Vitek v. Finch, 14479.
Citation | 438 F.2d 1157 |
Decision Date | 02 March 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 14479.,14479. |
Parties | William B. VITEK, Appellant, v. Robert H. FINCH, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Richard C. Murray, Lutherville, Md., for appellant.
Leonard M. Linton, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. (George Beall, U. S. Atty., on brief) for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF,* WINTER and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.
This action was brought in the District Court by the appellant, William B. Vitek, against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S.C.A. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary denying the appellant's application for disability insurance benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423. The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
The standard for judicial review in cases of this nature is prescribed in § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), as follows: "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, * * *." Accordingly, the traditional function of the courts in these cases is not to try them de novo, or resolve mere conflicts in the evidence. However, the courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the Secretary's findings, and that his conclusion is rational. Bridges v. Gardner, 368 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1966); Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964); see also Philley v. Cohen, 293 F.Supp. 1068, 1072 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Baker v. Celebrezze, 241 F.Supp. 971, 973 (E.D. S.C. 1965). Where the Secretary's determination is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the Secretary's decision "with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S. C.A. § 405(g); Thomas v. Celebrezze, supra; Branch v. Finch, 313 F.Supp. 337, 342 (D. Kan. 1970); Forbes v. Finch, 307 F.Supp. 1000, 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Hinson v. Celebrezze, 249 F.Supp. 232, 234 (D. S.C. 1966).
In October 1966 the claimant filed his present application for benefits, alleging that primarily because of a heart condition he was unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment.1 To establish his right to disability benefits, Vitek had the burden of demonstrating that he was disabled prior to September 30, 1962.2
In 1920 Vitek, then only 14 years of age, entered the employ of the Daily Record, a legal publication in Baltimore, as an office boy. He attended night school to complete his high school education and to study accounting. He served the Daily Record steadily as an accountant for more than thirty years until May 1957, when, at the age of 51, he suffered a nervous breakdown. Shortly thereafter he underwent an appendectomy and a cholecystectomy. After leaving the hospital, Vitek did not return to work at the Daily Record, and remained unemployed for two years. Dr. Samuel Morrison, his personal physician, advised Vitek to try some light work, and so, in the spring of 1959, he agreed to set up a bookkeeping system for his nephew who was opening a drug store. For three months he assisted his nephew, but on July 17, 1959, he collapsed at the drug store. At the hospital the diagnosis was "acute myocardial infarction" (a heart attack). Vitek remained in the hospital for two months, and since his discharge he has not been employed. In 1966, Vitek was again hospitalized for angina pectoris.
In the application submitted to the Social Security Administration, Vitek complained that he was unable to work because slight exertion caused shortness of breath and pain in his left arm. He also stated that climbing stairs caused him difficulty, and that if he tried to bend over, he fell. The claimant reported that he could water his lawn, and occasionally tried to mow the lawn, but that such exertion could not be tolerated more than fifteen minutes and he required several hours bed rest to recover from that effort.
The medical testimony submitted to the Secretary consisted of two reports, one by Dr. Morrison, who treated Vitek for more than fifteen years, and the other by Dr. Sidney Scherlis, a cardiologist, who examined Vitek at the request of the Social Security Administration in November 1962. Dr. Morrison stated that in the period from July 1959 to September 30, 1962, Vitek "could sit at a desk, etc., but not for a full-time work period," and that he had cautioned Vitek about climbing stairs. Dr. Morrison characterized Vitek's condition as of October 1, 1962, as "static," adding that no improvement was expected, that his condition shows "post coronary status" and that "any untoward walking, etc., results in dyspnea and/or angina." Additional reports from Dr. Morrison indicated that Vitek had recurrent attacks of precordial pain and had developed a "degree of myocardial insufficiency which keeps him symptomatic on the least exertion." Dr. Morrison's judgment, based on his patient's "coronary" and "emotional" status, was that Vitek was unable to resume his bookkeeping job or assume any other job.
Dr. Scherlis, the Government's doctor, found that Vitek had some limitation of movement in the right upper extremity, and suggested that an orthopedic examination might be proper. Using a classification system developed by the American Heart Association, he rated Vitek's cardiac condition as I-II-B. According to a questionnaire used by the Social Security Administration, a Class I cardiac condition refers to an impairment from 0 to 15 percent of the whole man and Class II an impairment from 20 to 40 percent of the whole man. Significantly, Dr. Scherlis expressed no opinion as to the claimant's capacity to work.
The Hearing Examiner decided in favor of the applicant, basing his judgment on Dr. Morrison's evaluation and his own assessment of Vitek's condition:
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...SECURITY ISSUES ANNOTATED A-72 Vitale v. Apfel , 49 F. Supp.2d 137 (E.D.N.Y May 13, 1999), §§ 202.5, 209.2, 1203.14 Vitek v. Finch , 438 F.2d 1157, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1971), § 101.4 Vogel v. Sullivan , 735 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1990), § 1803.1 Vogt v. Chater , 958 F. Supp. 537 ......
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