Virginian Ry. Co. v. SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 40, ETC.
Decision Date | 18 June 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 4005.,4005. |
Parties | VIRGINIAN RY. CO. v. SYSTEM FEDERATION NO. 40, RAILWAY EMPLOYEES DEPARTMENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
James Piper, of Baltimore, Md., and H. T. Hall, of Roanoke, Va. (W. H. T. Loyall, of Norfolk, Va., and John C. Donnally, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Clarence M. Mulholland, of Toledo, Ohio, and S. M. Brandt, of Norfolk, Va. (Frank L. Mulholland, of Toledo, Ohio, on the brief), for appellees.
Leo F. Tierney, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen. (John Dickinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Wendell Berge, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and Robert L. Stern, Sp. Atty., of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States, amicus curiæ.
On August 20, 1934, an election was conducted by the National Mediation Board among the employees of the mechanical department of the Virginian Railway to select a representative of these employees to act for them under the Railway Labor Act, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. At this election, System Federation No. 40 of the American Federation of Labor was the choice of the majority of those eligible to vote in four crafts, viz., the sheet metal workers, the machinists, the electrical workers and the boilermakers. It received a majority of the votes cast by the blacksmiths and by the carmen and coach cleaners, but not a majority of the eligible votes of those crafts. In the case of the blacksmiths, a majority of those eligible to vote participated in the election, but in the case of the carmen and coach cleaners this was not true. The Mediation Board, on September 13, 1934, certified under the statute that System Federation No. 40 had been chosen by all six of the crafts named to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining; and upon the refusal of the railway company to treat with or recognize the Federation as the representative of the employees in question, this suit was instituted, asking that the railway be required to treat with it as the representative of the employees and be enjoined from attempting to influence or interfere with the employees thereafter in their choice of representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The judge below heard the case fully and carefully and correctly analyzed the evidence in his opinion reported in (D.C.) 11 F.Supp. 621, to which we refer as a sufficient statement of the facts. In holding the Federation entitled to the relief prayed, except as to the right to represent the carmen and coach cleaners, he made the following findings as to the determinative facts, viz.: (1) That the defendant is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce; (2) that System Federation No. 40 is the duly authorized representative of the mechanical department employees of the defendant, except the carmen and coach cleaners, having been designated as such by the National Mediation Board, on September 13, 1934, in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act; (3) that the defendant, in violation of the provisions of that act, has failed to treat with System 40 as representative of employees who have chosen it as their representative; and (4) that, by means of personal interviews, posted bulletins, and the circulation of a pamphlet calling attention to the disadvantages of membership in a standard labor organization and the advantages of a company union, the defendant has sought to influence the employees of its mechanical department "against any participation in or association with a standard labor organization and thereby to maintain a mere nominal association or union supported wholly by the defendant", and that the defendant since the certification by the Mediation Board has "continued and doth now continue * * * to endeavor to deprive its mechanical department employees of any and all right to independent representation for the purpose of collective bargaining."
A careful study of the evidence convinces us that these findings are amply supported. It has been argued with much earnestness that the influence forbidden by the act is something in the nature of undue influence, reliance being placed upon expressions contained in the opinion in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, at page 568, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034, and that the circulation of the pamphlet, referred to as the Sasser statement, should not be condemned as constituting the exercise of such undue influence. It must be remembered in this connection, however, that any sort of influence exerted by an employer upon an employee, dependent upon his employment for means of livelihood, may very easily become undue, in that it will coerce the employee's will in favor of what the employer desires against his better judgment as to what is really in the best interest of himself and his fellow employees. One purpose of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, was to insure free and untrammeled action on the part of the employees in the choice of their representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining; and it is a violation of the terms, as well as of the spirit of the act, for the employer to address arguments to the employee couched in such terms, or presented in such manner, as to lead the employee to fear that he may suffer from the action of the employer if he does not follow the wishes of the latter in making his choice of representatives. Collective bargaining would be a delusion and a snare if the employer were permitted to exert pressure of any sort upon the employee with respect to a matter of this kind.
It is not necessary to decide here whether the Sasser statement, standing alone, would be sufficient to convict the railway of attempting to interfere with and unduly influence its employees in their choice of representatives, as we think that the other evidence, when considered in connection with that statement, is sufficient to support the finding of the trial judge in that regard. There can be no question, therefore, but that, granting the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, the portion of the decree enjoining the railway from interfering with the employees in the choice of representatives should be affirmed, unless there is something in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S.C.A. § 101 et seq., which forbids the granting of such an injunction. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S. S. Clerks, supra. We agree with the trial judge that that act does not forbid the granting of an injunction under the circumstances here appearing. As was well said by him:
This leaves four questions for our consideration: (1) Whether the mandatory feature of the decree is warranted by the statute and not forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act; (2) whether the statute is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce (Const. art. 1, § 8); (3) whether the statute is constitutional when tested by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (4) whether a majority of the votes cast in a craft election is sufficient for the choice of a representative for collective bargaining, or whether a majority of those eligible to vote is required. We shall consider these in the order named.
It is argued that the Railway Labor Act does not require agreement upon the terms of any contract, and that in providing merely that the carrier shall treat with the representatives it does not prescribe any duty enforceable in the...
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