Vinson v. Vinson

• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ALAN E. HIGHERS
• Decision Date: 11 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. W2012-01378-COA-R3-CV,W2012-01378-COA-R3-CV
• Citation: Vinson v. Vinson, No. W2012-01378-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. Sep 11, 2013)
• Parties: ELIZABETH LaFON WESTERN VINSON v. JAMES GERALD VINSON

ELIZABETH LaFON WESTERN VINSON v. JAMES GERALD VINSON

No. W2012-01378-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

April 16, 2013 Session

Filed September 11, 2013

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Henderson County

No. 25171

James F. Butler, Chancellor

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father challenges numerous rulings by the trial court, regarding both parenting issues and financial issues. We affirm in part, as modified, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

in Part, as Modified, Reversed in Part and Remanded

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER, J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

James Gerald Vinson, Enville, TN, pro se

(David W. Camp, Jackson, TN, filed a brief on behalf of Mr. Vinson but was allowed to withdraw as counsel by order of the Court dated February 4, 2013.)

C. Timothy Crocker, Michael A. Carter, J. Noble Grant, III, Ryan L. Hall, Milan, Tennessee, for the appellee, Elizabeth LaFon Western Vinson

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Elizabeth Vinson ("Mother") and James Vinson ("Father") were married in 1997. The parties have two sons, who were born in 1998 and in 2001. Mother filed a complaint for divorce in March of 2011, alleging adultery, among other things. Father filed an answer, denying the allegations of adultery, and he filed a countercomplaint for divorce. Both parties sought to be named primary residential parent of the two sons, who were then ages nine and twelve.

Father is a paramedic, and Mother is a registered nurse. The parties had jointly filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy during the marriage. As a result, all of their debts - which included two mortgages on the marital residence, credit card bills, medical bills, the notes on their two vehicles, and Father's student loans - had been combined into a single monthly payment of approximately $2,240. Father and Mother had nearly equal amounts withdrawn from their paychecks each month to meet the payment obligation required under the bankruptcy plan. They were still under the bankruptcy plan when the divorce proceedings were filed, and their bankruptcy obligation was scheduled to continue until November 2014.

The parties attended mediation in June 2011 and signed a "Mediated Agreement" that resolved some of the issues involved with the divorce. They agreed that Mother would be named primary residential parent, and they adopted a parenting schedule for the summer of 2011 whereby Father would have parenting time one day every week and one full weekend per month. Each parent also had one week of parenting time designated for their summer vacations. Father was ordered to pay $571 in child support per month "until further Orders of the Court." The parties agreed "to continue to equally divide the Chapter 13 bankruptcy payment." Finally, the parties agreed that Mother would use a $13,000 car wreck settlement that she was scheduled to receive in order to pay "for medical bills and to repay her Father," and Mother was directed to provide an itemized accounting of those expenditures to Father's attorney. All other issues were reserved for trial.

The divorce trial took place in April 2012. The trial court adopted and ratified the Mediated Agreement previously signed by the parties, resolved the remaining issues, and entered a final decree of divorce in May 2012. Specifically, the trial court granted a divorce to Mother on the grounds of adultery, divided the parties' marital estate, required the parties to continue to contribute equally toward the bankruptcy payment, named Mother primary residential parent and adopted her proposed parenting plan, ordered Father to pay child support, declined to award alimony, and ordered Father to pay $5,000 of Mother's attorney'sfees. Father timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, Father presents two issues for review, which we quote from his brief:

1. Did the trial court err when it found that the "mediated agreement" signed by the parties on June 2, 2011 was valid and enforceable and then ratified and confirmed the "mediated agreement" but contradicted the terms of said agreement in it's [sic] final ruling; and

2. Did the trial court erred [sic] when it awarded partial attorney fees in the amount of $5,000.00 after making a finding that the court is unable to approve [Mother's] request for attorney fees.

Mother seeks an award of attorney's fees on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, as modified, we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, a trial court's factual findings are presumed to be correct, and we will not overturn those factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). For the evidence to preponderate against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); The Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). We review a trial court's conclusions of law under a de novo standard upon the record with no presumption of correctness. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Consistency with the Mediated Agreement

We will begin by considering Father's assertion that the trial court's final ruling "contradicted" the terms of the Mediated Agreement. Father argues that "[t]he Final Decree of Divorce, Permanent Parenting Plan and Child Support Worksheet entered in this matter does not properly reflect the terms of the 'Mediated Agreement' or the letter ruling of theCourt." He contends that there are "inconsistencies" in these documents with regard to several specific rulings on various issues.

1. Provisions of the Parenting Plan

Father challenges several of the trial court's rulings regarding specific details of the parenting plan. At the outset, we note our agreement with Mother's argument that the trial court was not bound by the parties' Mediated Agreement regarding these issues. "The trial court should, of course, consider any agreement by the parties as to parenting issues, including the residential parenting schedule. The trial court is not, however, bound by such an agreement, but instead must evaluate whether the agreed arrangement is in the best interest of the children." Greer v. Greer, No. W2009-01587-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852321, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (citing Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2010); Coats v. Coats, No. M2007-01219-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4560238, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2008)). As we noted in Greer,

While an agreement on parenting issues would ideally reflect the parties' considered judgment on the arrangement that would best fit the needs of their children, it is also recognized that other factors can come into play in such an agreement, such as the original dysfunction in the parties' relationship, inequality of resources, reluctance to involve the children in the litigation, or even the parties' desire to get the divorce "over with." For that reason, the trial court has broad discretion to determine an appropriate parenting plan in light of the evidence adduced at a hearing and the best interest of the children, even where the parties have reached an agreement on such issues.

Id. at *7. Simply put, "parents cannot bind the court with an agreement affecting the best interest of their children," so the trial court was not bound to approve the mediated parenting plan. See Fletcher v. Fletcher, No. M2010-01777-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4447903, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Sept. 26, 2011) (citing Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d at 272).

In this case, however, the trial court considered the children's best interest and ultimately did adopt and approve the parties' Mediated Agreement.¹ In the final decree ofdivorce, the trial court stated that it "ratified and affirmed" the Mediated Agreement. The decree further provided that the trial court approved Mother's proposed parenting plan, but that Mother's proposed parenting plan "shall comply with the Mediated Agreement unless the parties agree otherwise by signing a different plan." Therefore, we will consider Father's arguments regarding the alleged inconsistencies between the Mediated Agreement and the parenting plan in order to determine whether they "comply," as the trial court intended.²

a. Father's Weeknight Parenting Time

The Mediated Agreement provided that Father would have parenting time with the children "during Summer of 2011 from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday one weekend a month when Father is off work and one day every week from 9:00 a.m. until the following day at 9:00 a.m. In the event that Mother is working, Father shall keep the minor children until 6:00 p.m." The parenting plan that was ultimately adopted by the trial court provided that Father would have parenting time "from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. one weekend per month . . . . In addition, father shall have parenting time with their children one night each week." Father's brief on appeal presents the following argument challenging the trial court's decision with regard to weeknight parenting time, which we quote in full:

In the Permanent Parenting Plan attached to the Final Decree of Divorce the mother did not include specific times within the day to day schedule but only states "Father shall have parenting time with the children one night each week." In the testimony at trial Mother acknowledged her Proposed Parenting Plan which was approved by the Trial Court differed

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