Vizard Inv. Co. v. Mobile Fish & Oyster Co.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1916
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 954
• Citation: 73 So. 328,197 Ala. 625
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: VIZARD INV. CO. v. MOBILE FISH & OYSTER CO.

73 So. 328

197 Ala. 625

VIZARD INV. CO. v. MOBILE FISH & OYSTER CO.

1 Div. 954

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 21, 1916

Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Mobile County; Saffold Berney Judge.

Assumpsit by the Vizard Investment Company against the Mobile Fish &amp Oyster Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Yerger & Foster, of Mobile, for appellant.

Ervin &amp McAleer, of Mobile, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

This appeal involves a construction of section 4273 of the Code reading as follows:

"Damages for Detainer after Expiration of Term of Lease.--Any person who, having entered into the possession of lands and tenements under a contract of lease, forcibly or unlawfully retains the possession thereof after the expiration of his term, or refuses to surrender the same on the written demand of the lessor, his agent or attorney, or legal representative, is liable for double the amount of the annual rent agreed to be paid under such contract, and for such other special damages as may be thereby sustained by the party thus unlawfully kept out of possession, to be recovered as now provided by law in actions of unlawful detainer, or by an action at law for damages."

This statute contains apparently two alternatives upon the happening of which the lessee becomes liable for double the amount of the agreed annual rent, to wit: One, the forcible or unlawful retention of possession by the lessee after the expiration of his term; the other, the refusal to surrender the same on the written demand of the lessor, his agent or attorney, or legal representative. The second alternative is not in express terms limited to happen after the expiration of the lessee's term, and yet it cannot be for a moment doubted that the expiration of the term in some sort is necessary to liability in either case.

To be noted in the next place is the fact that the double liability is limited to arise after the expiration of the lessee's term and not otherwise. That the statute is highly penal and is to be construed against liability so far as that may be done consonantly with the language used will not be questioned. In Lykes v. Schwarz, 91 Ala. 461, 8 So. 71, Stone, C.J., said:

"In Ullman v. Herzberg, at the present term [91 Ala. 458, 8 So. 408], we had occasion to interpret section 3391 of the Code of 1886 [[section 4273 of the present Code]. Our interpretation of that statute was, that when a tenant, who

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