Vincent v. State

Citation55 S.W. 819
Decision Date14 February 1900
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Appeal from Parker county court; I. N. Roach, Judge.

Fred Vincent was convicted of causing intoxicating liquor to be sold to a minor, and appeals. Affirmed.

McCall & Temple, for appellant. Robt. A. John, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.


Appellant was convicted of unlawfully causing intoxicating liquor to be sold to a minor, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $25; hence this appeal.

It is not necessary to notice appellant's motion to quash the second count in the indictment, inasmuch as the conviction was applied by the court in the judgment to the first count. This view disposes of all of appellant's assignments which bear on that question.

Appellant filed a motion to dismiss this cause, which, on exception, was stricken out by the court, and this is assigned as error. The motion to dismiss was predicated on an alleged agreement between the county attorney and appellant's father, acting for him, to the effect that appellant would disclose the name of the person who sold the intoxicating liquor, and also give to the county attorney the names of other persons so offending. It is further stated that appellant came to town, and went to the county attorney, and offered to carry out his said agreement, and that said county attorney refused to allow him to do so. A plea of this character is always subject to the approval of the court before it becomes even equitably binding on the state. It is not even suggested that the court entered into this agreement. There was no error, therefore, in refusing to entertain said plea. See Greenhaw's Case (Tex. Cr. App.) 53 S. W. 1024, and authorities there cited.

Evidence of the delivery of the intoxicating liquor to Williams was admissible under the first count in the indictment, and it is immaterial to inquire whether or not it was admissible under the second count. As explained by the court, there was no impropriety in the argument of the county attorney. It was in response to the argument of appellant's counsel. It further appears that, when the objections were made by appellant's counsel to the argument, the court then confined the county attorney to the record. Nor was it error for the court to refuse to allow defendant's counsel, after the closing argument of the state's attorney, to read additional law to the jury. As explained by the court, appellant's rights were fully guarantied in the suggestion made by the judge authorizing appellant's counsel to furnish the court with such decisions as he might desire to have read, and also to furnish the court with any special instructions which he might desire to be given.

By appellant's eighth and ninth bills of exception, he raises the question as to the validity of said indictment; that is, the first count thereof, and the proof in connection therewith. He insists that a sale of liquor by the saloonkeeper to Vincent (defendant), he not disclosing that the purchase was made by Blake Williams, was a sale to Vincent, and not a sale by Vincent to Blake Williams. In this contention appellant is literally correct. But that is not the allegation in the indictment under which appellant was convicted. He was not convicted for a sale to Blake Williams, but for knowingly causing intoxicating liquor to be sold to Blake Williams. The proof showed, without any controversy (indeed, appellant's own testimony established), that Blake Williams was a minor, and that he knew he was such; that he gave him 25 cents for the purpose of buying intoxicating liquor; and that he (appellant) went to R. J. Norton's saloon, in Weatherford, and bought 25 cents' worth of liquor with the money furnished him by Blake Williams, not disclosing his principal, and took said liquor and delivered it to Blake Williams. This, in our opinion, was knowingly causing intoxicating liquor to be sold by the saloonkeeper to Blake Williams. Appellant was the actor, and caused the sale to be made, and it is immaterial whether or not he disclosed the name of Blake Williams to the saloon man. And it is equally immaterial whether or not Norton, the saloon man, would also be...

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5 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • March 13, 2002
    ...10. Camron, 32 Tex.Crim. at 180, 22 S.W. at 683. 11. See Graham, 994 S.W.2d at 656-57. 12. See id. at 656 (quoting Vincent v. State, 55 S.W. 819 (Tex.Cr.App.1900)). 13. Rusk, 128 Tex.Crim. at 137-38, 79 S.W.2d at 866. 14. Id. at 137, 79 S.W.2d at 866. 15. See Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651......
  • Graham v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • June 2, 1999
    ......State, 81 Tex. Cr. 465, 198 S.W. 330 (1917); Ex parte Higgins, 71 Tex. Cr. 618, 160 S.W. 696 (1913); Reagan v. Page 655. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 443, 93 S.W. 733 (1906); Cox v. State, 69 S.W. 145 (Tex. Cr. App. 1902); Ex parte Gibson, 42 Tex. Cr. 653, 62 S.W. 755 (1901); Vincent v. State, 55 S.W. 819, 820 (Tex. Cr. App. 1900); Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Cr. 278, 53 S.W. 1024 (1899); Tullis v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 87, 52 S.W. 83 (1899).         This rule binds the State as well as the defendant, as our opinion in Washburn v. State, supra, 164 Tex. Cr. at 44950, 299 ......
  • Cochran v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • June 6, 1928
    ......Baker v. State, 4 Tex. App. 229; Cordway v. State, 25 Tex. App. 405, 8 S. W. 670; Norris v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 173, 22 S. W. 592; Chalk v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 32 S. W. 534; Washington v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 154, 32 S. W. 693; Ray v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 357, 33 S. W. 869; Vincent v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S. W. 819; Vann v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 15, 85 S. W. 1064; Roberts v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 112, 131 S. W. 321; Campbell v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 561, 138 S. W. 607; Moore v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 453, 144 S. W. 603. It would be a waste of space to discuss these bills ......
  • Floyd v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • October 31, 1956
    .......         Our disposition of this first attack upon the indictment obviates the necessity of passing upon the second because the jury returned a general verdict and all of the evidence was admissible under the count charging the misapplication of a house. Vincent v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 55 S.W. 819; 21a Texas Digest, Indictment and Information, k203. .         Another ground alleged for the motion to quash was that the allegations of the indictment were duplicitous in that it charged that the accused did fraudulently 'take, misapply and convert.' ......
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