exact location of the common area or whether the common area had to be separated from the lots by Oakview Drive. The record does not reflect whether the Commission required that the common area be on the north entrance boundary line, or whether it directed Frampton to construct Oakview Drive where it is currently located.

Frampton hired an engineer who had prepared the original Oakview PUD plat, which included the design and specifications for Oakview Drive and how it was to intersect with 6000 West. After the original plat was rejected by the Commission, Frampton was required to "resubmit the plat showing the common area separated by the road." The plat was returned to Frampton for "redesign" by his engineer. ³ Frampton modified the plat so it complied with the Commission's requirements, and the plat was approved.

The approved plat positioned Oakview Drive and, hence, the intersection, near the top of a gradient; the parties agree that that location creates a precarious sight distance "in that motorists entering the [i]ntersection from [Oakview Drive] are unable to see motorists entering the [i]ntersection on 6000 West in time to avoid an accident." At the time of the accident, no warning signs were in place on 6000 West cautioning drivers of the approaching blind intersection.

Plaintiff filed suit against both Highland City and Utah County.

Claims Against Highland City

In the suit against Highland City, plaintiff argues that Highland City had a duty to design, construct, sign, and maintain the intersection in a nonnegligent manner. Plaintiff also maintains that Highland City was negligent in approving the plat without requiring Frampton to relocate Oakview Drive along the northern boundary of the Oakview PUD. ⁴ The essence of plaintiff's complaint against Highland City is that, because the Commission conditioned approval of the Oakview PUD plat on placing the common area at the entrance to the Oakview PUD and required that Oakview Drive separate the common area from the residential lots, it "designed" the intersection. Because the location of Oakview Drive and the intersection create a dangerous condition based on the limited visibility, plaintiff alleges that the Planning Commission negligently designed the intersection.

Highland City moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from suit under the Act because it merely approved the Oakview PUD plat. Plaintiff opposed Highland City's motion for summary judgment, claiming that Highland City designed the intersection, instead of simply approving the plat, and it had therefore waived immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989), which waives governmental immunity for injuries caused by any defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on a road. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Highland City on the grounds that (1) Highland City was not responsible for the maintenance of either road involved in the accident, and (2) section 63-30-10(3) ⁵ of the Utah Code excepted Highland City from any waiver of immunity and, therefore, section 63-30-8 was inapplicable.

Claims Against Utah County

Plaintiff also filed suit against Utah County, claiming it had a duty to design, construct, sign, and maintain the intersection in a nonnegligent manner. Plaintiff further alleged that Utah County was negligent for failing to conduct a traffic and engineering study prior to reducing the speed limit along 6000 West to 35 miles per hour in 1988. ⁶

Utah County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiff, and even if it did, the Act shielded it from liability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Utah County, holding that because Utah County did not design, construct, or approve the intersection, it did not owe a duty to plaintiff. The court further held that, based on Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970), and Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App.1992), Utah County did not have a common law duty to erect a warning sign on 6000 West.

Plaintiff appeals both rulings of the trial court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only when, based on the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Whether a moving party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law and, therefore, no deference is granted to the trial court's ruling. Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Highland City

On appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Highland City, plaintiff raises only one issue--whether Highland City has waived immunity under the Act. Ordinarily, before reaching the issue of governmental immunity, it is appropriate to first determine whether there are grounds for liability. See Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Utah 1993); Smith v. Weber County Sch. Dist., 877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah App.1994). In a negligence action such as this, if a plaintiff has not alleged a valid duty and breach of that duty, courts will typically decline to reach the issue of immunity. Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1163-64; Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 152-153 (Utah 1989). However, if the issue of governmental immunity is clear, it is proper to begin the court's analysis there. Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1164; Smith, 877 P.2d at 1278. Plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's ruling in favor of Highland City may be summarily disposed of on the grounds of governmental immunity. Therefore, we address only that issue.

A. Section 63-30-8

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Highland City on the basis of governmental immunity. Plaintiff claims that since the Commission effectively required Frampton to move Oakview Drive 141 feet to the south of where it was originally planned so that the residential lots would be separated from the common area, Highland City "designed" the intersection. Plaintiff alleges that because the location of the intersection is dangerous, Highland City's immunity from suit is waived by section 63-30-8 of the Utah Code. ⁷ Highland City argues that plaintiff incorrectly interprets the facts, and that "[t]he conditions do not change the process [of plat approval] from one of granting a license or permit to one of designing roads." We agree.

When determining whether a governmental entity is immune from suit, a court must apply a three-prong test:

First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental function and therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained in section 63-30-3? ... Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has some other section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? Third, if the blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to that waiver which results in a retention of immunity against the particular claim asserted in this case?

Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1164; Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d 907, 910 (Utah App.1994).

According to the Ledfors test, the first issue we must address is whether Highland City was performing a governmental function in connection with its...