Vincent v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n

• Decision Date: 07 October 1904
• Citation: 58 A. 963,77 Conn. 281
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: VINCENT v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS'N.

58 A. 963

77 Conn. 281

VINCENT

v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 7, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edwin B. Gager, Judge.

Action by Mary Vincent against the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

James H. Webb and Arnon A. Ailing, for appellant.

Charles S. Hamilton, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. This is the cause which was restored to the docket of the superior court upon the writ of error which was before us in Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 75 Conn. 650, 55 Atl. 177. The action was brought by the beneficiary named in a life insurance policy to recover its amount. Upon its restoration the defendant pleaded two defenses. The first contained sundry admissions and denials, and an allegation of a breach of warranty, in that the material fact of the age of the assured was misstated in the application; it being stated as 56 at her nearest birthday, whereas she was in fact, as alleged, more than 65 years of age at the time. To this defense the plaintiff replied, denying the alleged misstatement, and thus raising the only issue of fact which became the subject of controversy in evidence. The second defense set up in bar of the action a former judgment in favor of the defendant in an action between the same parties, and for the same cause of action. The judgment thus pleaded was that approved by this court in Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 74 Conn. 684, 51 Atl. 1066. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion that the defendant be enjoined from pleading or making use of this defense. The motion set out that the present suit, begun March 2, 1901, was, upon the defendant's motion, erased from the docket for want of an ad damnum clause; that thereafter, on May 21, 1901, the plaintiff began another action to recover upon said policy, the same having been commenced more than one year after the death of the assured, and after the time limited in said policy within which a suit could be maintained thereon; that the complaint in said action set forth reasons which the plaintiff believed were sufficient to avoid the effect of said provision limiting the time within which action could be brought; that the defendant thereupon demurred to said complaint solely on the ground that the suit had been brought too late; that the court sustained said demurrer and dismissed the complaint solely upon the ground stated, and did not dismiss it for any reason involved in the merits of the case; and that the plaintiff thereupon brought her writ of error in said first and the present case, upon which it was held that it was improperly stricken from the docket, and as the result of which it was restored thereto. It concluded with the averments that "the just merits of her case were never beard or passed upon in said second case, nor were the matters in issue in that case now involved in this case ever heard or passed upon, and that the sole question involved in said second case was whether said second case was brought within the time which the plaintiff might bring her case upon this policy of insurance," and that to allow said judgment in said second case would, under the circumstances, be inequitable and unjust, and a prayer that the defense be stricken from the docket, and that the defendant and its attorneys be permanently enjoined from pleading or using said judgment in any way in defense or bar to the action, or offering it in evidence upon the trial thereof. The parties having been heard thereon, the motion was granted. The issue of fact under the first defense was subsequently determined by a jury in favor of the plaintiff, who thereupon had judgment for the amount of the policy.

We have no occasion to consider the objection which is now made to the regularity of the proceedings recited as the result of which the second defense was eliminated, since it comes too late. No objection was made at the time of the court's action, and both parties by their conduct concurred in inviting the court to determine in the informal manner which was pursued the important question as to whether the former judgment rendered under the circumstances recited in the motion was one which could be successfully pleaded in bar of the pending action, or used to defeat it The allegations of the motion were either accepted as true upon the theory that, being upon the records of the court, it could take judicial notice of them, or admitted by implication or verbal statement and a decision asked. The plaintiff cannot, therefore, be heard to complain with respect to the course pursued, and can only take advantage of some error involved in the court's conclusion upon the question of res judicata thus presented. The court correctly held that the former judgment constituted no bar. All that the former case decided was that the plaintiff had no right of action at the time that suit was begun. It was not decided that she had no such right when the present action was commenced. The latter question was not put in issue, or involved in any issue, since the only issue in the case arose out of the condition in the policy as to the time within which action thereon should be commenced. It is a familiar rule, found in many authorities, that, to constitute a former judgment a bar or estoppel in a pending action, there must coexist in the two cases four identities, to wit, (1) of subject-matter, (2) of cause of action, (3) of persons and parties, and (4) of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Lyon v. Perin & Gaff Mfg. Co., 125 U. S. 698, 8 Sup. Ct 1024, 31 L. Ed. 839; Mershon v. Williams, 63 N. J. Law, 398, 44 Atl. 211. This rule has been criticised as not strictly accurate as applied to all situations, and the suggestion made that the statement would be more comprehensive if for the first two identities named was substituted that of issues. 2 Black on Judg. § 610; Betts v. Starr, 5 Conn. 550, 13 Am. Dec. 94. As applied to the present situation, possibly the one rule is as satisfactory as the other. Both certainly lead to the same conclusion. The second defense avers an identity in the causes of action. The subject of both actions was undoubtedly the same; the object of both—that is, the relief sought—was also the same; but the causes of action were not identical. "'Cause of action' has been held from the earliest times to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed— every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse." Cooke v. Gill, L. R. 8 C. P. 107. It Is "all the facts which together constitute the plaintiff's right to maintain the action." Allhusen v. Malgarjo, L. R. 3 Q. B. 340, 343. See, also, Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 1. The plaintiff's second case involved a fact arising out of the contract sued upon which was in addition to any in the original case. It was the issue of law which was framed upon the allegations disclosing this fact, and attempting to evade its natural consequences, which, and which alone, proved fatal to the maintenance of the action. The issuable facts in the two cases were therefore not the same, and the issues framed upon them not the same. It is an accepted principle—the necessary corollary of those already discussed—that an estoppel by judgment extends only to the facts as they were at the time judgment was rendered, and to the legal rights and relations of the parties as fixed by the facts so determined; that, when new facts intervene before the second suit furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties, the issues are no longer the same; and that consequently a judgment in the first action cannot be invoked as an estoppel in the second. 2 Black on Judg. § 609; Ingraham v. Camden, etc., Water Co., 82 Me. 335, 19 Atl. 801; Kent v. Gerrish, 18 Pick. 564; Mershon v. Williams, 63 N. J. Law, 398, 44 Atl. 211; Smith v. McCluskey, 45 Barb. 610. The present case presents the more unusual converse situation, to which the converse of the rule stated must logically and necessarily apply. The plaintiff has never had her claimed right of action arising out of the issuance of the policy, the alleged compliance by the assured with all the conditions thereof, and the death of the assured, adjudicated. She was originally entitled to have such an adjudication in the present action, which was seasonably instituted, and she ought to be, and is still, so entitled, notwithstanding it may have been adjudged that she had no right by virtue of a stipulation in the policy to maintain an action thereon begun more than one year after the assured's death.

Upon the trial to the jury of the issues of fact raised by the first defense, the plaintiff offered the policy of insurance, the certificate of death of the assured, the proofs of death and loss, and evidence showing the plaintiff's insurable interest, and rested. The defendant...