VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. v. Gile, Record No. 990247.

• Decision Date: 14 January 2000
• Docket Number: Record No. 990247.
• Citation: 259 Va. 164,524 S.E.2d 642
• Parties: VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Charmayne GILE, an infant, et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

524 S.E.2d 642

259 Va. 164

VIRGINIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Charmayne GILE, an infant, et al.

Record No. 990247.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

January 14, 2000.

Thomas C. Givens, Jr. (Gillespie, Hart, Altizer & Whitesell, on briefs), Tazewell, for appellant.

(Albert M. Orgain, IV; Henry C. Spalding, II; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, Richmond, on brief), for appellee Norman Russell Carter, Jr.

Terrence Shea Cook (Bolling, Hearl & Cook, on brief), Richlands, for appellees Charmayne Gile, an infant, Tina Gile, a/k/a Tyna Beavers and Teena Louise Beavers, and Danny D. Beavers, Jr.

No brief or argument on behalf of Allstate Insurance Company.

Present: All the Justices.

KEENAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that a child who lives with her mother and her mother's male companion is the "foster child" of that companion and, thus, is an "insured" person as those terms are defined in his motor vehicle liability insurance policy,

The facts in the case are undisputed. In August 1996, 16-year-old Charmayne Gile was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by Maria Lynn Dye. The accident occurred when Dye's vehicle collided with a vehicle owned and operated by Norman Russell Carter, Jr. Both vehicles were insured under motor vehicle liability insurance policies, and the terms of those policies are not at issue in this appeal.

At the time of the accident, Charmayne lived with her mother, Tyna Gile, and Tyna Gile's companion, Danny J. Beavers, Jr., the named insured of the policy at issue in this case. Tyna Gile and Beavers were not married to each other but had cohabited since 1989.

Charmayne was not related to Beavers by blood or marriage and had not been designated as Beavers' ward or foster child in any legal proceeding. However, Beavers had "acted like Charmayne's father" since Beavers and Tyna Gile began living together, and he "look[ed] upon [her] as though she were his own daughter." Charmayne, in turn, looked to Beavers exclusively for "paternal love, affection, care, comfort, education, emotion[al] support, and guidance."

At the time of the accident, Beavers owned an automobile that was insured under a policy (the policy) issued by the Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau). The uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) motorist provisions of the policy define "PERSONS INSURED," among other things, as "the named insured and, while residents of the same household, the spouse of the named insured, and relatives, wards or foster children of either." The medical expense benefits provisions of the policy provide coverage that includes "the named insured or any relative who sustains bodily injury while occupying a motor vehicle." The policy defines "relative" as "a person related to the named insured by blood, marriage or adoption, including wards or foster children, who is a resident of the same household as the named insured." The policy does not define the term "foster children."

Charmayne, by her next friend, filed a motion for judgment against Carter alleging that she sustained personal injuries as a result of his negligence. A copy of the motion for judgment was served on Farm Bureau pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206. Farm Bureau then filed a motion for declaratory judgment against Charmayne, Tyna Gile, and Beavers (collectively, Gile), seeking a declaration that Charmayne is not an insured person under the UM/UIM and medical expense benefits provisions of Beavers' policy.

After considering the parties' admissions and stipulated testimony, the trial court ruled that Charmayne is Beavers'"foster child" and, thus, is an insured person under both policy provisions. The court concluded:

[I]t appears for all intents and purposes, that Danny Beavers considered Charmayne Gile as his foster child, as that term is understood using a broad definition; that the subject policy of insurance did not provide a definition limiting, qualifying, or excluding the use of a broad definition; [and] that a foster child should be afforded the same consideration as a child by blood or marriage .

On appeal, Farm Bureau argues that Charmayne was not Beavers'"foster child" under the policy provisions because that term has a clear meaning governed by statute. Farm Bureau contends that a "foster child" is a child who has been placed in a foster home by the Department of Social Services or a court under a foster care plan, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-281 and -282, when the child's natural parents are unable to care for her. Farm Bureau asserts that the trial court's application of a more general definition of the term is erroneous because this application potentially permits an extension of coverage to any child residing in the home of a named insured.

In response, Gile argues that the term "foster child" is ambiguous and, therefore, must be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of providing coverage. Gile contends that under common usage, the term "foster child" means "a child raised by someone who is not [her] natural or adoptive parents," and that this general definition should be applied to afford her coverage under the Farm Bureau policy. Since Charmayne is being raised by Beavers, who is not her natural or adoptive parent, Gile asserts that Charmayne is Beavers'"foster child" within the meaning of this policy term.¹ We disagree with Gile's arguments.

The language at issue under the UM/UIM provisions of the Farm Bureau policy is taken directly from Code § 38.2-2206(B), which provides in relevant part: "[i]nsured ... means the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of the named insured, and relatives, wards or foster children of either." Since this language was drafted by the legislature, rather than by the insurer, the construction of this particular policy language presents a question of statutory interpretation. Although we will construe the statutory language liberally to accomplish the intended purpose of the uninsured motorist statute, we nevertheless are bound by the plain meaning of the words that the legislature chose in drafting the statute...