Vinci v. Quagliani

• Decision Date: 07 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3:08–cv–01935 (CSH).,3:08–cv–01935 (CSH).
• Parties: Domenic VINCI, Plaintiff, v. Ronald QUAGLIANI, Lisa Whitney Yarbor, Thomas Gallagher, Alex Botte, Grace Hendricks, and Richard Smith, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

889 F.Supp.2d 348

Domenic VINCI, Plaintiff,

v.Ronald QUAGLIANI, Lisa Whitney Yarbor, Thomas Gallagher, Alex Botte, Grace Hendricks, and Richard Smith, Defendants.

No. 3:08–cv–01935 (CSH).

United States District Court,

D. Connecticut.

Sept. 7, 2012.

Kelly Anne Rommel, Cheshire, CT, Norman A. Pattis, The Pattis Law Firm, LLC, Bethany, CT, for Plaintiff.

Catherine S. Nietzel, Charles A. Deluca, Ryan Ryan Deluca, LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

I. Introduction and Summary of Facts

Plaintiff Domenic Vinci, a public employee, brings this action against Ronald Quagliani, Lisa Whitney Yarbor, Thomas Gallagher, Alexander Botte, ¹ Grace Hendricks, and Richard K. Smith (“Defendants”) in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges a First Amendment claim based upon actions and events which Plaintiff claims constituted employment retaliation for constitutionally protected activity, specifically Plaintiff's freedoms of speech and association.² Defendants now make a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 27], seeking a summary disposition of all claims Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint [Doc. 30]. For the reasons given below, summary judgment against those claims is appropriate.

A number of facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was at all times relevant to this action a police officer employed by the City of West Haven. At the time he filed his Amended Complaint, he had been a member of the West Haven Police Department (hereafter the “Department”) for eighteen years. The Plaintiff also served on the West Haven Democratic Town Committee (hereafter the “Democratic Town Committee” or the “Committee”), which he apparently joined in the spring of 2005. At all times relevant hereto, Quagliani was the Chief of Police of the Department, and at various relevant times Yarbor, Gallagher, Botte, Smith, and Hendricks were members of the West Haven Board of Police Commissioners (the “Board”).

Plaintiff avers that in the spring of 2005, together with fifty-three other members of the Democratic Town Committee, he endorsed John Picard as candidate for mayor of West Haven. As a result of this vote, the Committee refused to endorse the incumbent, Richard Borer, despite the fact that Borer was a member of the Democratic party. Although Borer did not receive his party's backing for reelection, he nonetheless ran for mayor as an independent. Borer was defeated by Picard in 2005. Plaintiff claims, without providing significant evidence to support his assertions, that Defendants remained loyal to Borer once Picard became mayor. Plaintiff also claims, without offering evidence outside his own testimony, that he was warned that his support for Picard might have negative consequences at work. After the election, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants jointly and severally “engaged in a campaign to harass, intimidate and punish” Plaintiff for Plaintiff's opposition to Borer's candidacy. [Doc. 30] at 2–4.

Plaintiff claims that prior to the 2005 mayoral election, he had enjoyed an unblemished career as a West Haven police officer. He had been appointed to the rank of detective in 2003, and at that time he was assigned to the Special Victims Unit of the Department (hereafter the “SVU”). He was still working in the SVU when in March 2005 he applied for and obtained a position as a School Resource Officer/Youth Officer for West Haven High School. Although Plaintiff was taking on a new role with West Haven High School, he reportedly agreed to finish the still-active SVU cases to which he had been assigned.

In December of 2005, Plaintiff was suspended from the Department for a ten-day period. This suspension was issued by Defendant Quagliani pursuant to a report written by Plaintiff's supervisor. The stated reason behind the suspension was the Plaintiff's late filing of several police reports, as well as the manner in which Plaintiff had investigated eight specific cases that had been assigned to him as an SVU Detective. This suspension was later unanimously overturned by a panel of the Connecticut State Department of Labor's Board of Mediation and Arbitration after a hearing and inquiry. The panel's accompanying report included a strongly worded critique of the initial Department decision to suspend Plaintiff, as well as a reference to “other problems raised in this case of a political nature which [the panel] found to be improper on the part of the West Haven Police Department.” [Doc. 32] Ex. 7, at 3–4.

In March of 2006, Plaintiff, along with another police Detective, was found by those Defendants who were members of the West Haven Board of Police Commissioners (i.e., all Defendants excepting Quagliani) to have mishandled a bomb threat at the West Haven High School at which both Plaintiff and the other Department employee worked as police liaisons. This finding was made pursuant to a Board hearing, and its immediate result was a decision to demote the Plaintiff from his then-position of Detective Grade A to PatrolmanGrade A. Following an arbitration settlement, this demotion was later reduced to a 45–day duration.

Plaintiff claims that the acts of each Defendant were intentional, inspired by malice, and related to Plaintiff's support for a particular mayoral candidate. Plaintiff further claims that as a direct and proximate result of these acts, he suffered “anxiety, humiliation, loss of reputation in the community, ascertainable economic loss and the violation of his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” [Doc. 30] at 4.

Each individual Defendant has filed sworn answers to discovery interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff, denying Plaintiff's claims. With the exception of Quagliani, Defendants swear that they were not aware in 2005 that the Plaintiff was on the Democratic Town Committee. [Doc. 27] Ex. A at 4. All Defendants deny having any knowledge about who Plaintiff endorsed or for whom Plaintiff voted during the 2005 West Haven mayoral election. Id. at Ex. E. Defendants also plead two affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense Defendants raise is that the claims and allegations set forth by the Plaintiff, “even if taken as true, do not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1988, as any deprivation ... therein does not rise to the level of a constitutional tort.” [Doc. 10] at 4. The second affirmative defense Defendants raise is that their “acts and conduct ... to the extent that they occurred as alleged ... were discretionary acts which were undertaken in good faith performance of their official duties as municipal officers, without malice” and, moreover, were “reasonable under the circumstances of which [Defendants] were aware [and] did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of [Plaintiff].” Id. As such, Defendants contend that they “have a qualified immunity defense from all liability therefor.” Id.

II. Standard of Review

The standards for summary judgment are familiar. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts in evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. It must also resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

“Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991). A nonmoving party, such as the Plaintiff in this case, must therefore present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. When “a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence ... the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but rather must present significant probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Marczeski v. Gavitt, 354 F.Supp.2d 190, 193 (D.Conn.2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). To present a “genuine” issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Should the nonmoving party fail to make a sufficient showing on an essential elementof his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, summary judgment against him is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A “complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Elements of a First Amendment Retaliation Claim

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff who is a government employee must present evidence which demonstrates: (1) that the speech at issue was protected; (2) that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the allegedly protected speech and the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Everitt v. DeMarco, 704 F.Supp.2d...