Vinson v. Koch Foods of Ala., LLC
| Decision Date | 03 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-11999,19-11999 |
| Citation | 12 F.4th 1270 |
| Parties | Maria N. VINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KOCH FOODS OF ALABAMA, LLC, Koch Foods, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Charles E. Guerrier, Alicia K. Haynes, Haynes & Haynes, PC, Jeffrey W. Bennitt, Jeff W. Bennitt & Associates, LLC, Heather Newsom Leonard, Heather Leonard, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Rachel V. Barlotta, Jenna M. Bedsole, Sharonda Childs Fancher, Baker Donelson Berman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Marion F. Walker, Fisher Phillips LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, GRANT and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
Maria Vinson, a Puerto Rican woman, sued her former employer, Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC ("Koch"), for race and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. Following a seven-day jury trial on the merits of her claim, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Koch and the District Court entered final judgment consistent with that verdict. On appeal, Vinson seeks a new trial on two grounds: first, that the District Court improperly overruled her Batson1 challenges against two of Koch's preemptory jury strikes and second, that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new trial due to Koch counsels’ violation of a pretrial order entered on a motion in limine . As Vinson has failed to meet her high burden on both grounds, we affirm the District Court.
Koch operates facilities where it kills, processes, and packages chickens and chicken byproducts. In early 2010, David Birchfield, the Human Resource Manager for Koch's Montgomery complex, hired Vinson as a new hire orientation clerk and translator. Vinson's job duties included processing new hires, translating, issuing and verifying identification cards and documents, completing federal forms for all personnel, conducting personnel drug screening, maintaining personal attendance records, and assisting with payroll.
On January 5, 2012, Vinson and a white co-worker, Heather Bowen, asked the senior HR person in their department, Misti James, for permission to visit a coworker in the hospital. Vinson and Bowen received permission and left the HR office, followed shortly thereafter by James. This left the office unattended for three hours. Upon their return, Birchfield suspended all three until further notice. On January 11, Birchfield allowed Bowen and James to return to work, then allowed Vinson to return the following day.
Soon after her return, Birchfield changed Vinson's job duties by moving her from the HR office to the production line to better train new hires. No changes were made to the duties of the other women, and Birchfield filled Vinson's old job with another Puerto Rican woman. In May 2012, Birchfield fired Vinson and eliminated her position.
Following her termination, Vinson filed suit against both Koch and Birchfield, claiming discriminatory discipline and wrongful termination under § 1981 and Title VII, among other claims. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Vinson's claims. On appeal, we reversed in part, allowing the discriminatory discipline and wrongful termination claims to go forward. Vinson v. Koch Foods of Alabama , 735 F. App'x 978 (11th Cir. 2018). The case then proceeded towards trial.
Prior to trial, Vinson and Koch both moved the District Court in limine to suppress any reference to a claim or part of a claim that had been dismissed, whether voluntarily or not. While these motions were pending, Vinson filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss with prejudice all claims against Birchfield. On January 11, 2019, the District Court granted Vinson's motion to dismiss all claims against Birchfield with prejudice and granted the parties’ motions to prohibit references to "any claim or part of a claim" which had been dismissed.
The trial began February 4, 2019, with jury selection. The District Court determined that the jury would consist of ten jurors with no alternates and that each side would receive three peremptory strikes. Peremptory strikes would be made in jury number order until either both sides exhausted their peremptory strikes, or ten jurors remained unchallenged, with no back striking allowed.2 The venire was comprised of twenty-three prospective jurors, at least nine of whom were black.3
At the close of the venire voir dire, both Vinson and Koch made for-cause strikes. Vinson made one for-cause strike against Juror 29, a white male who expressed dislike towards lawsuits; the District Court denied the strike. Koch then made six for-cause strikes against Jurors 16, 23, 27, 28, 31, and 41. The Court granted the strikes against Jurors 23, 27, 31, and 41: Jurors 23 and 41 were vegans with moral objections to Koch killing animals, Juror 27 expressed a clear preference for believing plaintiffs, and Juror 31 left the courthouse while his strike was under consideration. Koch's other two strikes, against Juror 16 for disliking at-will employment and Juror 28 for appearing to fall asleep during voir dire, were denied. As Jurors 16, 23, 27, 28, and 31 were black, Vinson expressed concern that Koch was challenging predominantly black jurors, but explicitly chose not to make a Batson challenge.
Vinson and Koch then moved on to making their peremptory strikes. The parties made their peremptory strikes in alternating order, with Vinson striking Jurors 10, 22, and 29 and Koch striking Jurors 9, 16, and 32. As all three of Koch's peremptory strikes were black, Vinson did make a Batson challenge here against the peremptory strikes of Jurors 9 and 32. Vinson did not challenge the peremptory strike against Juror 16 as Koch had challenged her earlier for-cause.
The District Court began by asking for Vinson's prima facie case. Vinson argued that Koch's use of most of its for-cause strikes and all its peremptory strikes against black jurors created a prima facie case that Koch was striking jurors based on their race. Additionally, Vinson noted that Koch had not asked Jurors 9 and 32 any individual questions despite doing so with the other prospective jurors, leaving no apparent reason other than race as to why they were struck. The Court then asked Koch to explain its strikes against Jurors 9 and 32.
In response, Koch stated that it had conducted background checks on all the prospective jurors and discovered that Juror 9 had an extensive litigation history, including various debt collection actions against her and a previous suit she had filed against a coworker. Taken together, Koch believed this litigation history would align Juror 9 more with a plaintiff's perspective. Vinson replied that Koch had not struck Juror 1, who had a DUI, or Juror 22, who had previously filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Koch answered that Vinson had already struck Juror 22 using one of her peremptory challenges before Koch could reach him and that an extensive history of civil litigation was much more likely to align a juror with a plaintiff in a race discrimination case than a prior DUI. The District Court then overruled Vinson's Batson challenge as to Juror 9.
Next, Koch moved on to Juror 32. Despite Vinson's claim, Koch stated that it had individually questioned Juror 32 and discovered she was a current union member who had previously filed a worker's compensation claim. Koch struck her because her responses towards questioning about her worker's compensation claim indicated she had reservations about the fairness of the process. In response, Vinson admitted Juror 32 had indicated "hiccups" in the worker's compensation process, but not that she would prefer one side or the other when making her decision, then noted that worker's compensation claims were different than discrimination claims. The District Court found that Koch had given a non-discriminatory explanation and overruled the Batson challenge as to Juror 32. Of the final ten jurors, three were black: Juror 28, one of Koch's unsuccessful for-cause strikes, and two unchallenged black jurors.
Opening statements were made on February 4, with testimony beginning February 5. On February 6, Vinson introduced without objection Exhibit 57, Koch and Birchfield's response to Vinson's first request for production, and then questioned Birchfield about its contents. Notably, Exhibit 57 listed both Koch and Birchfield as defendants in the suit, as the production request had occurred before Birchfield was dismissed. During a sidebar after the introduction of Exhibit 57, Koch counsel pointed out that Exhibit 57 identified Birchfield as a party despite the order in limine but said they did not object to it.
On February 8, counsel for Koch questioned Vinson about Exhibit 57. Their conversation went as follows:
At this point, the District Court asked counsel for Vinson if she had any objections, and the parties went into a sidebar. Here, counsel for Vinson objected to the entire discussion of Birchfield's former party status as a violation of the order in limine , in particular Koch's description of Birchfield as a "prevailing party," and asked for a mistrial. The Court denied the motion for a...
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