Vitasek v. Commonwealth

• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MARLA GRAFF DECKER, CHIEF JUDGE
• Docket Number: 1992-24-1
• Decision Date: 13 January 2026
• Citation: Vitasek v. Commonwealth, 1992-24-1 (Va. App. Jan 13, 2026)
• Parties: DEAN ANTON VITASEK v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

1

DEAN ANTON VITASEK v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

No. 1992-24-1

Court of Appeals of Virginia

January 13, 2026

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH Salvatore R Iaquinto, Judge

Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Allison M. Mentch, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judge AtLee and Senior Judge Humphreys Argued at Williamsburg, Virginia

OPINION

MARLA GRAFF DECKER, CHIEF JUDGE

Dean Anton Vitasek was convicted of eight counts of assault and battery of a law enforcement officer, two counts of obstruction of justice by threat or force, and one count each of malicious wounding of a law enforcement officer, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, depriving a law enforcement officer of a firearm or stun gun, possession of methamphetamine, and use of identification documents or information to avoid arrest.^[1] On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support three of those convictions-the malicious wounding, felon-in-possession, and deprivation-of-a-weapon offenses. He also suggests, in light of his mitigating evidence, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an active sentence of fourteen years. We hold the trial court did not err and affirm its judgment.

Background ^[2]

On May 6, 2023, Officer Patrick Matthews of the Virginia Beach Police Department was on routine patrol when he noticed a car with no front license plate. The driver pulled into a convenience store and went inside. After a brief investigation, Matthews determined that the driver, Vitasek, had an active warrant for his arrest.

Officer Matthews and Sergeant Joshua Massel, readily identifiable as law enforcement, approached Vitasek inside the store. Using Vitasek's first name, Officer Matthews said, "Hey, Dean, you have a warrant." Vitasek responded, "Get away[,] . . . I have a gun," and reached for his waistband. The officers tried to "maintain control of" Vitasek's arms to prevent him from drawing a weapon. As the men struggled, Vitasek continued to say he had a gun, and the officers repeatedly told him to "stop resisting" and "get on the . . . ground."

The physical confrontation lasted for about five minutes. During that time, Vitasek briefly disabled Sergeant Massel with a kick to the groin and tried to use a pencil from the nearby lottery kiosk to stab him. Vitasek also reached for Officer Matthews's knife in his tactical vest. He bit Matthews's hand through his glove, breaking the skin. He also bit Matthews's forehead, causing a bruise.

As the fight continued, Matthews and Massel hit Vitasek in the face to prevent him from grabbing Matthews's knife. The blows "opened up a cut" on Vitasek's forehead that bled profusely. He was "enrage[d]" and seemed "abnormally strong," "almost . . . inhuman." Matthews observed that "nothing" he or Sergeant Massel did "seemed to have any effect on" Vitasek. He hit the two officers in the face several times and spit both saliva and blood in their faces.

Before their backup officers arrived, Sergeant Massel fired a taser cartridge at Vitasek, and although the probes connected, Vitasek was immobilized for only a few seconds. Massel fired his second taser cartridge, but Vitasek was still reaching toward his waistband and started to remove the taser probes from his body. Officer Matthews then fired his own taser at Vitasek twice. Once again, the probes connected but "seemed to have no effect on him," and he pulled them out while trying to get up off the floor.

Because both officers had used all of their taser cartridges, Matthews put his knee on Vitasek's midsection and moved the taser toward his abdomen. Matthews's intent was to "initiate a drive stun," which involved placing the taser in direct contact to deliver a focused electrical shock. In response, Vitasek started fighting Matthews over the taser, putting both of his hands on it and trying to wrest it away. According to Matthews, Vitasek "pretty much gained control of [the] taser" and "manipulated it back towards" the officer. Matthews still had one hand on the weapon, but despite his efforts to prevent Vitasek from "turning it," Vitasek did so and tased Matthews in the arm. Matthews then regained control of the taser and threw it toward the back of the store to "get it out of the fight."

Three more officers arrived and intervened in the struggle. Vitasek, who stated during later questioning that he "hate[d]" the police, was "still actively resisting," "fighting" and trying to bite the officers. He never became fully "compliant" but was ultimately subdued and handcuffed. When officers moved Vitasek's hands and handcuffs from the front to the rear of his body, he again fought and tried to bite them.

After the arrest, police found methamphetamine, a smoking device, and syringes in Vitasek's car. They did not find a firearm, and at that point, Vitasek admitted he was unarmed.^[3]

Officer Matthews and Sergeant Massel were transported to the hospital as a precaution. In addition to the broken skin from the bite on his hand and bruising from the bite on his forehead, Matthews had lacerations on his nose and ear and bruising on his knees. His injuries took about two weeks to heal.

In a series of video and audio phone conversations from jail, Vitasek admitted he was "fucked up" when he fought with the officers and described the altercation as "like a . . . six-round UFC fight." He also admitted taking an officer's stun gun away from him.

At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Vitasek opted not to present evidence and made a motion to strike. The trial court denied the motion in part and convicted him of the instant offenses.^[4] After the preparation of a presentence report and a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to sixty-five years and thirty-six months, with fifty-one years and thirty-six months suspended, leaving him with an active sentence of fourteen years.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Vitasek challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support three of his convictions. The standard of review for sufficiency challenges is well established. "When an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, its role is a limited one." Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024). "[T]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is [']plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.[']" Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 304 Va. 92, 100 (2025) (first alteration in original) (quoting Garrick, 303 Va. at 182). And a determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is a finding of fact also entitled to deference on appeal under the plainly wrong standard. Washington v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.App. 606, 615-16 (2022). Appellate review "does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, as the fact finder itself 'is entitled to consider all of the evidence, without distinction, in reaching its determination.'" Garrick, 303 Va. at 183 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463 (2017)).

The question on appeal is "whether any rational trier of fact could have found the [challenged] elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Cappe v. Commonwealth, 304 Va. 86, 87 (2025) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)); see Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 97 (2023). "If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 513, 521 (2020) (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)); see Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 796, 806 (2022) (observing that this same standard applies to video evidence).

Of course, any related questions of law are reviewed de novo. See Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 496 (2015). Such questions include what elements are required to prove the underlying crime, the meaning of statutory terms defining those elements, and the application of a particular penalty. See id.; Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 764 (2007); Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73 Va.App. 70, 77 (2021).

A. Malicious Wounding of a Law Enforcement Officer

Vitasek challenges the proof that he intended to permanently maim, disfigure, disable, or kill Officer Matthews when he bit him, as required to support his conviction for maliciously wounding a law enforcement officer.

Whether a defendant acted with the statutorily required intent is "purely a question of fact." Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 331 (2018) (per curiam). Under the applicable "standard of review, a 'factfinder may "draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts,"' and those inferences cannot be upended on appeal unless [the appellate court] deem[s] them 'so attenuated that they "push 'into the realm of non sequitur.'"'" Id. at 332 (quoting Bowman, 290 Va. at 500). Put more simply, the appellate court must defer to all "[r]easonable inferences drawn by the factfinder" unless they are plainly wrong. Wilkerson, 304 Va. at 100.

Where the "mens rea of [a] crime is an 'intent to maim disfigure, disable[,] or kill,'" the Commonwealth "need prove only one intent to convict." Perkins, 295 Va. at 328-29 (quoting 7 Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia Practice Series: Criminal Offenses and Defenses 47-48 (2017-2018 ed.)). And proof that a "permanent condition" actually resulted is not required. Id. at 330 (quoting 7 Bacigal, supra, at 48). In other words, a...