Vincent v. Fuller Co.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1992
• Citation: 616 A.2d 969,532 Pa. 547
• Parties: , 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1635 Richard G. VINCENT, Appellee, v. FULLER COMPANY and GATX Corporation, Appellants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 969

616 A.2d 969

532 Pa. 547, 64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1635

Richard G. VINCENT, Appellee, v.FULLER COMPANY and GATX Corporation, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 24, 1992.

Decided Nov. 12, 1992.

[532 Pa. 548] Robert C. Brown, Jr., Easton, for appellants.

John R. Vivian, Jr., and Craig J. Smith, Easton, for Richard G. Vincent.

Elisabeth S. Schuster, Chief Counsel, Francine Ostrovsky, Asst. Chief Counsel, for amicus, Pennsylvania Human Relations Committee.

Carol Mager, Joel Schochet, Philadelphia, for amicus, Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ZAPPALA, Justice.

Richard G. Vincent brought this action against his former employer, Fuller Company, and GATX Corporation, its parent company, alleging that the termination of his employment constituted unlawful discrimination on account of age.The common pleas court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that because Vincent had failed to file a timely complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, he was precluded from asserting this cause of action under the Human Relations Act.Superior Court reversed, 400 Pa.Super. 108, 582 A.2d 1367(1990), holding that Vincent had invoked the Commission's jurisdiction in a timely manner.We now reverse and reinstate the order of the common pleas court.

Vincent was hired by Fuller in December of 1973 as Manager of Engineering Services, a position he held for seven years until becoming Manager of Administration of Fuller's Process, Products, and Projects Division.In November of 1982, Fuller eliminated Vincent's position, and he was laid-off as of December 3, 1982.On December 3, 1984, the lay-off became a final termination.

In the meantime, on March 15, 1983, Vincent filed a verified charge of discrimination based on age with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.Among the particulars, Vincent averred

--"On December 3, 1982, I was laid off from my position ..."

--"Respondent[Fuller] failed or refused to consider me for alternative positions for which I was qualified."

--"Per Respondent's policy, I have two years of recall rights.If I am not recalled within two years, my layoff becomes permanent."

--"On or about the time of my layoff, there were positions available....I fully qualified for these positions but Respondent did not consider me to fill them."

Vincent also identified the positions he considered himself qualified for and alleged that younger persons had been hired to fill them.The section of the form labeled "DATE MOST RECENT OR CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE," was filled in with "December 3, 1982."

The EEOC promptly forwarded a copy of the complaint to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, without requesting the Commission to process the claim or take any other action.One year later, in March of 1984, the EEOC advised Vincent that it would not proceed further with his charge of age discrimination.

On February 19, 1985, Vincent's counsel sent a letter to the Human Relations Commission, which in relevant part read as follows:

Pursuant to Title 43 Pennsylvania Statutes Section 959, please find enclosed for filing the Complaint of my client, Richard G. Vincent.Mr. Vincent first filed this Complaint with EEOC on March 15, 1983....

Mr. Vincent was placed on temporary layoff (with the right of recall for two years) on December 3, 1982.On March 13, 1983, [sic]he filed the within Complaint with EEOC.

....

On December 3, 1984, Mr. Vincent's "layoff" became a permanent termination.Therefore, for purposes of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, December 3, 1984, is the date the most recent discriminatory action took place.Consequently, Mr. Vincent is herewith filing his Complaint pursuant to Section 959 of that Act.

As indicated, a copy of the "Charge of Discrimination" form previously filed with the EEOC was enclosed with the letter as the "Complaint".

One week after the foregoing letter was sent to the Commission, Vincent filed a complaint in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas alleging, among other things, a cause of action for age discrimination.The count asserting the age discrimination claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on November 22, 1985, pursuant to Section 12(c) of the Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 962(c)(Commission must notify complainant if, within one year of filing of complaint, it dismisses complaint or has not entered conciliation agreement; complainant shall be able to bring action in court of common pleas on receipt of such notice).

On May 11, 1985, Vincent filed with the Commission a verified amended complaint alleging "that on or about or until about December 3, 1984the Respondent dismissed him," and further alleging that he was "fully qualified for positions which have been filled ... during the two (2) year layoff period."A second amended complaint was filed in common pleas court on March 4, 1986, again asserting a claim of age discrimination and averring that more than a year had passed since the filing of his complaint with the Commission and the Commission had taken no action.

In October of 1986, Fuller filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the record failed to establish that Vincent's termination was the result of age discrimination and that as a matter of law the action could not be maintained.The court, however, denied the motion, finding that there existed material questions of fact.Thereafter, Fuller filed a Motion for Pre-Trial Rulings, which contained a request for summary judgment and a request to reconsider the previous summary judgment ruling.In relevant part, this motion advanced the claim made in the New Matter filed to the second amended complaint that Vincent's action was barred by the statute of limitation.Acting on this motion, the court granted summary judgment.

The court first ruled that Vincent's claim that his layoff was based on age discrimination was time barred.The court noted that Vincent had first filed a charge of discrimination with regard to this claim with the EEOC on March 13, 1983, 100 days after the date of the layoff.¹Although this was within the 180 day period for filing under Title VII, and EEOC's transmittal of this charge to the Commission constitutes a filing under the Human Relations Act, Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 276 Pa.Super. 232, 419 A.2d 431(1980), the time limit for filing a complaint under the Act was, at the time, ninety days.²The filing by way of transmittal from the EEOC was thus untimely, and any statutory cause of action as to the layoff was barred.Superior Court affirmed this holding and, since it was not raised as error in Vincent's Petition for Allowance of Appeal, it is not here in dispute.

The common pleas court also held that Vincent's claim alleging age discrimination in the termination of his employment on December 2, 1984, was time barred.The court considered the February 19, 1985, letter from Vincent's counsel to be a timely filing, but agreed with Fuller's argument that it did not properly invoke the Commission's jurisdiction because it was not verified.Although the enclosed copy of the EEOC complaint was verified, it stated the date of the last discriminatory act as being December 3, 1982; the allegation that a discriminatory act took place on December 3, 1984, appeared only in counsel's letter, which was not verified by Vincent.

The court cited the Opinion in Support of Affirmance in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School District of Philadelphia, 522 Pa. 436, 562 A.2d 313(1989).That Opinion applied the reasoning of Murphy v. Commonwealth, 506 Pa. 549, 486 A.2d 388(1985), to a situation where a complainant had submitted information to the Commission on an unverified questionnaire within the applicable time limit, but had not filed a verified complaint until after the time had expired.In Murphy, the Court noted that according to the terms of the Act the Commission's jurisdiction is invoked by filing a verified complaint stating with particularity the discriminatory practices complained of, and affirmed the dismissal of a complaint that failed to set forth the particulars of a claim, even though an amended complaint stating particulars had been filed more than ninety days after the acts complained of.

Superior Court reversed, observing that because the Court was equally divided in School District of Philadelphia, there was no precedential guidance on the question "whether unverified information submitted ... with a copy of a previously verified complaint can operate to invoke [the Commission's] jurisdiction."Vincent v. Fuller Co., 400 Pa.Super. 108, 118, 582 A.2d 1367, 1372(1990).Unlike the common pleas court, Superior Court was persuaded by "[c]ogent remarks in the opinion in support of reversal."Id.The court treated the verification provision of the statute as more of a technicality than the requirement that the complaint set forth the particulars of the discriminatory practice complained of, and found it would elevate form over substance to deny the Commission jurisdiction over a complaint such as the one here.The court supported its conclusion with comparisons to cases treating the significance of verification in civil practice and procedure, e.g., In re Johnson, 509 Pa. 347, 502 A.2d 142(1985), and in practice before the EEOC, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph, 408 F.2d 228(5th Cir.1969).

Underlying Superior Court's decision is the assumption that Vincent's February, 1985, submission to the Commission contained allegations of discriminatory conduct that had occurred within the ninety day limitation period immediately preceding the submission.Fuller, however, notes that these materials, which consisted of a copy of the EEOC charge form and counsel's cover letter,...