Vincent v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 25 October 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 14831,14831 |
| Citation | 601 P.2d 1184,184 Mont. 92,36 St.Rep. 1886 |
| Parties | Charlotte VINCENT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John Robert EDWARDS et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
McDonough, Cox & Simonton, Glendive, for plaintiff and appellant.
Douglas Y. Freeman, Hardin, Ronald R. Lodders, Charles R. Cashmore, Billings, for defendants and respondents.
This is an appeal from the judgment in a personal injury action from the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. Plaintiff Charlotte Vincent appeals from the District Court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Schultz & Meyer Construction Company, Empire Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., and Jimmy D. Arndt.
Plaintiff brought this cause to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile accident on the night of July 3, 1974. She was a passenger in an automobile which struck a cow lying on Interstate 94 which was then under construction. The cow had been struck by two other automobiles immediately before plaintiff's collision.
The original complaint alleges the accident resulting in plaintiff's injuries was caused by the negligence of the operators of the two other automobiles and the construction companies working on Interstate 94. The original complaint was filed on June 28, 1977. At that time, plaintiff positively knew the identity of only two defendants, John Robert Edwards and George Mike Edwards. Consequently, the driver of the second car, Jimmy D. Arndt, and the two construction companies, Schultz & Meyer Construction Company and Empire Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., were designated by fictitious names pursuant to section 25-5-103, MCA. Respondent Arndt was designated as "John Doe" and the two construction companies were designated as "A.B.C. Construction Company" in the original complaint.
Later, plaintiff moved to amend the original complaint upon discovering the true identities of the fictitiously named defendants. The motion was granted on September 25, 1978, and plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
The three fictitiously named defendants were each served with a summons on or after September 25, 1978. Prior to such service, they had no notice of either the accident or the institution of any prior action on behalf of plaintiff. There is no dispute that the true names of the two construction companies could have been obtained from information easily accessible upon mere inquiry.
The three fictitiously named defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the three-year statute of limitations on plaintiff's claim had run on July 3, 1977, under section 27-2-204(1), MCA. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered against plaintiff on April 30, 1979. Plaintiff appeals from this judgment.
This appeal raises an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction: whether or not the "relation back" limitations of Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., apply to an amendment of a complaint made to identify defendants originally named fictitiously pursuant to section 25-5-103, MCA, and made after the statute of limitations has run.
This appeal involves two Montana statutes and their interpretation and relationship to each other. Plaintiff-appellant relies on the fictitious name statute, section 25-5-103, MCA, which provides:
The second statute relevant to this appeal is Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., regarding the relation back of amendments to pleadings, which provides in pertinent part:
In her brief appellant argues that Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., and the fictitious name statute speak to different circumstances. She contends that section 25-5-103 is concerned with defendants whose names or identities are originally unknown and are later discovered and no change of parties is involved. Rule 15(c), she argues, is concerned with a situation where a plaintiff has either misnamed the proper defendant or has mistakenly named the wrong defendant, and therefore wishes to make an amendment "changing the party." She argues that the requirements of Rule 15(c), which admittedly have not been satisfied here, do not apply to amendments substituting named defendants for fictitious defendants after the statute of limitations has expired. Thus, appellant contends, amendments identifying and substituting named defendants relate back to the filing of the original complaint naming fictitious defendants, and the statute of limitations is tolled. The only purpose of the fictitious name statute is to toll the statute of limitations in a situation such as that which confronted appellant in the present case. Finally, appellant denies that there is any requirement for a plaintiff utilizing the fictitious name statute to exercise reasonable diligence to determine the true name of the defendant, or in the alternative, if there is such a requirement, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice, which has not been done in this case.
Respondents urge that the statute of limitations had run out before any of the respondents were named as parties defendant, and that the trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment. They argue that the amended complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint for two reasons: (1) Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., is applicable and its requirements have not been met; and (2) the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence to determine the true names of the fictitiously named defendants.
Because we hold that an amendment to a complaint substituting named defendants for fictitiously named defendants falls within the scope of Rule 15(c), it is not necessary for us to consider the second issue raised on appeal.
At the outset it is worthy of note that while Montana's fictitious name statute, section 25-5-103, MCA, permits amendment of the pleadings upon discovery of the defendants' true names, the statute is silent as to the relation back of the amendment and the statute of limitations. Both of these issues, the relation back of amendments and the statute of limitations, are specifically addressed in Rule 15(c), but are not mentioned in section 25-5-103, the fictitious name statute. Nevertheless, appellant contends that despite the absence of any language in section 25-5-103 tolling the statute of limitations or providing for the relation back of an amendment, the only purpose of a fictitious name statute is to toll the statute of limitations and the amended complaint must therefore relate back to the filing of the original complaint, citing Annot., 85 A.L.R.3d 130, 134, in support of her position. We refuse to read such a rule into section 25-5-103 by implication, since Rule 15(c) expressly deals with the matter.
It is clear that the more specific provisions of Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., are controlling in the present case. This rule provides:
". . . An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted Relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied (same transaction or occurrence) And, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him." (Emphasis and bracketed material supplied.)
Appellant apparently acknowledges that the requirements of Rule 15(c) have not been met in this case in that neither respondent Jimmy D. Arndt nor respondents Schultz & Meyer Construction Company and Empire Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., had any notice or knowledge of the institution of the action against them until after the three-year statute of limitations had expired. Laforest v. Texaco, Inc. (1978), Mont., 585 P.2d 1318, 1321, 35 St.Rep. 1580. Appellant seeks to avoid the consequences of this fact under Rule 15(c) by attempting to limit the application of Rule 15(c) to situations where a plaintiff has either misnamed the proper defendant or has mistakenly named the wrong person as a party defendant, and by attempting to distinguish the circumstances covered by the fictitious name statute, where the identities of defendants whose names were originally unknown are later discovered. We agree with the respondents that this is a distinction without a difference.
As far as respondents are concerned, these amendments were amendments "changing the party against whom a claim is asserted," since the first time respondents had any notice or knowledge that they were being sued was when they were served with the amended complaints. From their standpoint, respondents were completely new parties brought into the action for the first time After the statute of limitations had run.
Rule 15(c) is designed to provide protection for individuals in the...
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