Viveros v. Donahoe

Decision Date30 November 2012
Docket NumberCASE NO. CV 10-08593 MMM (Ex)
PartiesELIA VIVEROS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK R. DONAHOE, POSTMASTER GENERAL, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of California
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS LAW

This action was tried to a jury from May 29 to June 1, 2012. On June 1, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Elia Viveros on her claim for pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII, as modified by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).1 The jury awarded Viveros $225,000 in damages for emotional distress.2 On June 12, 2012, the parties stipulated 18, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation and a joint statement regarding damages, setting forth the areas on which the parties agreed and the areas of disagreement concerning what further damageswere appropriate.3 The parties subsequently filed a stipulation stating that there were no issues of fact remaining in the matter, and that the remaining issues regarding damages could be resolved on the basis of the papers provided.4 Having considered the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the record in this action, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Background

1. At trial, Viveros argued that she was wrongfully terminated because she experienced a high-risk pregnancy that required her to be on bedrest and not to work.5 The parties agree that Viveros became a full-time, career employee of the United States Postal Service in September 2000.6 At the time of her termination, Viveros worked as a "T-6 Carrier Technician" at the Sherman Oaks Post Office.7

2. Viveros was pregnant from late-2008 to mid-2009, and gave birth to her fourth child on May 25, 2012.8

B. Back Pay and Benefits

3. The parties disagree regarding the amount of back pay to which Viveros is entitled. Viveros contends that back pay should be calculated from May 1, 2009 to the date judgment is entered, while Donahoe contends that back pay should be calculated from May 1, 2009 to May 1, 2012, to account for the time that Viveros would have taken after she gave birth on May 25, 2009.9 They agree, however, that Viveros' gross salary between May 1, 2009 and May 1, 2012 is $159,700.10 They also agree that Viveros' gross salary between May 2, 2012 and July 18, 2012 (the date the stipulation was filed) is $11,400, based on a salary of $150 per day.11

4. The parties agree that, in addition to receiving her gross pay, Viveros would have worked 5.47 overtime hours per pay period between May 1, 2009 and the date of entry of judgment.12 They agree that her overtime pay would have been $3,787 from May 1, 2009 to May 1, 2010, $3,894 from May 1, 2010 to May 1, 2011, and $4,001 from May 1, 2011 to May 1, 2012.13 The parties also agree that Viveros' overtime from May 1, 2012 to the date the court enters judgment would have been $790.14

5. Prior to her termination, Viveros was enrolled in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program; the bi-weekly health insurance premiums were jointly paid by Viveros and the Postal Service.15 Viveros was enrolled in the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Service BenefitsPlan under its "Standard Family" option.16 The parties agree that, between May 1, 2009 and July 18, 2012, Viveros' fringe benefit award, if any, should be predicated on a biweekly premium of $603.17 During that time, the Postal Service would have paid 76% of the bi-weekly premium ($460) and Viveros would have paid the remaining 24% ($143).18 The parties agree that, if the court finds premiums recoverable between May 1, 2009 and July 18, 2012, the portion of the monthly health insurance premiums that the Postal Service would have paid on Viveros' behalf would total $38,640.19

6. Similarly, with regard to Viveros' life insurance benefits, the parties agree that, prior to her termination, Viveros was enrolled in the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance ("FEGLI") Program; her life insurance premiums were paid by the Postal Service.20 Viveros was enrolled in the "S0 - Basic + 4x Option B" option.21 The parties agree that, between May 1, 2009 and July 18, 2012, Viveros' fringe benefit award, if any, should be predicated on an annual contribution by the Postal Service of $72 ($6 per month).22 Between May 1, 2009 and July 18, 2012, the portion of monthly FEGLI premiums that the Postal Service would have paid on Viveros' behalf would have totaled $235.23

7. Viveros contends that she is entitled to recover an hourly wage for the sick hours that she was unable to take, and that alternatively, she should be awarded a credit for the 332 sickleave hours she would have accrued had she remained employed by the Postal Service.24 The parties agree that Viveros would have accrued 312 sick leave hours between May 1, 2009 and May 1, 2012,25 and 20 hours between May 2, 2012 and July 18, 2012.26 The Postal Service does not "cash out" sick leave upon an employees' separation from the agency.27

8. Viveros had accrued 171.42 hours of sick leave at the end of 2006, 7.46 hours at the end of 2007, and 16 hours at the end of 2008.28

9. Viveros contends that she is entitled to recover an hourly wage for annual leave hours she was unable to take.29 Alternatively, she asserts that she is entitled to a credit for the annual leave hours she would have accrued.30 The parties agree that Viveros would have accrued 160 hours of annual leave from May 1, 2009 to May 1, 2010, 160 hours from May 1, 2010 to May 1, 2011, 160 hours from May 1, 2011 to May 1, 2012, and 30 hours from May 2, 2011 to July 18, 2012.31 Donahoe concedes that the Postal Service does "cash out" annual leave upon an employee's separation from the agency.32

10. Viveros had 16.07 hours of annual leave left at the end of 2006, -18 hours at the end of2007, and 0 hours at the end of 2008.33

11. Federal employees who are covered under the Federal Employees' Retirement System Retirement System ("FERS") have the opportunity to participate in the Thrift Savings Plan ("TSP"), a retirement savings plan similar to 401(k) plans available to private sector employees.34 The parties agree that Viveros is covered under FERS and was a TSP participant prior to her termination.35 The parties stipulate that, prior to Viveros' termination, she was contributing 10% of her pre-tax salary to her TSP account every two-week pay period.36 The parties agree that, as a FERS employee, Viveros could have received matching contributions from the Postal Service to her TSP account every pay period depending on the amount of gross pay she contributed. The first 3% would have been matched dollar-for-dollar by the Postal Service. The next 2% would have been matched at 50 cents on the dollar. Under this formula, when an employee contributes 5% of her basic pay to a TSP account, the Postal Service makes a contribution equal to 4% of the employee's pay.37 The parties stipulate that as a vested FERS employee, Viveros would have been entitled to an additional automatic 1% gross pay contribution from the Postal Service every pay period whether or not she contributed personally to her TSP account.38 Thus, taking into account the automatic 1% contribution, the Postal Service would have matched Viveros' TSP contributions dollar-for-dollar for the first 5% of her contribution.39 Viveros contends that she is entitled to recover this 5% matchingcontributions to her TSP accounts from the Postal Service. Donahoe contends that Viveros is entitled to recover only the automatic 1% gross pay contribution the Postal Service would have made because she was a vested FERS employee.40 Despite these differing positions, the parties agree that the amount the court awards, if any, should be predicated on the salary amounts set forth above.41 The parties also agree that the amount the court awards, if any, as contributions to Viveros' TSP account should be paid by the Postal Service directly to the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, which administers the TSP.42

12. The parties disagree as to whether the Postal Service is entitled to a back pay offset because Viveros was eligible for unemployment benefits.43 They stipulate, however, that given her salary prior to her termination, Viveros was eligible to receive weekly unemployment benefits of $450.44 They also agree that, between May 1, 2009 and May 1, 2012, Viveros was eligible to receive 99 weeks of unemployment benefits, totaling approximately $39,600.45

13. As a federal entity, the Postal Service fully funds its former employees' unemployment claims through the federal government's Unemployment Compensation Fund for Federal Employees program.46 Though individual states administer the benefits by issuing former federal employees' benefit checks, the funds disbursed by the states are reimbursed by thePostal Service through state contracts with the U.S. Department of Labor.47 These facts are undisputed by Viveros.48

14. The parties agree that Viveros is entitled to appropriate pre-judgment interest.49

C. Front Pay/Reinstatement

15. The parties agree that, in lieu of awarding front pay, Viveros should be reinstated as a Postal Service employee.50 They also agree that she should be reinstated as a T-6 Carrier Technician. If such position is no longer available, the parties stipulate that Viveros should be reinstated to a position of a similar nature at the same salary as a T-6 Carrier Technician.51 They also agree that she should be reinstated to the duty installation where she was working before her termination. If no positions are available at that location, the parties stipulate that Viveros should be reinstated to a duty installation at or near her prior installation.52 They further agree that in addition to reinstatement, Viveros will resume her status as an eligible employee in the reimbursable uniform program and will be entitled to all uniform allowances payable pursuant to the collective...

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