Vinnett v. General Electric Company, No. 07-14364 Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir. 3/31/2008)
| Decision Date | 31 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-14364 Non-Argument Calendar.,07-14364 Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Parties | WILLIAM VINNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia; D.C. Docket No. 05-00993-CV-TWT-1.
Before ANDERSON, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
William Vinnett appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of General Electric Co. in his employment discrimination and retaliation suit filed pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 3; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Vinnett, who is fifty-two years old and originally from Chile, began working as a product services engineer for GE's Power Systems Division in Atlanta in October 1999. Under GE's performance assessment system, there were three ratings an employee could receive. The highest rating was "top talent," the middle rating was "highly valued," and the lowest rating was "least effective performer." In 2001, Vinnett's manager at the time, Mark Hammont, rated Vinnett highly valued, but in 2002, Hammont rated him as a least effective performer. As a result of the least effective performer rating, Vinnett was placed on a performance improvement plan, and he was ineligible for a raise or a promotion in 2003. Vinnett objected to the rating as undeserved because he believed there was no area of his performance that needed improvement.
In September 2003, Vinnett filed a complaint through GE's internal dispute resolution process, alleging that he was being discriminated against on the basis of his age, national origin, or race. Vinnett specifically complained about the 2002 least effective performer rating, not getting a raise in 2003, and not being considered for a promotion. In October 2003, Vinnett's new manager, Jason Ruyle, responded to his complaint, finding it to be without merit.
Vinnett then filed a "level two" submission form through GE's dispute resolution process, repeating the same allegations contained in his first complaint. By this time, Vinnett had retained an attorney to assist him. In December 2003, GE's engineering general manager and human resources manager reviewed Vinnett's level two complaint, and both concluded that his accusations were without merit. Vinnett then submitted a "level three" complaint through GE's dispute resolution process, which resulted in the matter being submitted to the American Arbitration Association for mediation. Vinnett's attorney helped him fill out the mediation form and attended the day-long mediation with him in May 2004.
In June 2004, Vinnett decided that he no longer wanted to work at GE and began seeking other employment. Later that month, Vinnett accepted an offer of employment in Orlando, Florida with Mitsubishi Power Systems, and he began working for Mitsubishi in July 2004. Meanwhile, Vinnett and his attorney worked out a settlement agreement with GE. In consideration for Vinnett's release and settlement of all employment-related claims against GE, the agreement required GE to: (1) pay $40,000 to Vinnett and $10,000 to his attorney; (2) provide Vinnett a signed reference letter; (3) keep Vinnett on the payroll until July 9, 2004; (4) provide only positive references and make positive comments about Vinnett's employment; and (5) continue to use Vinnett's wife, Leena, as a contractor for GE Power Systems for six months, although she could be terminated for cause, which included GE's "discontinuation of Leena Vinnett's services as the result of purchasing services through a company different from the one which currently employs Ms. Vinnett."
Vinnett met with his attorney on July 1, 2004 to review the settlement agreement. He testified in his deposition that he discussed the terms of the agreement with his lawyer and read the document several times. When his attorney asked if he understood the agreement, he said he did and that the document was "straightforward." Vinnett and his attorney signed the release and agreement that day. The next day, an attorney for GE signed the agreement on the company's behalf.
At the time the settlement agreement was prepared, Leena worked for a company called Granite Services as a software developer. Pursuant to Granite's contract with GE Power Systems, Leena had provided network administration software configuration, and other IT services to GE since January 2000. Granite's contract with GE was subject to renewal on an annual basis, and it had almost always been renewed before 2004. In early 2004, the contract was again up for renewal under a competitive bid process. Granite notified Leena that if it lost the contract, her assignment would be lost, and that there was no other position to which she could automatically be transferred. Accordingly, Granite told Leena that she should submit an updated resume and check the company's website for other possible job opportunities.
At the end of the bid process, Granite lost the GE contract to another vendor, Softek. Leena learned of this in May 2004, and later that month, she accepted an assignment to Granite's temporary transition team, which was created to ensure an orderly transition to GE's new vendor. The agreement Leena signed with Granite specified that her employment was for "no fixed period," and in early July 2004, Granite notified Leena that her assignment would likely terminate at the end of August.
Leena told her husband that her assignment was going to end, but she did not notify anyone at Granite about the provision in her husband's settlement agreement with GE relating to her employment because she "thought they might change their mind . . . at [the] last minute." She decided to wait until the end of August to see if Granite would continue her assignment.
On August 27, 2004, when nothing had changed and her assignment was about to end, Leena notified her supervisor at Granite for the first time that there was a settlement agreement between her husband and GE that affected her employment status. Her supervisor knew nothing about the agreement and decided to speak to Granite's vice president for human resources, who also was unaware of any agreement but said he would look into it. Leena's assignment terminated on August 31, 2004. The next day, Leena's supervisor sent her a letter stating that Granite had been advised that the termination of her assignment did not conflict with any agreement between GE and her husband.
On December 20, 2004, Vinnett filed and submitted an EEOC charge, alleging retaliation and requesting "the settlement agreement to be restored and [his] spouse to get a permanent position with General Electric Company." In January 2005, the EEOC determined that its investigation did not establish any "violations of the statutes." Vinnett filed suit against GE in federal court in April 2005, alleging age discrimination, as well as retaliation. Specifically, Vinnett alleged that he was discriminated and retaliated against while he was employed at GE, and that GE retaliated against him after he left the company by causing his wife's employment to be terminated, in violation of the settlement agreement.
After the completion of discovery, GE moved for summary judgment on all of Vinnett's claims, which the district court granted. The district court found that Vinnett had released all claims of discrimination and retaliation that occurred before he signed the settlement agreement. The court further concluded that Vinnett had no viable claim relating to Leena's loss of employment because he had suffered no "adverse action," and there was no evidence of a causal connection between Leena's loss of employment and Vinnett's discrimination complaints. Vinnett timely appealed.
Vinnett contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to GE on his retaliation and discrimination claims because: (1) his prior settlement agreement with GE does not bar his discrimination and retaliation claims that arose during his employment; and (2) he established a prima facie case of retaliation for acts that occurred after the signing of the settlement agreement. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001). We draw all factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 1243.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact." Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We have stated that "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (quotations and alteration omitted).
Vinnett contends that the district court erred by concluding that the settlement agreement barred his retaliation and discrimination claims arising during his employment with GE. Specifically, Vinnett argues that the clause in the agreement concerning Leena's employment is ambiguous because each party intended for the clause to mean different things. Vinnett argues that he intended for the clause to guarantee Leena's employment, and according to him, GE breached the agreement when it terminated Leena. In light of the breach, Vinnett argues that rescission of the settlement agreement is appropriate.
We use the applicable state's contract law to construe and enforce settlement agreements. Ins. Concepts, Inc. v. W. Life Ins. Co., 639 F.2d...
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