Vince v. Posadas de Puerto Rico, SA, Civ. No. 84-2273 (RLA).

• Decision Date: 30 March 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 84-2273 (RLA).
• Citation: 683 F. Supp. 312
• Parties: Vito VINCE, Catalina Bergollo Vince, individually and on behalf of their conjugal partnership constituted between them; M & W All Weather Fence, Plaintiffs, v. POSADAS de PUERTO RICO, S.A., and/or d/b/a Condado Holiday Inn; American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico; Andreas T. Meinhold, in his personal character as well as employee of Condado Holiday Inn; Glen Wickersham in his personal character as well as employee of Condado Holiday Inn, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

683 F. Supp. 312

Vito VINCE, Catalina Bergollo Vince, individually and on behalf of their conjugal partnership constituted between them; M & W All Weather Fence, Plaintiffs, v. POSADAS de PUERTO RICO, S.A., and/or d/b/a Condado Holiday Inn; American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico; Andreas T. Meinhold, in his personal character as well as employee of Condado Holiday Inn; Glen Wickersham in his personal character as well as employee of Condado Holiday Inn, Defendants.

Civ. No. 84-2273 (RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 30, 1988.

George M. Torres López, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiffs.

Charles A. Cordero, Cordero Colon & Miranda, Old San Juan, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

ACOSTA, District Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, seeking over one billion dollars in damages for defendants' alleged malicious prosecution.

Before the Court is a motion for dismissal and/or summary judgment filed by defendants. Plaintiffs, after several delays, prompted mostly by some discovery disputes¹, filed their opposition to defendants' motion. A reply followed.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs have not and cannot, as a matter of the applicable Puerto Rico law, prove a cause of action for malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs, in opposition, do little more than rest on their allegations.

The record is now complete and the Court is fully briefed and ready to adjudicate this matter.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. On September 12, 1984, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint alleging, in essence, that defendants "falsely, maliciously, and with no probable cause accused Vito Vince" of attempting to defraud the Condado Holiday Inn in violation of the Innkeeper's Law, 10 L.P.R.A. §§ 711-723, thereby unjustly causing Mr. Vince's arrest and incarceration. Defendants answered the complaint denying all liability.

2. On September 4, 1986, defendants filed a motion for dismissal and/or summary judgment² alleging that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution upon which relief may be granted and/or that this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims of co-plaintiffs Catalina Bergollo Vince and the conjugal partnership because their damages did not exceed the jurisdictional amount required by law.

3. In their opposition, filed on August 31, 1987, plaintiffs allege that summary judgment is inappropriate insofar as they have established a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and thus, have raised a genuine issue of material fact.

4. Defendants replied to plaintiffs' opposition claiming that since only hearsay evidence was produced by plaintiffs in their opposition, a genuine issue of material fact was not established pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e) because it would be inadmissible in evidence if offered at trial. However, we reject defendants' argument and will therefore consider the extrinsic evidence presented in plaintiffs' opposition. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (an opponent to a motion for summary judgment need not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment).

We proceed to review the entire record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. On or about August 26, 1983, Mr. Mohan Vyas Sanguida registered as a guest at the Condado Holiday Inn. From August 1983 to late January 1984, coplaintiff Vito Vince ("Vince") paid all monies owed for lodging, food, and services provided to Vyas (and Vince) by the Hotel. (Vince's Aff. pp. 1-3) The credit manager of the Hotel would communicate with Vince, who then proceeded to periodically make partial payments towards the Hotel debt incurred by Vyas and/or Vince. (Vince's Aff. p. 2; Pérez's Aff. p. 2). However, a pattern of late payments occurred.

2. By April 10, 1984 the rising hotel bill for room and services, for a three-month period, was $21,037.96. Throughout that period Vince repeatedly refused to pay the sums demanded by the Hotel and, according to Vince, he advised the credit manager in conversations held on late January and early March 1984, that he would not be responsible, after January 1984, for Vyas' account at the Hotel (Vince's Aff. pp. 2-3). Vince also states that he refused responsibility for the hotel bill because after late January 1984 he was not, despite many requests, an officially registered guest at the Hotel due solely to the lack of vacancies (Vince's Aff. pp. 2-3). However, it is undisputed that from February to April 1984, Vince and Vyas shared the same hotel room and jointly used the hotel services (Vince's Aff. pp. 2-3; Pérez's Aff. pp. 2-4).

3. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by defendants to collect the monies owed by Vyas and Vince for room and services provided by the Hotel, defendants informed the police of a potential violation of the Innkeeper's Law. On April 10, 1984, almost four months after Vince stopped making partial payments to the hotel, the police went to the Hotel to investigate Vyas and Vince's nonpayment of their hotel bill.

4. As a result of the above-mentioned police investigation, police agent Lucas Aponte (Badge No. 9380) pursuant to the Innkeeper's Law filed a criminal complaint ("denuncia") on April 10, 1984, against Vyas and Vince for their nonpayment of the sum of $21,037.96 owed for room and services provided by the Hotel.³ Immediately afterwards, Vyas and Vince were taken by the police before a district court judge who determined that the evidence gathered by the police was sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause to arrest Vyas and Vince for violation of the Innkeeper's Law. The judge ordered the arrest of Vyas and Vince and set bail. At that time, neither Vyas nor Vince were able to post bail and thus the judge ordered their incarceration. At no time did the Hotel itself file a criminal complaint against either Vyas or Vince.

5. On May 10, 1984, at a preliminary hearing, another district court judge determined that the evidence gathered by the district attorney ("Fiscal") was sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause for trial against Vyas, but not against Vince, for violation of the Innkeeper's Law. The district attorney appealed to the superior court the decision of the district court judge regarding Vince. The superior court vacated the district court's decision and found probable cause for trial against Vince for violation of the Innkeeper's Law.

6. On June 15, 1984, the charges against Vyas and Vince were dismissed by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Part.

7. On September 12, 1984, plaintiffs herein filed the instant action for damages for alleged malicious prosecution.

8. On June 14, 1985, Vyas filed suit against the Hotel, among others, for damages caused by the Hotel's alleged malicious prosecution. On May 5, 1987, this Court (Judge Fusté) found that the facts of the case entitled defendants to summary judgment because "... the mere bona fide reporting to the police of a prima facie violation of the law does not establish a tort cause of action...." The Court's judgment became firm and final on June 4, 1987.

DISCUSSION

In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the Supreme Court of the United States held that:

... the plain language of Rule 56(c) (Fed. R.Civ.P.) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial....

In addition, "the purpose of summary judgment is not to explore all the factual ramifications of the case, but to determine whether such exploration is necessary," Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967, 968 (1st Cir.1970); therefore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is an issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Over The Road Drivers, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 816 (1st Cir.1980).

Although a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations in granting summary judgment, the court may end a suit before trial if the court determines that, taking the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable juror could find for that party.

Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir.1984).

After viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, see Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962), we find that they will be unable to discharge their burden at trial of establishing the existence of at least one, if not more, of the elements essential to sustain their cause of action for malicious prosecution. Hence, summary judgment is appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Santiago v. Group Brasil, Inc., 830 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1987) (Per Curiam); Potterton v. Porter, 810 F.2d 333, 334 (1st Cir.1987). And no further exploration of the facts (beyond the record) is necessary since there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts leading up to Vince's arrest. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed. 2d 754 (1976).

To maintain an action for malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove all of the following elements:⁴ (1) the criminal action was initiated and instigated by defendants; (2) the criminal action terminated in favor of plaintiffs; (3) defendants acted with malice; (4) def...