Vinyard v. Wilson
| Citation | 311 F.3d 1340 |
| Decision Date | 14 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-10898.,02-10898. |
| Parties | Terri VINYARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steve WILSON, Sheriff of Walker County, Georgia, Patrick Stanfield, Defendants-Appellees, Steve Dixson, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William Franklin Mitchell, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Aaron Jarret Aberson, Glenn S. Bass, Goldner, Sommers, Scrudder & Bass, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Terri Vinyard appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment (1) to defendant Officer Patrick Stanfield individually on her § 1983 claim for excessive force during her arrest, and (2) to defendant Sheriff Steve Wilson individually on her fraud and § 1983 claims for failure to investigate her excessive force complaint. After review and oral argument, we conclude Sheriff Wilson was entitled to qualified immunity but Officer Stanfield was not. Thus, we affirm as to Sheriff Wilson but reverse as to Officer Stanfield.
On or about October 4, 1998, Plaintiff Vinyard and some friends had a cookout at the home of Vinyard's boyfriend in Lafayette, Georgia. Vinyard admits to consuming four to five beers over the course of the evening. She contends, however, that she was "not highly intoxicated," but only "somewhat tipsy" or "had a buzz." At some point during the evening, Officer Stanfield stopped by the party. Stanfield was a deputy in the Road Patrol Division of the Sheriff's Office of Walker County, Georgia.
Stanfield advised Vinyard and her friends that James Steele, a neighbor, had complained that Vinyard's son had provided beer to Steele's son. Stanfield instructed Vinyard and her friends not to provide alcohol to Steele's son. Stanfield also told Vinyard to stay away from Steele.
After Stanfield left, Vinyard and two friends walked down the street to retrieve Vinyard's son, who was visiting another neighbor. After picking up her son, Vinyard and her friends began walking back to the party. On the way back to the party, the group passed Steele's residence. Vinyard contends that Steele made a comment to her and that the two engaged in a verbal confrontation. Vinyard, her son, and her friends then returned to the party.
Subsequently, Stanfield stopped again at the party and asked Vinyard if she had been to Steele's residence. Vinyard attempted to explain that she had passed Steele's residence when she went to retrieve her son. Stanfield, who appeared agitated and angry, responded that he "didn't want to hear it" and informed Vinyard that she was under arrest for going to Steele's residence.
Vinyard again attempted to explain why she had passed Steele's residence. Officer Stanfield then told Vinyard to get up from her chair. Before she could rise, however, he grabbed her arm and jerked her out of her chair. Officer Stanfield then handcuffed Vinyard behind her back, placed her in the back seat of his patrol car, and began to drive her to the Walker County jail. Stanfield's patrol car had a glass or plexiglass screen between the front and back seat.1
During the drive to the jail, Officer Stanfield and Vinyard exchanged verbal insults while he drove and she remained handcuffed in the back seat. According to Vinyard, Stanfield eventually informed her that Stanfield then told Vinyard that she did not deserve her children, and that Stanfield also was "not worried about [Vinyard's] fucking bastard son."2 After these remarks, Vinyard cursed Stanfield. Vinyard admits that she "got mad" and "started screaming" at Stanfield.
About one-fourth or one-half mile from the party and during Vinyard's verbal tirade, Officer Stanfield pulled his patrol car to the side of the dark, secluded road, stopped the car, got out, and stepped back to Vinyard's door and opened the door. Vinyard was scared and "did not know what Stanfield was going to do." Vinyard saw that Stanfield had something in his hand when he opened the door, and she ducked to the right. According to Vinyard, Stanfield grabbed Vinyard's arm, bruising her arm and breast. He then apparently let go of her arm, pulled Vinyard's head back by her hair and sprayed her in the face with two to three bursts of pepper spray.3 At all times Vinyard remained in the back seat and handcuffed behind her back with her feet on the floor-board. Vinyard is five foot, three inches tall and weighed 130 pounds; Stanfield is more than six feet tall and weighed more than 200 pounds. There were no witnesses to the incident.4
After bruising and pepper spraying Vinyard, Officer Stanfield then resumed driving Vinyard to the jail. According to Vinyard, the trip to the jail from the party was approximately four miles. When Vinyard complained that she could not breathe, Stanfield said, "I hope you die, because when I get you to the jail I'm going to beat the shit out of you and there's nothing you can do." When Stanfield and Vinyard arrived at the jail, Stanfield dragged Vinyard inside, either by her shirt, her arm or her hair. Two female officers escorted Vinyard to the shower to wash off the pepper spray. Vinyard admits that she may have become "a little rowdy" with the two female officers during the booking process, but she contends that she did not "fight" with them. Vinyard claims that after the arrest she missed a couple of days of work, and that the cause of her illness may have been the pepper spray.
Officer Stanfield ultimately charged Vinyard with disorderly conduct and obstructing a law enforcement officer. Vinyard subsequently pled guilty to the obstruction charge as part of a plea agreement that disposed of the criminal charges against her.
The day after her arrest, Vinyard was released from jail on bond. The following day, she and her employer went to the Sheriff's Office of Walker County and filed a misconduct complaint against Officer Stanfield. Defendant Sheriff Wilson is the Sheriff of Walker County, Georgia. At the Sheriff's Office, Officer Steve Dixson met with Vinyard and accepted her complaint. According to Vinyard, she was led to believe that an investigation would ensue. Vinyard thus took no further action against Stanfield, either by filing criminal charges or by filing a civil action.
In late January 1999, a news reporter contacted Vinyard and her mother, Linda Sue Collier, because he had received a call from a deputy or deputies at the jail who were upset about the physical and verbal abuse that Vinyard received the night of her arrest. Later, the reporter conducted an on-camera interview with Vinyard. After that interview, the reporter informed Vinyard that there was no formal complaint on file concerning her arrest. The news reporter also contacted Sheriff Wilson, who then called Vinyard and questioned her about the circumstances surrounding the filing of her first complaint. In his affidavit, Sheriff Wilson stated that he was unaware that Vinyard had filed a complaint in October 1998 or that an investigation had taken place.
On or about February 8, 1999, Vinyard went to see Sheriff Wilson personally and provided him with a copy of her previously filed complaint. Major Wayne Sturdivan, also of the Sheriff's Office, was present at the meeting. Soon after the meeting with Vinyard, Sheriff Wilson informed Vinyard by telephone that her original complaint had been located, and that Major Sturdivan had reviewed the original complaint back in October 1998 and had concluded that the facts supported Stanfield's actions. Nevertheless, Sheriff Wilson instructed Major Sturdivan to conduct another investigation into the allegations in Vinyard's complaint.
In February 1999, Major Sturdivan conducted the second investigation of Vinyard's allegations, interviewing several witnesses. At the conclusion of Major Sturdivan's investigation, Sheriff Wilson reviewed the investigation file compiled by Major Sturdivan and the policies and procedures of his office regarding the proper use of pepper spray.5 After this review, Sheriff Wilson concluded that Officer Stanfield had not engaged in any wrongdoing with respect to Vinyard's arrest, including his use of pepper spray.
In October 2000, Vinyard filed this lawsuit alleging: (1) a § 1983 claim against Officer Stanfield individually for excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a § 1983 due process claim against Sheriff Wilson individually for failure to investigate her complaint; and (3) a fraud claim under Georgia law against Sheriff Wilson individually.6
Following discovery, defendants Sheriff Wilson and Officer Stanfield filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court granted. As to Stanfield, the district court concluded that even if Vinyard's allegations stated a § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Stanfield was entitled to qualified immunity. As to Sheriff Wilson, the court concluded (1) that Vinyard had not shown a due process violation under § 1983 for failure to investigate her complaint, but that Sheriff Wilson would be entitled to qualified immunity in any event; and (2) that Vinyard was unable to show that Sheriff Wilson made false representations as to the investigation or that she suffered any damage as a result of any failure to investigate her complaint. Vinyard timely appeals.7
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), Vinyard sued Officer Stanfield individually for use of excessive force in violation of her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct "does not...
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