Vinci v. Allied Research Associates, Inc., 1127

• Decision Date: 06 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. 1127,1127
• Citation: 444 A.2d 462,51 Md.App. 517
• Parties: Blanche B. VINCI v. ALLIED RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 517

51 Md.App. 517

444 A.2d 462

Blanche B. VINCI v. ALLIED RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.

No. 1127.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 6, 1982.

Leonard S. Bernstein, Baltimore, for appellant.

George M. Church and John Ulrich, Jr., Baltimore, with whom were Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, Trimble & Johnston, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellees.

Argued before LISS and WILNER, JJ., and CLAYTON C. CARTER, Special Judge.

WILNER, Judge.

On January 14, 1974, while in the employ of appellee, Allied Research Associates, Inc. (Allied), appellant fell into a hole and injured her back, left leg, and shoulder, as a result of which she filed a workmen's compensation claim. Because appellant had some preexisting injuries, the Subsequent Injury Fund (the Fund) was impleaded into the case.

On January 16, 1976, the Workmen's Compensation Commission found that appellant had a 60% industrial loss of the use of her body as a whole, 20% being due to the accident of January, 1974, and 40% being due to the preexisting condition. An award was made, on that basis, against both Allied and the Fund. Dissatisfied, both appellant and the Fund appealed to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

After trial in that court on April 22, 1977, six issues were submitted to a jury, which returned verdicts as follows:

(1) Appellant had a permanent industrial disability of 90%;

(2) She had a permanent impairment before the January, 1974, accident;

(3) That previous impairment was not a hindrance or obstacle (and was not likely to be a hindrance or obstacle) to her employment;

(4) Appellant's present permanent industrial disability was substantially greater because of the combined effects of the previous impairment and the January, 1974, injury than the disability would have been from that injury alone;

(5) All (100%) of appellant's industrial disability was attributable to the January, 1974, injury; and

(6) Ten percent of appellant's present condition was attributable (assessed) to the previous disease or infirmity. ¹

The court thereupon remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings in conformance with the jury's findings. On May 4, 1977, the Commission rescinded its previous order and issued a supplemental one finding that appellant sustained a permanent partial disability amounting to 90% industrial loss of use of her body, 80% being attributable to the January, 1974, accident and 10% to preexisting conditions. The new order recited the jury's findings and stated that it was being issued "in conformity with the Findings and Judgement of the Jury." It revised the amount of the award, and, in light of the jury's third finding--that the preexisting impairment was not a hindrance to appellant's employment--excused the Fund from liability and assessed the award solely against Allied and its insurer.

On September 11, 1978, appellant sought to reopen the proceeding, claiming a worsening of her condition. After a hearing on the matter, the Commission, by order of April 11, 1979, found that, as a result of the January, 1974, accidental injury, appellant had become permanently totally disabled. Following a denial of Allied's request for rehearing and the Commission's affirmance of the award, Allied appealed.

Having been excused from liability in May, 1977, the Fund did not participate in the 1978-79 proceeding before the Commission, although it apparently retained its status as a party. Allied's petition for appeal did not name the Fund as a respondent and made no allegation against or affecting it. The sole complaint made in the petition, as set forth in paragraph 8, was that, by finding that 100% of appellant's disability was attributable to the January, 1974, accident the Commission "overruled" the jury verdict that only 90% was so attributable. The Fund, nevertheless, answered the petition, denying the allegations of paragraph 8, and then moved to be dismissed as a party. The court treated that motion as one for summary judgment and, on April 17, 1980, granted it. Relying on Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 275 Md. 628, 342 A.2d 671 (1975), and art. 101, § 66, the court held, correctly, that the Fund would be liable only if a preexisting condition created an obstacle to appellant's subsequent employment, that the jury had previously determined as a fact that such was not the case, and that that determination constituted res judicata and could not be relitigated.

The court took a different approach with respect to Allied's res judicata argument, which was repeated in its motion for summary judgment. Referring to the Commission's continuing jurisdiction under art. 101, § 40(c), and to comments made by us in Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md.App. 339, 392 A.2d 94 (1978), the court concluded that the Commission had the authority to reopen a proceeding before it and to revise previous orders and awards made by it. Res judicata, it said, was not applicable to such determinations. The court therefore denied Allied's motion, and ruled that the sole issue to be resolved in the appeal was whether appellant "is now permanently totally disabled as a result of her accidental injury of January 14, 1974 or whether her permanent total disability is also attributable to the preexisting condition."

After trial, those issues were submitted to a jury, which agreed with the Commission that appellant was 100% permanently disabled but found that 45% of the total disability was due to a preexisting physical condition. The latter finding, of course, served to reduce substantially appellant's benefits, and has prompted this appeal. Two issues are raised, but we need address only the first: whether res judicata, or some allied doctrine, precluded the Commission and the court from revising the first jury's finding that 10% of appellant's disability was attributable to preexisting conditions.

Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 40(c), provides in relevant part that "[t]he powers and jurisdiction of the [Workmen's Compensation] Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may, from time to time, make such modifications or changes with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified...." In Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, supra, 40 Md.App. 339, 345, 392 A.2d 94, we characterized that section as "one of the broadest re-opening statutes," one that "not only gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction over each case, [but] also invests the Commission with blanket power to make such changes as in its opinion may be justified." The doctrine of res judicata, we said, "is necessarily limited in its effect" by that statute. Compare Mackall v. Zayre Corporation, --- Md. ---, 443 A.2d 98 (1982).

In a real sense, § 40(c) gives the Commission a revisionary power akin to that available to courts under Md.Ann.Code, Courts article, § 6-408, and Maryland Rule 625 a, but without the thirty-day limitation. Commission orders are final, in the sense of being appealable, when they are entered, as are judgments entered by a court; but they can be reconsidered and revised by the Commission at its discretion. As res judicata would not preclude a court from exercising its authority under § 6-408 or Rule 625 a, so it would not preclude the Commission from exercising its authority under § 40(c). The Commission is not "irrevocably bound" by its earlier findings. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 278 Md. 320, 328, 363 A.2d 505 (1976). ²

We are not dealing here just with a revision of a Commission order or finding, however; this case involves an important added dimension. The finding that the Commission revised, and that the jury re-revised, was one made by a jury, not by the Commission. As noted, the Commission's second order, of May 4, 1977, was adopted merely to conform to the jury's findings. That requires us to consider the effect of § 56 of art. 101, concerning appeals from Commission decisions, and the principle laid down in Buffin v. Hernandez, 44 Md.App. 247, 408 A.2d 393 (1979).

Section 56 authorizes any person aggrieved by a Commission decision to "have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal" in the appropriate circuit court. The court, in such a proceeding, "shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts concerning the injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the article , and whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided." On the motion of any party and subject to an exception not relevant here, the court shall "submit to a jury any question of fact involved in such case...." The court, upon the evidence it hears, may confirm, reverse, or modify the Commission decision or remand the case for further proceedings.

Where the claim arises from an accidental injury, as here, rather than an occupational disease, § 56 provides "for a trial which is essentially de novo." Maryland Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 382, 265 A.2d 860 (1970); Montgomery Ward & Co., Incorporated v. Bell, 46 Md.App. 37, 415 A.2d 636 (1980). The jury's function in such a case is the same as in any civil case, to weigh conflicting evidence and make findings of fact on the issues presented to it; and, as in any civil case, the jury's findings of fact, if based on legally sufficient evidence, are final and are not reviewable on further appeal. Atlantic Refining Company v. Forrester, 180 Md. 517, 25 A.2d 667 (1942); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Hill, 201 Md. 630, 95 A.2d 84 (1953). The court's function is merely to apply the law to the facts as found by the jury. Arundel Corp. v. Plater, 236 Md. 322, 203 A.2d 895 (1964); Morris v. Christopher, 255 Md. 372, 258 A.2d 172 (1969).

Once that is done, the jury's finding becomes part of the judgment of the court, which is a tribunal superior in authority to the Commission. That necessarily limits the Commission's prerogatives under § 40(c); for if the superior...