Vinson v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 03 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-15534.,00-15534. |
| Citation | 288 F.3d 1145 |
| Parties | Brian VINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, United States of America, Intervenor, v. Alice THOMAS, individually and in her capacity as the Director of the Vocational Rehabilitation Branch of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii; Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii; Intracorp, a duly organized and incorporated Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael K. Livingston, Honolulu, HI, for the plaintiff-appellant.
J. Gerard Lam, Deputy Attorney General, Honolulu, HI, and Michael W. Kirk, Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii and Alice Thomas.
Seth M. Galanter, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for intervenor United States of America.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii; Helen Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-00091-HG/FIY.
Before: THOMPSON, O'SCANNLAIN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Brian Vinson ("Vinson") filed suit against Alice Thomas ("Thomas") and the State of Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations ("DLIR") (collectively "the defendants") claiming they denied him vocational rehabilitation services in violation of his rights under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Vinson appeals.
Consistent with our recent decision in Douglas v. California Department of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812, as amended, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.2001), we hold that by its acceptance of federal Rehabilitation Act funds, the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to Vinson's claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We also conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude summary judgment on that claim. Thus, we reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of the DLIR on Vinson's Rehabilitation Act claim.1
Vinson's claims against the individual defendant, Thomas, were asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only § 1983 claim preserved in this appeal is the claim that, acting in her individual capacity, Thomas violated Vinson's federal rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. We conclude Vinson may not pursue a section 1983 claim against Thomas in her individual capacity for her alleged violation of either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, and thus we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Thomas.
In August 1993, Vinson injured his neck and back while working for a flooring company. He received workers' compensation benefits, including vocational rehabilitation benefits paid for by his employer's workers' compensation carrier. The insurance carrier contracted with Intracorp, a private contractor, to develop and manage a vocational rehabilitation plan for Vinson. Intracorp referred Vinson to rehabilitation specialist, Barbara Boddy, for evaluation.
Vinson told Boddy that he had dyslexia. Boddy adjusted her testing to accommodate Vinson's self-reported dyslexia by giving him both the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) and Non Reading Aptitude Test Battery (NATB). After this testing, Boddy believed that a two-year college program would be an important element of Vinson's vocational rehabilitation, and that he could succeed in such a program so long as he received "some special assistance such as a note taker, tape recorder, or consideration for extra time on tests." Boddy further indicated that it might take Vinson "longer than average" to complete a two-year college program and that Vinson would "have to be a very serious and dedicated student to accomplish his goal."
In the spring of 1995, Vinson enrolled at Honolulu Community College ("the college") where he attended classes through the summer of 1996. Vinson took only 9 units per semester, rather than the customary 12. Nonetheless, the college considered him to be a full-time student because of his long-standing history of a learning disability. Throughout this period, his employer's workers' compensation carrier, under no obligation to do so, voluntarily paid for Vinson's schooling as part of his vocational rehabilitation.
In April 1996, Intracorp sought approval from the DLIR of a State-funded rehabilitation plan for Vinson that would provide him with a two-year community college education with accommodations for his dyslexia, including a reduced courseload and the use of computer hardware and software. Initially, DLIR representatives told Intracorp that Vinson had to take at least 12 units per semester, which the college considered full-time. Although he preferred to take only 9 units per semester, Vinson indicated he would be willing to attempt 12 units so long as the State provided him with appropriate computer hardware and software for persons with dyslexia.2
Soon thereafter, Alice Thomas, the vocational rehabilitation supervisor at the DLIR, decided that Vinson should take not just 12, but 15 units per semester so that he would complete the college program sooner. She also stated that he had to demonstrate he could meet "competitive standards," as measured by a 15 credit courseload, so that the DLIR would be assured that he could work and compete in an average labor market once his schooling was completed.3
At this point, Vinson's workers' compensation attorney got involved. He sent a letter to Intracorp and to Alice Thomas at the DLIR formally requesting that Vinson be permitted to take 9 units per semester and be provided with an appropriate computer. Thomas, however, remained of the view that Vinson required neither a reduced courseload nor a special computer. She also was not persuaded that he suffered from dyslexia. Thus, by letter dated July 12, 1996, Thomas asked Vinson's attorney to submit "any and all medical information (to include but not limited to diagnoses and limitations) regarding [Vinson's] unrelated disability."4
On July 25, 1996, Vinson's attorney responded with a letter which included the following attachments: (1) a July 8, 1996 letter from the college indicating that Vinson had a long-standing history of a learning disability, that the college recognized him as a full-time student with nine credits on account of his disability, and that he required a reduced course load in order to continue to progress in his studies; (2) a March 20, 1996 letter from Learning Disability Specialist Lynne Douglas at Leeward Community College stating that upon review of Vinson's past history and existing diagnostic documents Vinson could benefit from computer based programs; and (3) a March 7, 1996 letter from the college noting that Vinson had a "long-standing learning disability, Dyslexia," and recommending that he be permitted to take a reduced courseload and be provided with computer hardware and software.
Thomas responded by letter on July 26, 1996 clarifying that she needed the following documentation regarding Vinson's claim of disability:
1. Verifiable, medical/psychological evidence establishing a disability exists (diagnosis, test scores, etc.,)
2. Specific physical/psychological limitations (medically established) experienced by your claimant.
3. The credentials and reports of the experts referred to in your previous correspondence who, based on said limitations, identified appropriate accommodations. (Emphasis in original.)
On July 30, 1996, Vinson's attorney sent Thomas another letter stating that he would try to provide the information requested, but that the diagnostic "evidence" sought by the DLIR probably did not exist. On August 2, 1996, Thomas responded by letter stating that the only evidence in the program file that Vinson had dyslexia was his own self-report. She further clarified her request for information:
For guidance as to what evidence is needed the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual addresses diagnostic criteria. Providing us with diagnosis, psychological/physical limitations, and current medical status (defined as stability of limitations) may allow us to identify reasonable accommodations at HAR 12-14-5(a)(4) or at least clarify the need to revisit HAR 12-14-5(a)(3).
For the record, your claimant's request to take nine credits a semester rather than meet the competitive standard of fifteen, would represent a 75% increase in plan duration.
Thomas placed Vinson's rehabilitation case in suspended/interrupted status for 60 days to allow him time to submit the additional information requested.
On September 26, 1996, shortly before the 60 day suspension was to expire, the learning disability specialist, Lynne Douglas, sent Gina Eustaquio, the Intracorp disability specialist who was managing Vinson's vocational rehabilitation plan, a summary report that contained extensive information regarding Vinson's diagnostic, academic, and behavioral history, his vocational rehabilitation testing, his progress at the college, and his current status. Attached to Douglas's report was a one-page Individualized Education Program Plan for Vinson dated June 12, 1979, showing that he had been placed in full-time learning disability classes in elementary school as a result of "psychological and educational data." Douglas noted that Vinson had been diagnosed with a learning disability early in his schooling, and had been served as a person with a learning disability throughout his education.
Based upon Douglas's report, and considering the accommodations provided to Vinson by the college, Ms. Eustaquio believed a sufficient diagnosis of dyslexia had been made to warrant consideration of reasonable accommodations by the DLIR. Eustaquio telephoned Thomas and read Douglas's report to her. Without seeing the report, Thomas concluded that it was insufficient...
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