Vinson v. State

Decision Date31 March 1977
Docket NumberNo. 48476,48476
PartiesClifford VINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Robert E. Pyle, of Pyle & Barber, Lake Alfred, and Frank C. Alderman, III, Fort Myers, for petitioner.

Joseph P. D'Alessandro, State's Atty.; Louis S. St. Laurent, Chief Asst. State's

Atty., Fort Myers and James R. Thompson, Asst. State's Atty., for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice (Retired).

We review here by conflict certiorari a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 320 So.2d 50 (Fla., DCA 2d, 1975), reversing a decision of the trial court which discharged the defendant. We have tentative jurisdiction because of apparent conflict with State v. Febre, 156 Fla. 149, 23 So.2d 270 (1945).

Petitioner Vinson, defendant at the trial level and a physician, was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance as proscribed by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, 1973, known as the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Dr. Vinson entered a plea of not guilt but later, after what appeared to be some form of plea bargaining, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of nolo contendere. The trial judge ordered an evidentiary hearing on the plea. The State objected contending that upon the tender of such a plea the sole responsibility and authority of the Court was to accept (or reject) the plea and, if accepted, to impose sentence. Over the State's objection, the trial court proceeded to receive into evidence five exhibits and heard six witnesses, such witnesses being at times questioned from the bench. Several weeks later, the trial judge entered an Order finding Dr. Vinson not guilty of both counts and discharging him. The State appealed the decision to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, contending that the action of the trial judge in conducting the hearing and discharging the defendant was without authority of law and in effect a nullity and, therefore, did not prevent further prosecution of the case. The decision of the District Court in reversing the trial court appears as State v. Vinson, 320 So.2d 50 (Fla., DCA 2d, 1975). The controlling question now presented is whether or not the action of the trial court was sufficient to bar further prosecution against a defense of former jeopardy.

The District Court properly determined that the trial judge was without authority at all to consider as viable the issue of guilt or innocence and explained:

'We hold, therefore, while not precluding a trial judge in his discretion from making inquiry into a factual basis for a nolo contendere plea, there being no express requirement therefor under Rule 3.170 RCrP, that if the trial judge indeed makes such inquiry or if, for one reason or another, he thinks that the underlying facts of the case do not establish the defendant's guilt, he nevertheless has no authority to enter a judgment of not guilty.'

Preliminarily, we find that Rule 3.170, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1 does not require that an inquiry be made into the factual basis for a plea of nolo contendere. This rule expressly provides:

'(j) Responsibility of Court on Pleas. No plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be accepted by a court without first determining, in open court, with means of recording the proceedings stenographically or by mechanical means, that the circumstances surrounding the plea reflect a full understanding of the significance of the plea and its voluntariness, And that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty.' (Emphasis supplied)

Although this rule requires a determination by the trial court that the circumstances surrounding the plea reflect a full understanding of the significance of the plea of nolo contendere or guilty and its voluntariness, as evidenced by the explicit language contained therein, an inquiry must be made into the factual basis of a guilty plea but not a plea of nolo contendere.

A plea of nolo contendere admits the facts for the purpose of the pending prosecution. It raises no issue of law or fact under the accusation. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in a note to its decision in Tucker v. United States of America, 196 F. 260 (CA 7 Cir., 1912), described the nature and purpose of such a plea, as follows:

'The plea of Nolo contendere (I will not contest it) is used in criminal cases where the accused, though unwilling to confess his guilt, does not wish to go to trial, and desires the court immediately to impose sentence.

The early records of this ancient plea state the fact to be that the defendant is unwilling to contest the question with the Crown, and therefore throws himself upon the mercy of the court. Non vult contendere cum domina regina et ponit se in gratium curice. 2 Hawk. P.C. chap. 21; Reg. v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55; Chitty, Crim. Law, chap. 10 (which is quoted at length in the opinion of the reported case). The effect in practice was that there was nothing left for the court to do, except to impose sentence.

In State v. La Rose, 71 N.H. 435, 52 Atl. 943, the plea is thus characterized: 'The plea is in the nature of a compromise between the state and the defendant,--a matter not of right, but of favor. Various reasons may exist why a defendant conscious of innocence may be willing to forego his right to make defense if he can be permitted to do so without acknowledging his guilt. Whether, in a particular case, he should be permitted to do so, is for the court.'

And in Doughty v. De Amoreel, 22 R.I. 158, 46 Atl. 838, it was said: 'Doubtless it is often used as a substitute for a plea of guilty, but it simply says that the defendant will not contend. This is not a confession of guilt, because an accused person might find himself without witnesses to establish his innocence, from their death, absence, or other cause, and hence waive a fruitless contest."

The Supreme Court of the United States in Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 47 S.Ct. 127, 71 L.Ed. 347, analyzed the historical background of the plea:

'The use of the plea in the Federal courts and the propriety of imposing a prison sentence upon it are recognized by the Probation Act; March 4, 1925, chap. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, (Comp. Stat. § 10,564 4/5, Fed.Stat.Anno.Supp.1925, p. 172). Section 1 of that Act provides for the suspension of sentence and the release of the prisoner on probation 'after (453) conviction, or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for any crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment.'

'The plea of nolo contendere was known to the common law, and is referred to, although not by name, by a modern English text-writer. See Archbold's Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases, (26th ed. 1922) 379. But no example of its use in the English courts has been found since the case of Queen v. Templeman, decided in 1702, 1 Salk. 55 (91 Eng. Reprint, 54), where, although a fine was imposed, the question now under consideration was neither decided nor discussed.

'The view of the court in the Tucker (v. United States, 7 Cir., 196 F. 260), Case that a prison sentence may not be imposed on the plea of nolo contendere rests upon no more substantial basis than a possibly ambiguous phrase in a passage from Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 8th ed. book 2, chap. 21, 466. The author prefaces the chapter, 'Of Confessions and Demurrer,' with the remark, 'And now I am to consider what is to be done to a prisoner upon his confession; which may be either Express or Implied.' In §§ 1 and 2 he points out that a confession of guilt 'carries with it so strong a presumption of guilt, that an entry or record, quod cognovit indictamentum, etc., in an indictment of trespass, estops the defendant to plead 'not guilty' to an action brought afterwards against him for the same matter.' He then says:

"Sec. 3. An implied confession is where a defendant, in a case not capital, doth not directly own himself guilty, but in a manner admits it by yielding to the king's mercy, and desiring to submit to a small fine: in which case, if the court think fit to accept of such submission, and make an entry that the defendant posuit se in grantiam regis, without putting him to a direct confession, or plea (which in such cases seems to be left to discretion), the defendant shall not be estopped to plead not guilty to an action for the same fact, as he shall be where the entry is quod cognovit indictamentum.'

'(454) This passage appears in all the earlier editions of Hawkins. It has been handed down from generation to generation of text writers in substantially the same form with occasional glosses, but researches rarely went further. Similarly, judicial study of the history of the plea halts with Hawkins.

'But even if we regard the implied confession as a petition which in Hawkins's time had to be accepted as tendered, in modern practice it has been transformed into the formal plea of nolo contendere. Like the implied confession this plea does not create an estoppel, but like the plea of guilty, it is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case. Section 3, it is true, speaks of the defendant's yielding to mercy and his desire 'to submit to a small fine,' but even if we assign to these words the more comprehensive meaning suggested, they do not say that the court is bound to yield to the prisoner's petition in fixing sentence, nor do they suggest that the court by accepting a formal plea which admits guilt for the purposes of the case would be bound to yield to its implied appeal for mercy.

'Undoubtedly a court may, in its discretion, mitigate the punishment on a plea of nolo contendere, and feel constrained to do so whenever the plea is accepted with the understanding that only a fine is to be imposed. But such a restriction made mandatory upon the court by positively rule of law would only hamper its discretion and curtail the utility of the plea.'

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  • State v. Trice
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 15 Mayo 2012
    ... ... Walker v ... Florida , 880 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (2004) ("'A plea ... of nolo contendere does not admit the allegations of the ... charge in a technical sense but only says that the defendant ... does not choose to defend.'" (quoting Vinson v ... Florida , 345 So. 2d 711, 715 (Fla., 1977))), ... rev'd on other grounds , 932 So. 2d 1085 (2006) ... And because Trice pleaded nolo contendere, no facts were ... proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Walker , 880 So. 2d ... at 1265. Thus, the sentencing court ... ...
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    • 11 Septiembre 2020
    ...contendere because that plea, like a guilty plea, results in a conviction and "gives the court the power to punish." Vinson v. State , 345 So. 2d 711, 715 (Fla. 1977).The Supreme Court has relied on similar features to conclude that exactions that bore a far greater resemblance to taxes tha......
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