Vincent v. Fuller Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1990
• Citation: 582 A.2d 1367,400 Pa.Super. 108
• Parties: Richard G. VINCENT, Appellant, v. FULLER COMPANY and Gatz Corporation, Individually and Jointly, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1367

582 A.2d 1367

400 Pa.Super. 108

Richard G. VINCENT, Appellant, v. FULLER COMPANY and Gatz Corporation, Individually and Jointly, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 19, 1990.

Filed Dec. 4, 1990.

Craig J. Smith, Easton, for appellant.

Robert C. Brown, Easton, for appellees.

Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and HUDOCK, JJ.

HUDOCK, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County dismissing Appellant's statutory causes of action for discriminatory lay-off and discriminatory discharge as time-barred and granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment as to all of the common law causes of action. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The complicated facts and procedural history, as ably summarized by the trial court, are as follows: On December 17, 1973, Appellant was hired by Fuller Company (Fuller), a wholly-owned subsidiary of GATX Corporation (GATX), for the position of Manager of Engineering Services. After seven years, Appellant became Manager of Administration of the Process, Products, and Projects Division. In November 1982, Fuller eliminated Appellant's position pursuant to an alleged workforce reduction. Consequently, Appellant was "laid-off" effective December 3, 1982. ¹ At the time of the lay-off, Appellant was fifty-eight years old. On December 3, 1984, Appellant's lay-off became a permanent termination. Appellant contends that his lay-off and subsequent termination occurred solely because of his age rather than being economically motivated.

On March 15, 1983, Appellant filed a verified complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC forwarded a copy of this complaint to the state Human Relations Commission (HRC). The EEOC did not proceed to process the complaint under the ADEA. On December 3, 1984, Appellant filed suit in federal court, alleging age discrimination in violation of ADEA. He discontinued this suit, without prejudice, on February 26, 1985.

By letter dated February 19, 1985, Appellant, through counsel, filed a copy of his complaint which had been previously filed with the EEOC, with the HRC. The letter, which was not verified by Appellant, stated that Appellant's lay-off became permanent on December 3, 1984. Thus, the letter stated that, for purposes of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), December 3, 1984 was the date the most recent discriminatory action took place. On May 11, 1985, Appellant filed an amended verified complaint with the HRC.

On February 26, 1985, Appellant filed an original complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County alleging, inter alia, causes of action for age discrimination and breach of implied contract terms of employment. An amended complaint was filed on June 13, 1985. By order of court (Franciosa, J.) dated November 22, 1985, the complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A second amended complaint was filed on March 4, 1986, alleging, inter alia, age discrimination and breach of implied contract of employment. In this complaint, Appellant averred that Fuller and GATX provided him with publications entitled "GATX Personnel Policies and Practices," and that Fuller and GATX's breach of various provisions therein formed the basis, in part, for the causes of action. Preliminary objections were filed on March 24, 1986. By order of court (Van Antwerpen, J.) dated June 26, 1986, all preliminary objections were dismissed.

On October 11, 1988, Fuller and GATX filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court (McFadden, J.) granted the motion for summary judgment only as to the claims relating to policy 4.01 of the publication, dealing with non-union salaried employees with ten or more years of service. The motion was denied insofar as it sought dismissal of Appellant's common law action for breach of contract and the statutory action based on age discrimination.

On February 21, 1989 a pre-trial conference was held and the case was placed on the June 1989 trial list. The case was then continued several times. On October 13, 1989, Fuller and GATX filed a Motion for Pre-Trial Rulings containing a request for summary judgment and a request to reconsider the previous summary judgment decision of Judge McFadden. After hearing argument on the matter, President Judge Alfred T. Williams, Jr., entered a final order on February 28, 1990, dismissing all of Appellant's outstanding causes of action. It is from this order that Appellant now appeals. Appellant raises several issues which will be dealt with in seriatim.

Appellant first claims that the trial court (Williams, P.J.) abused its discretion in considering Fuller and GATX's second motion for summary judgment because the filing of such a motion violated Rule 1035 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure in that it improperly delayed the trial of the case. Rule 1035 provides as follows:

(a) After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment on the pleadings and any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1035, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

In the absence of specific case law prohibiting the serial filing of motions for summary judgment, this Court will not find that Fuller and GATX's second motion for summary judgment delayed the trial of the matter. The record reveals that this case was continued several times and that the second filing by the above-mentioned parties did not cause additional delay. This is especially true since the issue regarding whether the alleged violation of the PHRA was time-barred presented a new legal issue and, in the interest of judicial economy, the trial court saw fit to re-examine the motion in light of newly decided case law.

Appellant next claims that the President Judge erred as a matter of law and abused the court's discretion in reconsidering and reversing the previous denial of Fuller and GATX's motion for summary judgment, as it applied to Appellant's common law action for breach of contract. It is generally recognized in Pennsylvania that, "absent some new evidence, it is improper for a trial judge to overrule an interlocutory order of another judge in the same court in the same case." Farber v. Engle, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 173, 177, 525 A.2d 864, 866 (1987). Indeed, President Judge Williams recognized this to be the law in Pennsylvania. (Trial Court Opinion at p. 7). The purpose underlying this rule is that there must be some finality to the determination of all pre-trial applications so that judicial economy and efficiency can be maintained. Reifinger v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 315 Pa.Super. 147, 461 A.2d 839 (1983).

Another principle of Pennsylvania law, however, becomes applicable in the instant case. Where no further factual developments have occurred from the time of the first pre-trial motion, a second pre-trial motion may be entertained by the trial court to consider "any relevant legal authority decided in the interim period." See generally Diandrea v. Reliance Savings and Loan Association, 310 Pa.Super. 537, 456 A.2d 1066 (1983). The underlying purpose of this principle of law is self-evident; if new case law is decided subsequent to an earlier ruling by the Court and it clarifies a principle of substantive law or overrules an important case relied upon by one of the parties at an earlier stage of the proceedings, judicial economy and efficiency is best served by consideration of the new law prior to trial.

In the instant case, the recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Morosetti v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, 522 Pa. 492, 564 A.2d 151 (1989) and Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90, 569 A.2d 346 (1990), are directly relevant to the instant case and were decided and reported between the time of Judge McFadden's decision and the scheduled time for trial. These cases were relevant on the merits of whether an alleged failure to follow a corporate policy would permit a cause of action for breach of an implied contract. Thus, Judge Williams did not commit an abuse of discretion when he reconsidered the previous motion for summary judgment. We must now consider whether Judge Williams erred in reversing the denial of the motion for summary judgment on the merits.

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. To uphold summary judgment, there must be not only an absence of genuine issues of fact, but also entitlement of judgment as a matter of law. Rossi v. Pennsylvania State University, 340 Pa.Super. 39, 489 A.2d 828 (1985); Curry v. Estate of Thompson, 332 Pa.Super. 364, 481 A.2d 658 (1984). Initially, it must be noted that Appellant's common law causes of action do not claim that Fuller and GATX breached an implied contract created by corporate policy for permanent and continuous employment, but that the breach was caused by the failure of those companies to find alternative employment for laid-off employees pursuant to Corporate Policy 2.09. Thus, Appellant, in his complaint, is merely urging this Court to find that a failure to follow a corporate policy creates a common law cause of action.

In the recently decided Morosetti, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court restricted the ability of a discharged employee to bring an action against his former employer solely on the basis of a company policy:

it is not sufficient to show [the employer] had a policy. It must be shown that [the employer] offered it as binding terms of employment. A company may indeed have a policy under which they intend to act, given certain circumstances...