Vincent v. John Bowen Co., 1651.
| Decision Date | 23 July 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 1651.,1651. |
| Citation | 32 A.2d 628 |
| Parties | VINCENT v. JOHN BOWEN CO. et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alexander L. Churchill, Judge.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act on petition for review by Antonio Vincent employee, opposed by John Bowen Company, employer, and its insurance carrier. From a decree confirming decision of the director of labor awarding compensation, the employer and its insurance carrier appeal.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Eugene J. Sullivan and Lisker, Sullivan & Lisker, all of Providence, for petitioner.
Haslam, Arnold & Sumpter and Harry A. Tuell, all of Providence, for respondents.
This is a petition for review under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300, by an employee against his employer and its insurance carrier to recover compensation because of an alleged decrease in earning capacity resulting from an accidental injury which the employee received in August 1937. Since the liability of the insurance carrier is dependent upon that of the employer, we shall hereinafter treat this case as if the latter were the only respondent.
The present petition was filed November 19, 1941. On June 20, 1942, the director of labor, after hearing, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and awarded him compensation for total incapacity from the date of the petition. From this decision the respondents duly appealed to the superior court, where they moved that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the employee had no right to file such a petition under the act. Upon the denial of this motion, the cause was heard on its merits and at the conclusion thereof the trial justice, on November 20, 1942, entered a decree confirming the decision of the director of labor. The case is before us on respondent's appeal from the entry of that decree.
It appears in evidence that the petitioner suffered an injury to his back on August 19, 1937, while working for the respondent as a bricklayer in the construction of a building in the city of Providence. There being then no question about either the accident or Vincent's subsequent total incapacity, the respondent, on November 10, 1937, entered into a preliminary agreement with him under the terms of which he was to receive compensation at the rate of $18.21 per week from August 20, 1937, “until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.”
In 1938 the respondent filed a petition with the director of labor to review the agreement just mentioned for the purpose of terminating its liability thereunder on the ground that Vincent's incapacity had ceased. Following a hearing thereon after notice to petitioner, the director of labor, on June 10, 1938, rendered a decision in which he found that such incapacity had in fact ceased, which finding, unless reversed on appeal in accordance with the provisions of the act, relieved the respondent from liability for future payments of compensation to Vincent under the agreement of November 10, 1937. Vincent did not appeal from this decision, which therefore became a final decision on the merits of the case.
On July 12, 1938, Vincent returned to work for respondent and he continued in its employ until August 30, 1938, when he claims to have slipped and again strained his back. Without reporting this accident, or giving any other notice to the respondent of his then condition, he left the following day for the Azores, where he stayed at his sister's farm, doing no work and receiving no medical attention. Upon his return to this state in November 1941, he made no attempt to work but brought the present petition. Vincent never instituted any original proceedings for compensation on the ground that the alleged incident of August 30, 1938, was a new accident.
The controlling question before us is one of law, namely, whether, in the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is entitled to maintain a petition for review under § 13 of art. III of the act, as amended by P.L.1941, chap. 1064, section 1. It is undisputed that the agreement for compensation involved in this case was approved by the director of labor on November 10, 1937. It is also undisputed that respondent's liability under this agreement was terminated on June 10, 1938, by a...
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Zannelli v. Di Sandro
...In construing a statute it is permissible to consider the reasonableness of the result of a particular interpretation. Vincent v. John Bowen Co., 69 R.I. 241, 32 A.2d 628. In any event it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended an unreasonable The statute under consideration is ......
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Esposito v. Walsh-kaiser Co. Inc.
...under consideration. Examination of the rescript shows that in reaching his conclusion the trial justice relied on Vincent v. John Bowen Co., 69 R.I. 241, 32 A.2d 628. That case, however, is no authority for the proposition that an unappealed decision of the director of labor terminating re......
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Starnino v. George A. Fuller Co., 1722.
...is no statement therein that he was able to work at his usual employment and that his incapacity has terminated. See Vincent v. John Bowen Company, 69 R.I. 241, 32 A.2d 628. We disagree with the respondent that the settlement receipt terminated compensation. In our opinion that receipt mere......
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Pepe v. American Silk Spinning Co., 1682.
...The attorney for the respondent contended before us that under the rule laid down in the opinion of this court in Vincent v. John Bowen Co., 69 R.I. 241, 32 A.2d 628, the petitioner had no right to bring the present proceeding. This contention was made in the superior court, but was not sus......